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The decade o f the 1920s conjures up a unique cluster o f im­
ages. A few broad, organizing conceptions dominate as people and 
events are filtered through a screen of memories, books, and films. 
This was the era o f “normalcy,” prohibition, “ flaming youth,” and 
the “golden glow.” George Babbitt, Al Capone, and Charles Lind­
bergh reign unchallenged in America’s mind. Looking backward, 
Middletown seemed to have revolved around the acquisition of au­
tomobiles, radios, and washing machines. Beneath this perceptual 
facade, poorly focused, were ordinary Americans who lived and 
worked much the same as their ancestors and descendents. The 
needs, fears, and resulting activities of some of these men and 
women are the subjects o f this study. Alongside the flapper and the 
bootlegger stands the hooded figure of the Ku Klux Klansman as 
one of the enduring symbols o f the decade.
The images o f these Klanspeople are faint, for the Invisible 
Empire o f the twenties has been lost in the wakes o f America’s two 
more publicized Klan movements. The first Ku Klux Klan arose in 
the South during Reconstruction in response to black emancipation 
and Republican rule. The third movement appeared after World 
War II and grew steadily in reaction to black assaults upon the racial 
status quo. Only recently has it moved north and west to capitalize 
upon racial tensions. Violence was characteristic of both movements.
Unlike these Klans, the movement in the 1920s was not pri­
marily southern, terrorist, or white supremacist. Preaching a multi­
faceted program based upon “ 100 Per Cent Americanism” and mili­
tant Protestantism, it enlisted recruits in every section of the nation. 
Perhaps as many as six million Americans heeded its call to resist 
Catholics, Jews, lawbreakers, blacks, and immigrants. Despite the 
size and importance of this social movement, its character remains 
shrouded in mystery. Sixty years after its rise to power students of 
the Ku Klux Klan are still uncertain o f its causes, rural or urban na­
ture, and the socioeconomic disposition o f the membership.
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Building upon the work o f sociologist John Mecklin, scholars 
such as David Chalmers, John Higham, Richard Hofstadter, William 
Leuchtenburg, and Seymour Lipset maintain that the Klan was in 
message and membership a movement o f the villages and small 
towns o f America. Kleagles recruited those Protestants who had had 
the least contact with minority groups and who were left relatively 
unscathed by the emergent mass-production and mass-consump- 
tion urban culture. The Klansman living in a large city was merely a 
recent migrant who “brought his heartland values and his defen­
siveness with him to the metropolis.” 1 Urban knights were thus a 
small minority and for all practical purposes indistinguishable from 
their country cousins.2
Local community tensions did not generate the Klan move­
ment. The Klan was, instead, the last major gasp o f small-town Prot­
estant America in its struggle with the city for cultural hegemony. 
The Klan impulse, wrote Hofstadter,
was not usually a response to direct personal relationship or 
face to face competition, but rather the result o f a growing 
sense that the code by which rural and small-town Anglo-Saxon 
America had lived was being ignored and even flouted in the 
wicked cities, and especially by the “aliens,” and that the old re­
ligion and morality were being snickered at by the intellectuals. 
The city had at last eclipsed the country in population and 
above all as the imaginative center o f American life. . . .  It was 
the city that enjoyed the best o f the new prosperity, the coun­
tryside that lagged behind. But above all, the city was the home 
o f liquor and bootleggers, jazz and Sunday golf, wild parties 
and divorce. The magazines and newspapers, the movies and 
radio, brought tidings o f all this to the countryside and even 
lured children o f the old American stock away from the old 
ways.3
Spurred on by the “unspent hatreds” o f World War I, the economic 
depression o f the early 1920s, and the appearance o f a new wave o f 
foreign immigration, the alienated residents o f provincial America 
rallied around the Klan. Klan-inspired racial and religious bigotry 
was, therefore, a manifestation o f a deeper malaise. The real threats 
were “ status deprivation,” cultural change, and the “acids o f moder­
nity.” The struggle against these unassailable specters was, from its 
inception, hopeless and irrational, a futile attempt to resurrect a 
past golden age.4
Historian Charles Alexander, while accepting the Klan as a
vm
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small-town phenomenon, has looked beyond such abstractions for 
an explanation o f the order’s rise. His survey o f Klan activity in 
Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Arkansas revealed that people 
joined because o f widespread, flagrant violations o f the law and 
moral codes. Against a backdrop o f war-related tensions and eco­
nomic hard times, southwestern Klansmen organized “ to preserve 
premarital chastity, marital fidelity, and respect for parental author­
ity; to compel obedience o f the state and national prohibition laws; 
to fight the postwar crime wave; to rid state and local governments 
o f dishonest politicians.” 5
In 1967 Kenneth Jackson issued a provocative challenge to the 
traditional interpretation. On the basis o f detailed research in nine 
cities, Jackson contended not only that kleagles were extremely suc­
cessful in recruiting members in large cities but that the Klan was 
predominantly an urban movement. The Klan’s urban complexion 
was reflected in the lifestyle o f the leadership, the source and char­
acter o f the order’s newspapers, the places o f residence o f the ma­
jority o f members, and the influence o f city klaverns on state and 
national decision-making.
Jackson’s analysis o f urban Klans indicated that the hooded 
order’s attention was focused upon the immediate concern o f neigh­
borhood transition. Klan growth was a result o f the clash between 
the diverse racial, ethnic, and religious groups which formed the ur­
ban environment. Conflict was particularly acute in the “zone o f 
emergence,” the strip o f land that separated the crowded ghettoes 
from the more affluent, outer residential districts. To this zone, peo­
pled primarily with poorer, white, working-class families, turned 
those who sought to escape their ghetto existence. It was among the 
white, Protestant residents o f this area that the Klan found its great­
est success. “ Not a reaction against the rise o f the city to dominance 
in American life, the Invisible Empire was rather a reaction against 
the aspirations o f certain elements within the city.” 6
The socioeconomic identities o f the members o f the Invisible 
Empire have also long been subjects for speculation and debate. Al­
most every scholar agrees with John Mecklin’s observation that the 
vast majority o f Klansmen were “conventional Americans, thor­
oughly human, kind fathers and husbands, hospitable to the strang­
er. . . .” 7 Consensus, however, ends at this point. Mecklin, an early 
and perceptive student o f the organization, considered the Klan a 
movement o f the “well-meaning but more or less ignorant and un­
thinking middle class. . . .” It included “ in many instances the best 
citizens o f the community.” 8 Journalist Stanley Frost, also writing in
IX
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the 1920s, agreed: “They are usually the good, solid, middle-class 
citizens, the ‘backbone o f the nation.” '9 In Oklahoma town merchants 
and professionals, rather than poor farmers and tenants, joined 
the secret society. Seventy-three Pennsylvania Exalted Cyclopses 
swore under oath in 1927 that the rank and file was “gleaned from 
the average walk o f life and such as composes our Protestant church­
es, our lodges, commercial clubs, and other civic organizations.” 10 
The Klan’s economic and social respectability has been chal­
lenged with qualitative and quantitative data that portray the orga­
nization's membership as overwhelmingly lower middle and work­
ing class. While it is conceded that prominent men did appear in the 
klavern hall initially, they were among the first to defect when the 
Klan swelled with members o f lesser rank. Allegedly, Klan violence 
and blatant appeals to prejudice repelled the better educated pro­
fessionals and businessmen. Seymour Lipset argued, “As a simplistic 
moralistic bigoted movement, the Klan increasingly became a move­
ment o f the less educated and less privileged strata. . . 11 Frederick 
Lewis Allen dismissed the Klan as a product of “the less educated 
and less disciplined elements o f the white Protestant community.” 12 
Norman Weaver’s investigation o f the Detroit Klan revealed that 
southern whites, threatened by black competition for jobs and 
homes, were especially receptive to the secret society’s appeals. The 
Middletown Klan, remarked Helen and Robert Lynd, was “largely a 
working class movement.” 13 Jackson’s study of urban Klans strongly 
bolsters the marginal man—low status argument. His analysis of 
Klan membership lists and chapter records from six cities and towns 
demonstrated that “white collar workers in general provided a sub­
stantial minority o f Klan membership and included primarily strug­
gling independent businessmen, advertising dentists, lawyers, and 
chiropractors, ambitious and unprincipled politicians and salesmen, 
and poorly paid clerks. The greatest source of Klan support came 
from rank and file nonunion, blue-collar employees of large busi­
nesses and factories. Miserably paid, they rarely boasted o f as much 
as a high school education and more commonly possessed only a 
grammar or ‘free school’ background” 14 Proponents o f the low- 
status view augment their position by quoting the Klan’s second Im­
perial Wizard, Hiram Wesley Evans: “We are a movement of the 
plain people, very weak in the matter o f culture, intellectual support 
and trained leadership. . . . This is undoubtedly a weakness. It lays 
us open to the charge of being ‘hicks’ and ‘rubes’ and ‘drivers of sec­
ond-hand Fords.’ We admit it.” 15 Contemporary opponents o f the 
Klan agreed, although their motives may be more suspect. Also of-
x
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fered in evidence is the frequently quoted observer of an Indiana 
Klan demonstration: “You think the influential men belong here? 
Then look at their shoes when they march in parade. The sheet 
doesn’t cover the shoes.” 16
A third hypothesis, rarely made explicit, has also been sug­
gested. A few students o f the Klan have interpreted the organi­
zation’s heterogeneous program as a mirror o f the membership. 
Charles Alexander, while accepting the middle-class explanation, 
concluded from his study o f the Klans in the Southwest that “ex­
cluding non-whites and non-Protestants, the membership o f the 
order was remarkably cross-sectional. Bankers, businessmen, sales­
men, physicians, lawyers, ministers, and even university professors 
donned their white robes and hoods alongside mechanics, farmers, 
and day laborers. The Klan had something for them all.” 17
Colorado provides an unparalleled opportunity to probe these 
conflicting conceptions o f the hooded society. The Klan arrived in 
Colorado in 1921 and in less than three years converted the state 
into one o f the Invisible Empire’s strongest realms. Centered in 
Denver, it enlisted more than 35,000 men and played a powerful 
role in the election o f Colorado’s local and state leaders. No other 
state in the Rocky Mountain West compared in membership or polit­
ical clout. Only in Indiana did Klan political influence rival that at­
tained in the Centennial state.
Because the Klan keyed its message to the local environment, 
five cities and towns differing in population, economic base, sizes 
and types o f minority groups, and regional location were selected 
for analysis. The communities are: Denver, the state’s largest city 
and political, financial, and cultural capital; Pueblo, Colorado’s sec­
ond largest city and chief industrial center; Colorado Springs, rank­
ing third in population and a tourist and health resort; Canon City, 
a remote, small town of 4,500 people; and Grand Junction, with a 
population of 8,700 persons, the largest town on the Western Slope. 
Case studies o f this disparate group of communities allow an exam­
ination of the effects of variations in geographic, social, economic, 
and demographic features upon the Klan experience. Such in­
depth investigations are also necessary to isolate the variables which 
influenced Klan mobilization success or failure. The patterns which 
emerge from the local Colorado environments may provide added 
insights not only into the Ku Klux Klan but into other American so­
cial movements as well.
Also important in the selection process was the availability in
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each community o f complete files o f newspapers, the chief source of 
qualitative data about the Klan. Reliance upon newspapers does not 
preclude critical evaluation o f their contents. News reports were 
used carefully and always measured against other materials to assess 
their accuracy. Moreover, the style, extent o f event coverage, and in­
terpretation o f newspaper reports and editorials molded readers’ 
perceptions and attitudes. The newspaper, as a daily opinion-shaper 
and chronicle, is thus an indispensable historical tool for discerning 
a past actor’s reality.
Interviews gave life to the material gleaned from the news­
papers. The Klan’s meaning was largely distilled from the experi­
ences o f the actors. Their perceptions o f events, reasons for joining 
the Klan or opposing it, and characterizations o f the leading person­
alities o f the period crucially shaped every part o f this study. O f the 
twenty-seven interviews or telephone conversations conducted, ten 
were held with Klansmen, thirteen with anti-Klansmen, and four 
with neutral observers. Names were collected from Klan and anti- 
Klan membership lists, newspaper accounts, and personal referrals. 
It was necessary to use an alias when contacting Klansmen because 
the initial effort under my real name produced no interviews. An 
additional nine interviews conducted by James Davis were also em­
ployed extensively.
Qualitative materials have been the basis but also the limitation 
o f almost every investigation o f the Ku Klux Klan. In Colorado, 
however, statistical analysis is possible because membership lists are 
among the artifacts which have survived the Klan days. The names 
o f Denver, Pueblo, and Colorado Springs Klan leaders are known. 
Rosters o f the Klan’s rank and file in Denver and Canon City are 
available. Information about each Klansman was extracted from city 
directories, vital statistics records, obituaries, military records, and 
membership lists o f various fraternal, civic, and social groups. These 
sources furnished data about age, place o f birth, military service, 
membership in other organizations, place and length of residence, 
occupation, pattern o f mobility, and marital status. Determining 
which men joined not only will produce a sharper social and eco­
nomic picture o f the Klan but will enhance our understanding of 
why they joined.
A conscious effort was made to avoid the methodological weak­
nesses which have hindered studies o f the Klan. Unlike other re­
search concerning membership, data were collected upon a variety 
o f socioeconomic variables. Occupational status, while critical, was 
only one fragment o f information that composed a variegated por­
xii
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trait. Moreover, gross classification o f occupational information into 
monolithic white- and blue-collar categories was rejected for more 
precise and intellectually defensible divisions. Random sampling 
furnished groups o f Klansmen representative o f the larger klavern 
membership. Comparisons to the general population were also un­
dertaken to more fully explore the nature o f the Klan movement. 
Since the rosters were dated, the character o f Klan membership 
could be determined over time.
This book also addresses two largely unexplored areas in Klan 
research. The Klan was in Colorado, as in many other states, a polit­
ical machine. Colorado Klan organization, tactics, and strategy are 
extensively probed on the local and state levels to explain the secret 
society’s success in outmaneuvering the established political parties. 
Also, as elsewhere in the United States, Colorado Klansmen could 
not translate their electoral victories into legislative accomplish­
ments and governmental policy. The reasons for their failure are 
pertinent not only to the Klan but to other liberal and conservative 
movements which throughout American history have wrestled with 
the power structure for their version o f reform.
Finally, this study attempts to treat the Ku Klux Klan as a social 
movement rather than a pathological assembly of deviant men and 
women. The Klan, like all social movements, was a formally orga­
nized .group which consciously sought to promote or resist change 
through collective action. Social movements are rooted not in indi­
vidual psychosis or breakdowns in society’s integrating mechanisms 
but instead in confrontations with real community problems. Like 
members o f conventional groups, social movement participants are 
rational individuals who seek to mobilize resources (people, money, 
and votes) to influence the decisions which affect their lives>The Ku 
Klux Klan thus differs in appeals but not in tasks from the American 
Association o f University Professors, the Sierra Club, and more “ac­
ceptable” movements such as the National Organization for Women. 
An assumption o f continuity and similarity furnishes more explana­
tory power than a division between normal and abnormal. Obvi­
ously an assumption o f rationality and normality does not imply ap­
proval o f aims. Only when the conceptual blinders are shed can such 
an organization as the Ku Klux Klan be understood.18
The combination of the techniques o f oral history and collective 
biography in a case-study framework will furnish some answers to 
the questions that have perplexed students o f the Klan: Why did 
men join the Ku Klux Klan? Did the Klan’s voice seem especially 
reasonable to “marginal men” or those threatened by neighborhood
xm
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change? What community variables affected joining motivation? 
Did urban klaverns recruit more men and exercise greater influence 
than the small-town organizations? Were Klansmen drawn from a 
particular socioeconomic segment or did they represent a cross-sec­
tion o f their society? Has the unifying symbol o f the burning cross 
disguised an organization composed o f heterogeneous factions?
Many have extended their time and energy, both academic and 
personal. Eleanor M. Gehres, Opal Harber, Frederick J .  Yonce, 
Hazel Lundberg, Young Chin Mueller, Lynn Taylor, Bonnie Hard­
wick, Carolyn Koplin, Augie Mastrogiuseppe, and especially Kay 
Kane, Douglas Tabor, Sandra Turner, and Kay Wilcox of the West­
ern History Department, Denver Public Library, gave to the limit 
professionally and emotionally. The Denver Klan’s official member­
ship lists were opened only because o f the ceaseless efforts of Dr. 
Maxine Benson o f the State Historical Society of Colorado. The 
company o f Ellen Wagner and Christopher Compton, also of the 
Historical Society, made the wading through piles o f microfilm 
almost pleasurable. Stan Suski’s patience with my demands was 
greatly appreciated. Donald Davids, director o f the Colorado Bu­
reau o f Vital Statistics, cut endless red tape to allow access to crucial 
records. David Hardy and Eleanor Drake generously permitted me 
to search their family collections for Klan material. In the field 
counseling from Professor Steven Leonard o f Metropolitan State 
College suggested new areas o f research and kept me from numer­
ous historical embarrassments.
Academically I am most heavily indebted to Professor Charles 
P. Cell o f the University o f Wisconsin’s Department of Sociology. 
With give and take on the farm and in the classroom, he sharpened 
my perception o f the Klan as a social movement. Professor John M. 
Cooper, Jr., o f Wisconsin’s Department o f History supervised this 
study, giving me what I most needed: independence, reassurance, 
and perceptive criticism. Professors Daniel Rogers and Diane Lind- 
strom, also o f the Department o f History, cogently convinced me of 
weaknesses in the early drafts, many o f which I hope have been 
remedied. I have also benefited from the incisive yet gently ten­
dered suggestions o f Professors Crandall Shifflett of Virginia Poly­
technic Institute and David R. Johnson of the University of Texas at 
San Antonio. Lois Corcoran and Rose Pantoja expeditiously, accu­
rately, and patiently typed the manuscript over and over again.
My deepest appreciation goes to the Goldberg clan. My mother, 
father, brothers, and sister could not have been more supportive.
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chief officer o f the local Klan chapter, elected 
by the membership for a one-year term.
the Klan leader of the state, appointed by the 
Imperial Wizard.
chief administrator o f a province.
highest officer o f the Colorado Women’s Klan.
national leader o f the Ku Klux Klan.
lofty name for the Knights o f the Ku Klux 
Klan Inc., its bureaucracy and territory.
treasurer o f the local Klan chapter, elected by 
the membership for a one-year term.
vice-president o f the local Klan chapter, 
elected by the membership for a one-year 
term.
inner guard o f the local Klan chapter, elected 
by the membership for a one-year term.




outer guard o f the local Klan chapter, elected 
by the membership for a one-year term.
investigator o f the local Klan chapter, elected 
by the membership for a one-year term.








annual state convention o f delegates from 
chartered Klans.
chaplain o f the local Klan chapter, elected by 
the membership for a one-year term.
kleagle recruiting or organizing activities.
keeper o f the fiery cross o f the local Klan 
chapter, elected by the membership for a one- 
year term. ■­
administrative unit encompassing a group of 
counties. The Colorado realm was divided into 
two provinces until 1925 and three thereafter.
a subdivision o f the Invisible Empire 
equivalent to a state.
T H E  K L U X I N G  OF C O L O R A D O
CHAPTER ONE
Our organization is more than a secret order; it is a movement; in a
sense, it is a Crusade.
Paul S. E theridge
Im perial Klonsel, Knights o f the Ku Klux Klan
I
In the spring of 19 21 William Joseph Simmons stepped from a 
train at Denver’s Union Station. Dressed in a well-fitted suit embla­
zoned with lodge buttons, this tall, heavy-set man attracted little 
notice from the crowd. Simmons, the son o f a country physician, 
had been born on a farm near Harpersville, Alabama, in 1880. 
Groping for success, he had been in turn a medical student, Meth­
odist circuit rider, history instructor, and fraternal organizer. Sim­
mons had only recently found his true calling; on the train platform 
stood the self-proclaimed Imperial Wizard o f the Knights o f the Ku 
Klux Klan.1
Peering through his pince-nez glasses, Simmons immediately 
spotted his old friend Leo Kennedy. Kennedy, a Mason and former 
member o f the anti-Catholic American Protective Association, hur­
riedly greeted Simmons and quickly led him from the station. Within 
minutes they were driving up Seventeenth Street to the Brown Pal­
ace Hotel. Speed was essential, for the Imperial Wizard was travel­
ing incognito and word o f his mission was not to appear in the Den­
ver newspapers.2
Once in traffic the two men relaxed. Perhaps, after a few pleas­
antries, Simmons recounted the events that had propelled him to 
national power. Six years earlier on Thanksgiving night, 19 15 , Sim-
3
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mons had persuaded fifteen men to follow him to the summit o f 
Stone Mountain in Georgia. There they had knelt before an Ameri­
can flag and burning cross and dedicated themselves to the resur­
rection o f the Invisible Empire. Simmons traced his inspiration to a 
vision he had experienced upon his return from the Spanish-Ameri­
can War. One summer evening he had stood transfixed as the clouds 
in the sky were molded into charging white-robed horsemen. When 
the images had faded, Simmons had fallen to his knees and prom­
ised to convert this divine sign into reality.3
The resurrected Ku Klux Klan had not been an immediate suc­
cess; by 1920 the Invisible Empire consisted o f only 4,000 or 5,000 
knights in scattered Klans throughout Georgia and Alabama. To re­
vitalize his dream, Simmons had enlisted the aid o f two shrewd pro­
moters, Edward Young Clarke and Mrs. Elizabeth Tyler o f the At­
lanta-based Southern Publicity Association. On June 7, 1920, they 
had signed a contract which stipulated that the association, hence­
forth the Propagation Department o f the Invisible Empire, would 
promote and enlarge the Klan in exchange for eight o f the ten-dol­
lar membership fee or klectoken. Clarke and Tyler had hired an ini­
tial sales force o f more than 200 kleagles or recruiters and directed 
them to exploit any issue or prejudice that would lure men to the 
movement. The kleagles worked on a commission basis and thus 
sought to secure as many new members as they possibly could. The 
sharp rise in the secret order’s membership reflected their success, 
for between June, 1920, and October, 19 2 1, 85,000 men joined the 
Klan. Simmons later said o f Clarke: “ He put an army of 1,100  paid 
organizers in the field; hundreds o f smart men working for him. 
They made things hum all over America.” 4
The Imperial Wizard was correct; America hummed. In Texas, 
the Invisible Empire’s first self-governing realm, 200,000 men 
joined, and a Klansman was elected to the U.S. Senate. Oregon fur­
nished the cause with 50,000 o f its citizens, and Klan-endorsed can­
didates won the governor’s chair and a Senate seat. The Klan en­
rolled 50,000 Protestants in California and helped capture the 
statehouse for its approved candidate. The Midwest proved quite 
fertile to Klanism. Twenty local chapters were organized for Chi­
cago’s 50,000 Klansmen, while 35,000 wore the hood and robe 
in Detroit. The Klan citadel o f Indiana sheltered 240,000 knights 
who succeeded in electing two governors and two U.S. senators. In 
neighboring Ohio 400,000 men paid their klectokens for the priv­
ilege o f entering the Invisible Empire. New York added 200,000 
more Klansmen, and Pennsylvania 225,000. The Klan found recep­
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tive Protestants even in New England: Connecticut provided 20,000 
men, and Maine 15,000. At its height in 1924 the national move­
ment drew an estimated three to six million men from throughout 
the United States.5
Simmons’s visit to Denver was part o f the initial kluxing surge. 
At the request o f Leo Kennedy, the Imperial Wizard had scheduled 
a private meeting at the Brown Palace Hotel to explain the Klan 
message. The select group o f prominent Denverites had already 
formed when Simmons and Kennedy arrived. With the fervor o f a 
revivalist Simmons extolled the virtues and principles o f his new se­
cret society. The men were convinced and he promptly initiated 
them. The Ku Klux Klan had arrived in Colorado and would soon 
spread to every county in the state.6
II
By train and automobile the kleagles scoured Colorado for pro­
spective Klansmen. Topographical variations in the new sales terri­
tory influenced their efforts. Extending east from the foothills o f the 
Rocky Mountains to the Nebraska and Kansas borders lies a dry, 
treeless prairie dotted by farms and small, isolated towns. Devoted 
to agriculture, its people grew wheat, hay, and corn and raised beef 
and dairy cattle. The Klan fastened itself to the region, meeting only 
scattered resistance. In 1920 four o f every ten Coloradans lived 
within a thirty-mile-wide strip running along the base of the foot­
hills and extending the length o f the state. Crowded into this band 
were the state’s steel mills, stockyards, meat and canning plants, 
wholesale and retail houses, and major financial institutions.) The 
foothill belt contained all o f Colorado’s cities with a population of
8,000 or more except Grand Junction. The urban centers were also 
physically close: Denver, the state capital, was only thirty miles from 
Boulder, fifty-four miles from Greeley, seventy miles from Colorado 
Springs, and 1 12  miles from Pueblo. Because they were so easily 
accessible, the people o f this section experienced the most inten­
sive Klan recruiting campaigns. The Rocky Mountains to the west 
slowed Klan expansion; klaverns or local chapters were not orga­
nized in western Colorado until 1924, several years after similar 
efforts on the Eastern Slope. Although the Klan eventually gained 
a foothold among its high mesas and narrow, fertile valleys, the 
sparsely populated Western Slope proved most resistant to the Klan 
onslaught.7
The kleagles lectured Coloradans about all aspects o f the Klan
5

creed. They portrayed the Klan as a patriotic organization dedi­
cated to the preservation of America’s institutions and ideals. The 
white-robed “guardians o f liberty” stood for fair elections, honest 
leaders, efficient government, and against unresponsive and cor­
rupt politicians. Disclaiming partisanship, the Klan infiltrated both 
major parties and elected scores o f candidates pledged to its version 
o f “ 100 Per Cent Americanism.” For those demanding political re­
form, the Klan provided a convenient vehicle for mobilization.
Clothed in the symbols o f Protestantism, the Klan posed as the 
savior o f the “old time religion.” The Klan promised to unite Protes­
tants in a crusade that would combat the teaching o f evolution and 
restore faith in God, the Bible, and the Christian fundamentals. Vig­
orous recruitment o f ministers and generous donations to Protes­
tant churches enhanced the organization’s aura o f religiosity. Ac­
cording to Denver Klan leader the Reverend William Oeschger, 
“The Klan includes more Protestants who are without the church 
than it does those that are within it. It is gathering together the great 
arm o f Protestantism into a single unit and counteracting the great 
tragedy o f Protestantism, namely its division.” 8
Law and order was another Klan rallying cry. In the postwar 
years a sharp upsurge in crime jolted Coloradans. Although crimes 
of all types increased, most attention was focused upon the break­
down o f the prohibition laws. Moonshiners and bootleggers infested 
the state, pursuing their trade with impunity as local authorities 
seemed unwilling or unable to stamp them out. Citizens o f such 
towns as Aguilar, DeBeque, Meeker, and Oak Creek were frustrated 
by inadequate law enforcement and beseeched Governor William 
Sweet for state assistance. In 1924 the Denver Post echoed the senti­
ments o f many o f its readers: “ When the law is not enforced, when it 
is disregarded spurned and trampled upon . . . when its lack o f en­
forcement and its delay fail to protect the citizen and taxpayer, he 
has but one immediate recourse, and that is to enforce the laws him­
self. . . . The zero point is just about reached in this community.” 9 
The traditional code o f morality was also under attack. Chal­
lenges to the moral status quo had appeared before World War I 
and rapidly multiplied in the twenties. Evidence o f moral laxity was 
everywhere; new styles o f clothing, “suggestive” dances, and “ tit­
illating” motion pictures were symbols o f the decay sapping Amer­
ica’s strength. Klansmen vowed not only to banish loose women, 
roadhouses, and “joyriding neckers and petters” but also to restore 
decency and decorum to their communities. The Klan’s main thrust 
was directed at the bootlegger, for it was his product that fueled the
The Kluxing of Colorado
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revolution in manners and morals. The Boulder klavern’s Rocky 
Mountain American proclaimed: “The Klan is the answer, not the 
question. The question is the immorality that permeated the gov­
ernment, the churches, the social and domestic life in the post-war 
saturnalia.” 10
The Klan’s message o f Americanism and law enforcement was 
not aimed at all o f Colorado’s 939,629 people; only white, native- 
born, Protestant males, eighteen years or older, were accepted for 
mobilization. Later the eligible population was expanded, and klea­
gles organized women and foreign-born Protestants. Completely ex­
cluded from “ 100 Per Cent Americanism” and depicted as threats to 
the nation’s ideals and values were the Catholics, Jews, immigrants, 
and blacks.
The Catholics bore the brunt o f Klan hatred. Unlike Jews and 
blacks, who were concentrated in Denver, Colorado’s 125,757 Ro­
man Catholics resided in all sections o f the state. Preying upon long­
time suspicions and prejudices, the Klan excoriated Catholics for 
their devotion to a false church that preached a “paganistic creed 
with its worship o f the Virgin Mary, dead saints, images, bones, and 
other relics.” 11 More important, kleagles accused Catholics o f plac­
ing their allegiance to the pope above their loyalty to the United 
States. Catholics, said Klan sympathizer Bishop Alma White o f the 
Pillar o f Fire Church, were completely subservient and unable to re­
sist the Vatican’s commands. “ Moral obligations,” she argued, “have 
little to do with holding a Romanist in subjection to his superiors; it 
is the fear that the secrets o f the confessional might be used against 
him so as to effect his undoing in this world and that which is to 
come.” 12 Ever ready to expand his power, the pope had long coveted 
Protestant America. With Catholic votes he would elect men to do 
his bidding. Once the Catholic hierarchy had gained control o f the 
government, it would end the separation o f church and state, ban 
the Bible, and destroy the freedoms of press, speech, and religion. 
In the 1920s, the Klan contended, the papists were within reach of 
their goals. A Klansman speaking at a naturalization ceremony near 
Trinidad, Colorado, warned that 85 percent o f federal government 
employees, 60 percent o f elected and appointed office holders, and 
the entire Secret Service were Catholic.13
Rumors o f papal intrigue spread all over the state. In the Fort 
Collins area Klansmen circulated faked copies o f the oath o f the 
Knights o f Columbus, “ the oily knights o f the Pope’s militia.” In Las 
Animas County suspicious citizens tore the corners off dollar bills to 
destroy the fabled papal mark. Klan newspapers were filled with ar-
8
The Kluxing o f Colorado
tides detailing priestly corruption and convent horrors. Colorado 
kleagles demanded that the high walls surrounding monasteries, 
convents, and parish schools be demolished and probes launched 
into the activities o f these institutions. In the Denver klavern leaders 
reported that Colorado Catholics had kidnapped and mutilated sev­
eral Protestant men. Boulder’s Klan newspaper admonished Protes­
tants to awaken to the danger. Fifteen million American Catholics 
are “organizing and working as a unit through many societies that 
are military and are drilled and equipped with arms and ammuni­
tion. . . .” Their aim was obvious: “ to make America Catholic.” 14
Klansmen also believed that Rome was anxious to subvert the 
public school system. Regarded as essential to the creation o f a loyal 
and intelligent citizenry, the schools were conspicuous targets. The 
papists sought to ruin the quality of education and romanize the stu­
dents by placing Catholics on the school boards and employing them 
as teachers. “ In the event o f their success, there would be a string of 
beads around every Protestant child’s neck and a Roman Catholic 
catechism in its hand. ‘Hail Mary, Mother o f God,’ would be on every 
child’s lips, and the idolatrous worship o f dead saints a part of the 
daily program.” 15 The menace, cautioned the Klan, was neither 
imaginary nor distant. A Klan recruiter claimed that Roman Cath­
olic catechisms had been seized in a public school in southern Colo­
rado* In 1924 eight public schools were burned; authorities placed 
the blame on an insane arsonist. For those taught to mistrust Catho­
lics, the Klan’s explanation was more convincing.16
Klan-inspired anti-Semitism was largely unknown outside of 
Denver, the center o f Colorado’s Jewish population. In the Klan 
litany the Jews were “Jonah[s] on the Ship o f State,” incapable of as­
similation because o f their conceited religious and social exclusive­
ness. Scornful of American traditions, the Jews planned to under­
mine Protestant hegemony. Well-organized “ Hebrew syndicates” 
forced Protestants from positions o f economic power. The motion 
picture industry, an early victim of the Jews, produced debauching 
films, commercialized the Sabbath, and lured Protestants from their 
churches. The Klan also accused Jews o f leading the movement 
branding the Bible a sectarian book and excluding it from the public 
schools. Protestant women were warned of the lascivious Jews, “men 
in whose characters animal passions and greed are the predominant 
forces.” 17 Some even believed that Jewish financiers were aiding the 
pope in his scheme to disinherit Protestant Americans.18
Immigrants presented another challenge to pure Americanism, 
a Trojan horse filled with inferior and disloyal men and women.
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The Klan maintained that the newcomers from southern and east­
ern Europe cared little for justice and liberty, wanting only to siphon 
America’s wealth and return to lives o f ease in their homelands. 
Clustered in urban foreign quarters, immune to the forces o f Am er­
icanization, the immigrants perpetuated their alien lifestyles and re­
tained their allegiance to the Old World. Underlying much o f the 
Klan’s animosity were the religious affiliations o f the immigrants. 
Because they were predominantly Catholics and Jews, immigrants 
were merely pawns in the anti-Protestant conspiracy.19
White supremacy had always been a major tenet in the Klan’s 
creed, and Denver kleagles in particular called men to its defense. 
The Klan, despite Colorado’s small black population, exploited 
white fears o f a “new Negro” emerging from World War I demand­
ing political, economic, and social equality. Kleagles even spread 
rumors that black leaders advocated intermarriage with whites. Cit­
ing the Bible and “scientific evidence” o f black mental inferiority in­
herited from “savage ancestors, o f jungle environment,” Klansmen 
stood ready to battle for the purity o f the white race. “ W e  m u s t  k e e p  
t h i s  a  w h i t e  m a n ’s c o u n t r y ,”  decreed a Klan recruiting ad. “Every 
effort to wrest from the White Man the control o f this country must 
be resisted. No person o f the White Race can submit . . . without 
shame.” 20
Klansmen, lamented Dr. John Galen Locke, the Grand Dragon 
o f the Colorado Ku Klux Klan, were “now outlaws in the land of 
their forefathers, forced to conceal their activities and identity with 
a mask o f secrecy.” Their birthright was imperiled by the Jew, “his 
eye . . .  on the prosperity, w’ealth and resources o f America” ; the Ro­
man Catholic, who would “have us bow down our heads in worship 
to his foreign pope” ; and the Negro, “the untaught would fain be 
teacher.” “Should they gain sway,” he continued, “no more would 
America be a land o f liberty, justice and equality, a land o f resources 
and opportunity, the land o f virgin hope, the land o f the ideals and 
aspirations o f our forefathers. All this would these people sacrifice 
on the altar o f self.” 21
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In each Colorado town and city Klan mobilization success was a 
function o f the interplay o f four variables: local tensions, govern­
mental responsiveness, the quality o f the klavern’s leadership, and 
community perceptions. The Klan offered a program of Ameri­
canism, militant Protestantism, fraternity, order, religious intol­
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erance, and racial purity— a plethora o f causes from which to choose. 
But such abstract causes could not generate membership unless they 
drew meaning from the immediate environment. Real community 
tensions and neighborhood conflicts rather than distant dangers 
produced Klan growth. “You cannot put into effect any set pro­
gram,” insisted Hiram Wesley Evans, the Klan’s second Imperial 
Wizard, “ for there are different needs in the various localities. Your 
program must embrace the needs o f the people it must serve.” 22 The 
Klan’s rationale was dependent upon the actions of the local au­
thorities. Their level o f responsiveness to Protestant demands to 
curb law violators, resist minorities, or initiate civic reforms critically 
affected the Klan’s ability to justify its existence. The men responsi­
ble for molding the Klan’s message to the needs o f the targeted com­
munities were the klavern leaders. Attuned to local conditions, these 
ambitious, dynamic men made Klan explanations and solutions con­
vincing for the discontented. Often well-known community figures, 
they exploited their reputations and positions of trust to attract re­
cruits. The community’s perception of the Ku Klux Klan also influ­
enced a potential Klansman’s membership decision. The reaction of 
the local opinion-making public— clergymen, newspaper editors, 
and other respected individuals— helped shape the Klan’s defini­
tion. A negative, positive, or neutral response colored residents’ at­
titudes and hence a Klan leader’s organizing effectiveness. The 
actions o f government officials or the arguments of an anti-Klan 
movement could likewise sway the public mind. Joining the Pueblo 
Klan could thus mean something far different from membership in 
either the Canon City or Denver organizations. Loose coordination 
and a lack o f strong central direction from the state hierarchy mili­
tated against outside interference in variable interplay. Community 
isolation makes a case-study approach necessary to discern the dif­
fering experiences of Colorado Klansmen.
The Colorado realm, moreover, was for several years immune 
from national Klan meddling. Distance, the personality of the Grand 
Dragon, and the distraction o f the Imperial Wizard enabled Colo­
rado Klansmen to develop their organizations with a minimum of 
interference. As a Grand Junction Klansman recalls: “We knew that 
the Klan came out o f Georgia, but we never thought o f them being 
at the head o f it. We knew that they probably got a dollar out of our 
ten dollars to join . . . and we knew our bed sheets came from there. 
As far as we were concerned Denver was the head of it ” 2:*
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CHAPTER TWO
Well, this might not be as funny as it looks. There is something big 
starting in this country, and we’ve just joined it.
A nonym ous D enver K lansm an ;
The Denver klavern was the largest and most influential mem­
ber o f the Colorado Klan federation. Its energetic and skillful Klan 
leaders were able to build the state’s strongest organization because 
they responded to the grievances o f Denver Protestants confronted 
with an actual breakdown in law and order and challenges from mi- , 
nority groups. With city officials seemingly unresponsive, the Klan j 
solution became, for many, the only solution. Using lodge, social, 
and professional connections, Klansmen first contacted Denver’s 
public officials, Protestant ministers, and leading businessmen. 
Later, in preparation for political action, the Klan broadened its 
base and welcomed all who sought to enlist. Klan recruiting and re­
source gathering, after an initial confrontation with government au­
thorities, encountered only scattered resistance. Following a few 
skirmishes, the path was cleared toward the goal o f controlling com­
munity decision-making. The organization, wrote national Klan 
leader Edgar I. Fuller, “was not taken seriously at first; many who 
saw the danger thought that by ignoring it the chances o f its spread­
ing would be lessened. But, this proved to be a mistaken idea, for, 
like a spark in a sawdust pile, the smoldering fire burst and grew 
into flame. . . . ” 1
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During the 1920s Denver was the financial and commercial cen­
ter o f the Rocky Mountain West, unchallenged in a wide trade area 
extending for 500 miles in all directions. Denver had been founded 
in 1858 and first served as an outfitting station for miners seeking 
their fortunes in the mountains. With the building of the railroads 
and the settlement o f the plains, the city had expanded to supply the 
needs o f farmers and cattle ranchers. Denver was primarily a dis­
tribution and collection point and never developed substantial 
heavy industry. Manufacturing was diversified, small scale, and ori­
ented toward local and regional markets. Only 28 percent of the 
labor force was employed in manufacturing, slightly less than the 
number engaged in trade and transportation. Denver was also Colo­
rado’s capital and largest city, containing slightly more than one- 
fourth o f the state’s total population. Between 19 10  and 1920, the 
population o f Denver had increased by 20 percent, to over 256,000 
persons. The growth rate slowed in the 1920s, reaching 287,000 
persons by 1930. Denver citizens were predominantly white and 
Protestant. In 1920 there were only 6,075 blacks in the city, an in­
crease o f 649 since 19 10 . There was no heavy migration from the 
South during the twenties and Denver’s blacks barely maintained 
their percentage o f the population. The number o f Roman Catho­
lics had risen from 28,772 in 19 16  to 37,748 in 1926, thus con­
stituting nearly 15  percent o f the city’s inhabitants. Aside from a few 
immigrant neighborhoods, the city was ethnically and culturally 
homogeneous.2
Soon after their initiation at the Brown Palace Hotel, the Ku 
Klux Klan’s new recruits founded a klavern under the title “Denver 
Doers Club.” The inspired initiates wasted no time in spreading the 
Klan message to friends and relatives. To coordinate recruiting 
efforts and direct the enlistment campaign, the Klan’s Propagation 
Department in Atlanta quickly dispatched several kleagles to the 
city. Headquarters for the membership drive were established in 
rented offices in the Continental Trust Building at Seventeenth and 
Larimer streets. On Ju ne 17, 19 2 1, after a few months o f secret 
organizing, the Denver Klan was ready to announce its existence. 
The Klan boasted, in a letter to the Denver Times, o f its ability and 
eagerness to suppress crime: “ We are a law and order organization 
assisting at all times the authorities in every community in uphold­
ing law and order. Therefore we proclaim to the lawless element of
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the city and county o f Denver and the state o f Colorado that we are 
not only active now, but we were here yesterday, we are here today 
and we shall be here forever.” 3
Two weeks later, at midnight on June 29, a column of cars load­
ed with Klansmen sped through downtown Denver and stopped in 
front o f the Rivoli Theater on Curtis Street. Klansmen holding red 
torchlights affixed notices to the theater demanding the re-engage­
ment o f the film The Face at Your Window. According to a Klan re­
cruiting newsletter, the motion picture “ shows the hooded figures 
o f the knights o f the Ku Klux Klan riding to the rescue and portrays 
the final triumph of decent and orderly government . . . over the 
alien influences now at work in our midst.” 4 The film was reshown 
and the Klan given credit and free publicity in a Denver Post adver­
tisement. In Ju ly  A. J .  Padon, Jr., the Grand Goblin of Domain No. 
7, which included Colorado, claimed that 175 Denver men had been 
recruited and promised 2,000 more members in ninety days. The 
Klan, he said, was ready to place these men at the disposal o f the 
chief o f police within three minutes whether day or night. Only with 
these additional forces could crime be driven from Denver. Ameri­
canism, relief of the poor, protection of the home, and brotherhood 
were also declared goals. The image-making process had only just 
begun.5
Anti-Klan sentiment quickly surfaced. Mayor Dewey C. Bailey 
condemned the Klan as a threat to lawful government and ordered 
an investigation. “We are going to find out the purpose of this new 
organization in Denver,” vowed Bailey, “and if it plans to take the 
law into its own hands . . .  we are going to . . . break it up.” 6 F. C. 
Howbert, Denver’s collector o f internal revenue, launched a probe 
into the local Klan’s alleged failure to pay federal taxes on initiation 
fees and dues. Simultaneously the Department o f Justice sent agents 
to Denver to gather evidence for its investigation o f the national 
Klan. In September the Denver Express, a liberal, labor-oriented 
newspaper, began the first of several exposes of Klan secrets.7
The Klan, partly in reaction to these moves, closed its recruiting 
office, and its kleagles left the city. Mention o f the activities o f the 
Denver Klan disappeared from the newspapers for the rest of the 
year. The apparent defeat o f the Ku Klux Klan was a relief to many 
Denverites, for their city had been spared the strife and discord that 
usually accompanied the hooded order. The Klan, however, had not 
surrendered. Rather, a shift in tactics was needed. Responsibility fell 
into the hands o f a nucleus o f local men who chose to carry on their 
crusade underground. Klan leaders, now shielded from hostile
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opinion makers and authorities, guided their movement through its 
formative stage. Quietly they organized and the ranks swelled.8
The leader of this determined band was an enigmatic Denver 
physician, John Galen Locke. Dr. Locke had been among the first 
in Denver to join and quickly rose to command the organization. 
Under his astute leadership as Exalted Cyclops and later Grand 
Dragon, the Klan came to dominate the city and state. Locke had 
been born in New York City on September 6, 1873. Like his father, 
he had decided upon a career in medicine and enrolled in Bellevue 
Hospital Medical College. Locke had left New York for Denver in 
1893 where he completed his education at the College of Physicians 
and Surgeons. After several years o f further training in Europe he 
had returned to Denver to practice. Locke was never admitted to ei­
ther the Denver or Colorado Medical Societies despite his seemingly 
extensive training. Speculation concerning his rejection ranged 
from the accusation that he performed abortions to his supposed 
failure to keep abreast o f developments in his profession. More 
likely, it was Locke’s belief in homeopathy as opposed to allopathic 
medicine that kept him from membership. The Spanish-American 
War in 1898 had briefly interrupted his practice. He had enlisted 
and was commissioned a first lieutenant in Chafee’s Light Artillery, 
but his unit never left the United States and he did not see action.9
In appearance, Locke was hardly awesome or inspiring. He was 
a short fat man, weighing 250 pounds, who wore a Van Dyke beard 
and carefully trimmed moustache. A former patient likened him to 
a “buddha with a goatee.” 10 His voice was high and squeaky, the re­
sult o f a knife wound he received while attempting to quell a riot in 
London, England. Locke practiced an ascetic lifestyle which barred 
drink and sex and permitted only an occasional cigar. Yet under­
neath this deceptive exterior was a charismatic personality possess­
ing the necessary traits o f leadership. Locke’s genius for organiza­
tion, eloquence, and ability to inspire fanatical loyalty made him one 
of the most important factors in the growth of the Colorado Klan. 
The Grand Dragon’s office and private hospital, located at 1345 
Glenarm Place, further enhanced his aura of leadership. In the 
basement behind sliding steel doors was Locke’s inner sanctum and 
the headquarters o f the Colorado Ku Klux Klan. In the center of 
the soundproof hall was a thronelike chair at the feet of which 
lounged a Dalmatian and two fawn-colored Great Danes. A solid 
gold seal o f the United States hung above an enormous fireplace, 
and ancestral portraits, hunting trophies, swords, and pistols cov­
ered the walls. Half a dozen bodyguards were always present to en-
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sure the safety o f their leader. An astonished Denver Post reporter 
remarked when ushered into the room, “ His tastes are of another 
age.” 11
Locke, despite his position as Grand Dragon, was rarely accused 
o f bigotry. He had been married to a Catholic; he paid the pew rents 
o f his two Catholic secretaries. At Klan meetings Locke preached 
moderation and nonviolence; a Catholic priest credited him with 
preventing the bombing o f Denver’s Immaculate Conception Cathe­
dral- For legal advice Locke turned to Catholics and Jews. It was nei­
ther prejudice nor money that lured Locke to the Klan, it was his 
lust for power. A close friend o f the Grand Dragon recalled: “ He 
felt a sense o f history and mission all of a sudden. Here, he, Dr. 
Locke who had never done anything but work on this poor human 
carcass was shaping the course o f life o f thousands o f people. And 
he loved the power, he just loved it. No doubt about it.” 12
Locke’s eccentricities and mystical regalia should not disguise 
his affinity to leaders o f other more mundane movements and orga­
nizations. The Klan’s leader planned strategy and issued orders 
while he simultaneously faced the pressures o f a tight budget, ju g ­
gled the interests o f differing factions, allocated scarce resources, 
and parried challenges to his authority. His efforts, while sometimes 
based upon incomplete or erroneous information, were clearly di­
rected toward achieving Klan aims. The order’s success in Denver 
and Colorado testify to this man’s effectiveness.
II
The Denver Klan reappeared in January, 1922, with a donation 
to the Young Men’s Christian Association. A month later Klansmen 
fastened a note to the door o f Dr. William H. Sharpley, Denver’s 
manager o f health and charity, warning the city to take precautions 
against a threatened smallpox epidemic. Nine recent deaths at­
tributed to the disease gave credence to Klan fears. In March a des­
titute widow received $200 from the Denver klavern. Klansmen 
trumpeted these acts of benevolence and public service as evidence 
o f their sincere desire to aid their fellow man. Such activities were 
also effective public relations devices which lessened community re­
sistance and attracted new members. Visitations and contributions 
to Protestant churches reinforced the Klan’s image o f piety. More 
spectacular was the staged kidnapping of Aimee Semple McPherson 
on Ju ne 17, 1922. Klansmen presented McPherson with a bouquet 
of white roses and assured her “ that the spirit o f the Ku Klux Klan
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will surround you wherever you go.” “There is work for you men to 
do,” replied the evangelist, “ to defend the weak and to stand as 
champion for those who have none to stand by them.” 13 A news­
paper reporter was conveniently present to record the scene. Thus 
did Klan power grow. It was reflected not only in a larger member­
ship base but in informal alliances with other, more established com­
munity organizations.14
The Klan even exploited the dead to ease its reception. In Feb­
ruary, 1922, “handsomely robed” Klansmen interrupted the funeral 
services o f Charles E. Locke, placed a white floral cross at the head 
o f the grave, and withdrew. Locke was a veteran of the Civil War, 
Spanish-American War, and Philippine insurrection as well as a 
prominent member o f the Masons. The Klan praised him as “a real 
American” whose “ record stands unsurpassed in the service of our 
country.” 15 He was also the father o f John Galen Locke and, al­
though it was denied, a member o f the Denver Klan.
The Klan’s benevolent activities only briefly masked its darker 
side. On January 27, 1922, black janitor Ward Gash received a letter 
from the Denver Klan charging him with “ intimate relations with 
white women” and “ the use o f abusive language to, and in the pres­
ence o f white women.” He was warned to leave town by February 1. 
“Nigger,” the note concluded, “do not look lightly upon this. Your 
hide is worth less to us than it is to you.” 16 Gash turned the letter 
over to District Attorney Philip Van Cise and promptly left Denver. 
Van Cise carefully investigated the Klan’s charges and found them 
groundless, characterizing Gash as a “ good boy.” He then turned his 
anger against the Klan. A grand jury was called and began its probe 
of the Klan on March 10. A second Klan threat, sent this time to 
George Gross, the president of Denver’s National Association for 
the Advancement o f Colored People, made the grand ju ry ’s work 
more imperative. After a month the grand jury issued a report re­
turning no indictments but recommending further investigation. 
Van Cise decided against launching another formal inquiry and in­
stead ordered five o f his men to infiltrate the organization and spy 
on its activities. Van Cise’s tactical decision helped guarantee Klan 
success. With Denver’s publicity-minded mayor amenable merely to 
verbal anti-Klanism, the district attorney was the only city official in 
a position to exert the government’s power against the secret order. 
When Van Cise opted for weekly spy reports and minimal infiltra­
tion, he removed the government as an effective obstacle to Klan 
ambitions. Klansmen attempted to retaliate by initiating a recall 
effort against the district attorney in the summer of 1922. The move­
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ment collapsed, however, when Van Cise smashed Denvers notori­
ous bunco ring.17
The Klan sought to regain a measure o f respectability during 
the grand jury investigation and filed its articles of incorporation 
with the state government. State officers, however, refused official 
recognition and rejected the charter as too vague. Such prominent 
Denverites as Benjamin B. Lindsey, father o f the juvenile court; Fa­
ther Matthew Smith, editor o f the Denver Catholic Register, Sidney 
Whipple o f the Denver Express; and Jewish leaders Philip Hornbein 
and Charles Ginsberg hammered the Klan in eloquent editorials 
and speeches as a threat to constitutional government and the liber­
ties o f all Americans. Yet their voices were barely heard, for after an 
early demonstration o f opposition Denverites acquiesced in the 
Klan’s presence. The Rocky Mountain News and the Denver Tim,es kept 
silent about the Klan issue. The Denver Post at first hesitated and re­
mained neutral; later it swiped at Klansmen not so much for their 
membership in the secret order but because they were political op­
ponents. Anti-Klan forays by the Denver Jewish News and the Colorado 
Statesman, a black newspaper, were feeble. In at least one instance 
silence nearly gave way to appeasement. In 1924 members of Den­
vers B ’nai B ’rith planned an open meeting to curry favor with Klan 
leaders, but the scheme was blocked only after heated debate. Those 
who looked for anti-Klan champions among Denvers white Protes­
tant organizations despaired because only a few groups such as the 
men’s Bible class o f the Central Presbyterian Church publicly con­
demned the order.18 , ,
Denver’s inability to generate an effective counterforce during 
the Klan s formative years, whether in the form of attitudes or an 
opposition organization, facilitated the movement’s expansion. City 
officials underestimated their adversary and failed to pursue a pol­
icy of continual harassment and confrontation. In fact, their own 
actions voided the use o f government power as an effective in­
strument o f social control. Opinion makers— Protestant ministers, 
editors, and other leading community figures— emitted ambiguous 
signals; most were unable or perhaps unwilling to define the Klan as 
deviant. Rather than intimidating and exhausting the Klan, their si­
lence created the atmosphere which allowed the secret society to 
gather resources— men, money, and good will— with only minor in­
terference. The Klan easily defended itself against a confused and 
sporadic opposition composed mainly of minority group members. 
Protestant Denver accepted or at least tolerated the Klan and only
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occasionally questioned it as a legitimate response to community 
needs.
The grand jury investigation and charter rejection only tempo­
rarily slowed the Klan’s momentum. Two thousand hooded Klans­
men gathered in June, 1922, at Estes Park, fifty miles from Denver, 
for the state’s first publicized outdoor initiation. Three hundred 
Colorado men formed a circle around an altar and burning cross, 
knelt, and swore an oath of allegiance to the Invisible Empire. “ Mor­
tal men,” proclaimed a Klan officer, “cannot assume a more binding 
oath. . . . Always remember that to keep this oath means to you 
honor, happiness, and life, but to violate it means disgrace, dis­
honor, and death. . . .” 19 Men flocked to the Klan standard and the 
Denver klavern quickly outgrew its meeting places, Yeager Mor­
tuary, Woodmen Hall, the Mining Exchange Building, and the 
Knights o f Pythias Hall. The Klan eventually acquired the Cotton 
Mills Stadium in South Denver and South Table Mountain, nine 
miles west o f the city, to accommodate its knights.20
I l l
The Klan’s most effective draw was its pledge to clean up Den­
ver and rid the city o f its criminal element. In 1920 the newly elected 
District Attorney Van Cise had described Denver as “ practically a 
wide open town” and had formulated plans to eradicate the prob­
lem.21 A sharp rise in criminal activity had frustrated his efforts. The 
Denver Express reported that “ the wave of lawlessness sweeping Den­
ver in 1921 exceeded all previous criminal reigns.” 22 Police arrested 
an average o f fifty-three persons per day for a total of 19,649, an 
increase of 28 percent over the 1920 figure and almost double the 
number apprehended in 1919 . The crime rate continued upward in
1922, and although more cases were filed than in 19 21, convictions 
decreased. Police statistics revealed a slight decline in lawlessness 
during 1923, but a series of jarring crime waves evoked doubt about 
the city’s ability to cope with the situation.23
Prohibition law violators accounted for much of the increase in 
crime. Colorado and federal statutes outlawing intoxicating bev­
erages had in no way curbed Denver’s thirst. Liquor was cheap and 
easily obtainable, and police raids failed to dam the city’s supply. 
Anxious Denverites attended mass meetings to prod city officials 
to more aggressive action against the bootleggers. The police re­
sponded with flurries o f raids and arrests which lasted only until the
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outcry had dissipated. Denver police officials complained that le­
nient judges thwarted their efforts by restricting search and seizure 
practices. Judges were also lambasted because congested court cal­
enders had forced them to accept guilty pleas in exchange for fines 
rather than impose prison terms. Van Cise realistically asserted, “ I 
admit we are getting nowhere with bootlegging. The people are not 
back o f us and it is hard to find a ju ry that will convict.” 24
Prostitution also flourished in the city. Denver had officially 
closed its red-light district in 19 12 , but lax regulation after World 
War I had enabled some sixty brothels to reopen and scores o f pros­
titutes to work the streets. On Ju ne 22, 19 2 1, a federal investigator 
charged, “Street conditions are worse here than in any place I was 
ever in. I was solicited by no less than two dozen prostitutes. . . . 
They seem to be on the streets as much in the day as in the night.” 25 
A year later a grand ju ry investigation found no change in the situa­
tion. Prostitution was rampant in the downtown district and sur­
vived only because o f official connivance. Van Cise had attempted, 
after taking office, to banish prostitution from Denver. In response 
to the grand ju ry ’s probe his office accelerated the campaign and 
launched a series of raids which padlocked most o f the brothels and 
temporarily swept the streets o f prostitutes. The raids, however, had 
an unforeseen result, since the prostitutes who had been primarily 
concentrated in a twelve-block downtown area slipped the confines 
o f the district and spread to all parts o f the city.26
Denver’s drug problem was less publicized but equally alarm­
ing. A Denver Post headline in August, 19 2 1, declared, “C ity  Dope 
T ra ff ic  G allo p s on, P o lice  Experts Unable to  Cope w ith  th e  
Ever-Present Scourge.” 27 The police disclosed that drug addiction 
had claimed more than 1,000 victims and was not confined to any 
particular socioeconomic group. To stimulate business, the organiz­
ers o f the traffic visited high schools and distributed free samples to 
students. Confiscations and prison sentences failed to check the traf­
fic or lessen parental concern.28
Police inefficiency and malfeasance aggravated crime conditions. 
The Denver police department’s main weapon against lawlessness 
was a periodic sweep which collared “ all suspicious characters and all 
persons . . . unable to give a good account o f themselves. . . .” 29 
More important, the city’s police force was riddled with corruption. 
Charges such as accepting bribes, selling bootleg whiskey, associat­
ing with prostitutes, and drinking on duty were regularly lodged 
against Denver police officers. The infection was not confined to the 
poorly paid patrolman but spread to the upper echelons of the de­
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partment. A 1923 grand jury censured eight law enforcement offi­
cials, including the manager o f safety and the city constable as “ to­
tally unfit to hold any office in this city and should be discharged 
forthwith.” 30 The district attorney was more sweeping: “The present 
city administration is a disgrace to American government.” 31
In addition to bootlegging, prostitution, and narcotics, the city 
reeled under frequent and intense epidemics o f burglaries, hold­
ups, and sometimes murders. Unsolved crimes proliferated and fur­
ther compromised the police. A few months before the Klan’s ar­
rival Denverites initiated plans to form a vigilance committee to 
assist the police department. The leader of this effort, a non-Klans- 
man, declared, “Things have come to such a pass that such action 
now seems imperative.” 32 The Denver Post also sounded the alarm: 
uThe reign of outlawry that has existed during the past two or three years 
cannot continue and our country and government remain stable and safe. 
The government cannot continue to function when its laws are . . . belittled 
and insulted by law violators everywhere.” ™
The Klan early seized upon the city’s crime problem and prom­
ised to make Denver again a fit place to live and raise children. Pub­
licity-wise Klan leaders lost no opportunity to bolster the orga­
nization’s law and order image. They thus issued warnings to 
lawbreakers, offered rewards, and pledged thousands of men to aid 
the police department in fighting crime. Unscrupulously, yet tac­
tically quite sound, Klansmen appeared at the funeral o f non-Klans- 
man Richie Rose, a police officer gunned down by Italian boot­
leggers, and demanded that his murderers be apprehended and 
brought to trial without delay. They also vowed that “the family of 
Patrolman Rose will not suffer for want o f food and clothing. Their 
needs will be known to the members o f this organization for many 
years to come.” 34
Distrustful o f their police force and impatient with the court 
system, many Denverites turned to the Ku Klux Klan as the only 
agency capable o f driving crime and vice from the city. One such in­
dividual was Warren R. Given, president o f a brokerage and invest­
ment company and a highly respected member o f the community. 
Given had been born on November 10, 1874, in Centralia, Illinois, 
of native-born American parents. He was reared in Denver and was 
active in several fraternal orders, the First Church o f Christ (Scien­
tist), and Republican politics, having served as the vice-president o f 
Colorado’s Harding for President Club. Given, one o f the founders 
o f the Denver Ku Klux Klan, cited the reason for its formation: “A 
wave o f crime during the past two years has swept over Denver and
2 1
HO O D E D  EMPI RE
other cities, the magnitude o f which is the greatest in its history. . . . 
Because o f this condition . . . [the Klan] is being maintained to the 
end that its members can give greater aid and support to the officials 
in stamping out crime, lawlessness and immorality, and to assist 
the authorities in ridding . . . Denver o f criminals and undesir­
ables. . . .” 35 For Given, the actual breakdown in law and order was 
not an abstract issue nor the Klan a symbolic crusade. The danger to 
family and city was immediate. The solution to the problem seemed 
to lie with the Klan. A large bloc o f fellow Klansmen shared Given’s 
fears and hopes.36
The Denver Klan raised the papal specter to garner members, 
thus perpetrating the city’s anti-Catholic tradition. In the 1890s the 
American Protective Association had attracted 10,000 men to its 
anti-Catholic campaign and captured the city government. The 
APA’s demise had led Protestant crusaders to form, in turn, the 
Knights o f Abraham Lincoln, the Guardians o f Liberty, the Knights 
o f Luther, and the Night Riders. These groups had boycotted Cath­
olic merchants, blacklisted Catholic political candidates, and de­
manded passage o f a convent inspection law.37 Catholic job seekers, 
especially teachers, found it almost impossible to secure positions. 
Anti-Catholic sermons were frequent, and the Menace, a weekly 
published in the Ozark hills o f Missouri, and “escaped nun” Maria 
Monk’s Confessions were sold openly on Denver streets.38
Anti-Catholic agitation eased during World War I only to resur­
face in the twenties when evidence o f an apparent conspiracy ap­
peared and helped rekindle dormant Protestant fears. In April, 
19 2 1, the Denver Catholic Register announced the formation o f the 
Colorado chapter o f the National Council o f Catholic Men. An en­
thusiastic spokesman claimed, “By Christmas it is expected every 
layman in the state will be a member o f this great organization.” 3il Its 
objectives were vague: to unite Catholic men all over the United 
States “ for general welfare work.” In its first year the new society re­
ported that it had established contact with similar organizations in 
other counties throughout the world. Also in 19 2 1, Catholics estab­
lished the Colorado Apostolate to wage a campaign for converts. 
The apostolate, backed by the Knights o f Columbus, planned to 
“make one o f the greatest drives ever engineered in any American 
diocese to bring Catholic truth to the attention o f as many non­
Catholics as possible. . . .” 4<> It pledged, in addition, to aid Protestant 
ministers financially or otherwise, after their “leap toward the 
light.” 41 Klansmen even found support for their charges o f priestly 
corruption. In 1923 Father Walter Grace o f Arvada, a Denver sub-
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urb, was indicted for forging a nun's signature on a liquor permit 
and served two years in prison. For those alert to Catholic machina­
tions, the news was ominous.42
Dedicated anti-Catholics as well as those Protestants susceptible 
to their message used the Klan to defeat the papal intrigue. The 
Klan fanned their fears even though the National Council of Cath­
olic Men was merely a paper organization, the Colorado Apostolate 
consisted of only two men, and the Grace affair was an isolated oc­
currence. Kleagles searched the roster of the anti-Catholic Loyal Or­
ange Society for recruits and also persuaded former members of 
Denver’s Night Riders to join. Ex-APA members were contacted and 
several became prominent in the new movement, including Charles 
Locke, the Grand Dragon’s father; Leo Kennedy, who brought the 
Imperial Wizard to Denver; and Rice Means, the Klan’s candidate 
for the U.S. Senate. The Klan’s most conspicuous anti-Catholic was 
Gano Senter, the Great Titan of Colorado’s northern provinces. In 
19 14  Senter and a group o f like-minded Denverites sent an open 
letter to the Rocky Mountain News echoing the charges of an anti­
Catholic lecturer: “The Catholic priesthood is a great octopus and 
an unscrupulous political machine . . . extending its tentacles into 
every country it can for plunder, fighting . . . free schools and prog­
ress, and keeping the people in ignorance and superstition that it 
can ply its trade of corruption and extortion. . . .” 43 Senter joined 
the Klan in his early thirties and his “ Koo\ Kozy X afe” on Fifteenth 
and Curtis streets became an important hooded haunt. A large sign 
hung in the window: “ We Serve Fish Every Day— Except Friday.” 44 
Jews received a similar welcome. Denver needed the Klan, said Sen­
ter, because “ the Catholics and the Jews were taking over and we 
had to do something. So we went down to the Masonic Lodge and 
organized.” 45
The Klan attracted many men from Bishop Alma White’s Pillar 
of Fire Church. Their Klan fervor, like that o f their leader, was par­
tially rooted in the belief that the Catholic church was a major obsta­
cle in the struggle for women’s suffrage and equality. The Klan’s 
anti-Catholicism plus its support of prohibition made it the foe of 
the twin evils enslaving women. “To whom,” asked Bishop White, 
“shall we look to champion the cause and to protect the rights of 
women? Is there not evidence that the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan 
are the prophets of a new and better age?” 46
Irrationality or status anxiety are not sufficient explanations for 
Klan anti-Catholicism. Protestant fears proved groundless yet were 
based on actual events o f the early 1920s. Reports of alleged papal
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plotting and organizing interacted with and seemed to confirm the 
anti-Catholic stories and lessons learned as children. The long- 
dreaded Catholic revolution, given credence by local, tangible evi­
dence and Klan speakers, had begun. Protestant rule was being 
challenged. Colorado and Denver had to be defended.
The kleagles did not create Denver’s anti-Semitism; they merely 
exploited it. Denver’s Jewish population had increased almost nine­
fold between 19 16  and 1926, to 17,000 persons. The Jews were pri­
marily concentrated around West Colfax Avenue, an area derisively 
referred to as “Little Jerusalem ” or “Jew Town.” Tracts of vacant 
land and the South Platte River separated the district from Protes­
tant Denver. The compact settlement housed many immigrants and 
Orthodox Jews who maintained their traditional values and cus­
toms. Numerous religious schools, multiple dialects, and more than 
a dozen synagogues reflected the diversity o f nationalities and be­
liefs. Culturally, ethnically, and religiously distinct, the West Colfax 
Jewish community generated distrust and disgust among many 
Protestants. The inhabitants o f the section, contended a former 
Klansman, were “cagey and aggressive, with Jew-stuff oozing out o f 
every pore.” 47
Denverites were suspicious for reasons other than the commu­
nity’s alien nature. Many, including the district attorney, linked the 
Jews to bootlegging and illicit gambling operations. The Denver Jew ­
ish News acknowledged the problem: “ Unfortunately many Jewish 
sounding names are mentioned among those guilty o f conducting 
gambling houses or disorderly places, as well as those who frequent 
them.” 48 It also excoriated Jewish bootleggers who posed as rabbis to 
obtain large consignments o f wine for religious purposes. The son 
o f Denver Klan leader Harry Saunders concluded, “We had a lot of 
pretty scabby Jews.” 49 Jewish migration from West Colfax to the rest 
o f Denver accelerated in the 1920s and did little to ease tensions. 
Again, stress-provoking incidents in the immediate environment in­
termingled with latent prejudices to produce Klan recruits.50
The Italians o f North Denver also incited Klan hostility. Little 
Italy was an enclave o f Old World culture where Italian was spoken 
as often as English. The Klan’s indictment went beyond ethnicity 
and religion, for the colony was tagged with an undeserved reputa­
tion for lawlessness. “These are the criminals,” charged Van Cise, 
“these are the disturbers, these are the unfit.” 51 The Italians con­
trolled Denver’s supply o f bootleg whiskey and wine throughout the 
prohibition era despite numerous raids and arrests. Little Italy, in 
addition, was considered the center of the city’s drug traffic. Denver
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narcotics agent Henry Williamson blamed the drug plague on “olive 
complexioned youths o f the loud clothes and the impressive motors 
[who] are scouring the highways . . . every evening in search o f sus­
ceptible girls. They are finding all too many.” 52 The Italians, like the 
Jews, concentrated in a small but highly visible ethnic pocket, were 
an obvious fulcrum upon which to build the Klan.53
Black Denver was numerically small and barely expanding in 
the 1920s. Blacks were confined mainly to the Five Points area, an 
old and deteriorating section east o f downtown and north o f Capitol 
Hill. Denver’s racial tensions, unlike other cities after World War I, 
resulted not from a southern influx but from the actions of black 
Denverites aggressively assaulting the racial status quo. Despite the 
existence o f a state public accommodations law and the absence o f 
legal residential segregation, to blacks, “Dallas, Dixie and Denver 
were very much alike.” 54
Even before World War I blacks rebelled against their second- 
class status. In 19 15  they organized the Colored Protective League 
and a chapter o f the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People to advance civil and political rights. They attempted 
with the assistance o f the city’s two black newspapers, the Colorado 
Statesman and the activist Denver Star> to prohibit the showing of the 
film Birth of a Nation, but failed. Blacks were more successful a year 
later when they helped block a plan to legalize residential segre­
gation in Denver. Those protests in 19 16  sparked an anonymous 
threat to reactivate the Ku Klux Klan.55
The struggle to achieve equality was vigorously renewed after 
the war. In 1920 a black man filed suit against the city because he 
was prevented from playing on tennis courts restricted to whites. A 
black woman sued the city the following year when she was ejected 
from the municipal auditorium after refusing to sit in the seats re­
served for blacks. Dr. Clarence Holmes, president o f the Denver 
NAACP, launched a drive to integrate the downtown movie the­
aters. The now-organized Klan sent a threatening note to Holmes 
and burned a cross in front o f his office in retaliation. Black students 
at East Denver High School interrupted a whites-only dance to force 
integration o f the school’s social events.56 The students acted with 
the approval o f several black organizations and promised that their 
action signaled the beginning o f a campaign to attain full equality in 
the city’s schools. The Parent-Teacher Association and the Parkhill 
Improvement Association responded with resolutions advocating 
separate schools for blacks and whites. Denver Klan No. 1 proposed 
a more moderate solution: integrated schools, segregated social
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events. The suggestion also contained a warning: “Any intrusion by 
members o f either race into the social affairs o f the other will not be 
tolerated.” 57
Meanwhile, blacks were escaping their ghetto and buying homes 
in white neighborhoods. They received a hostile reception. In 1920 
a white mob and the threat o f violence forced Mrs. Emma Davis to 
leave her home at 2540 Gaylord Street.58 On Ju ly  7, 19 2 1, a bomb 
ripped the newly acquired home o f a black family at 2 1 1 2  Gilpin 
Street, and four months later the house was bombed again. Iri De­
cember, 1926, bombs were hurled at E. E. Carrington’s home at 
Twenty-second Avenue and Vine Street; a second attempt a month 
later drove the family from the neighborhood. None o f the bombers 
was ever apprehended.59
Bombing was only one o f several white reactions. The Capitol 
Hill Improvement Association appointed a committee to organize 
Denver in support o f Jim  Crow laws that would guarantee school 
and residential segregation. The Allied Council o f Improvement 
Associations sanctioned such action. When these efforts failed, 
many o f Denver’s improvement associations successfully called 
upon property owners to sign covenants restricting the sale of their 
homes to whites. The black community refused to cower. “Let no 
one suppose for a moment,” fired back the Colorado Statesman, “ that 
the Negro citizens o f Colorado will sit supinely by and witness their 
rights . . . ruthlessly taken from them.” 60 Thus black efforts to 
achieve equality posed an immediate threat to white control. White 
Denverites believed racial mixing at school social functions imper­
iled the chastity o f their daughters. Property values, they feared, 
would surely plummet once blacks moved into all-white neighbor­
hoods. Even more disconcerting, the black revolt did not appear to 
be the work o f a few radicals but, instead, had the support o f the 
leading members o f the black community. It is not diflicult to under­
stand why some Denverites looked to the Ku Klux Klan as the 
means to preserve neighborhood purity and restrain contentious 
blacks.61
The Klan appeal involved more than its issue-oriented cam­
paign. The Invisible Empire offered an exotic fraternal life com­
plete with ghostly costumes and eerie burning crosses. Denver 
Klansmen escaped their routine lives twice a week to mingle in the 
klavern with the exalted cyclops and his nighthawks. Regular lodge
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nights were supplemented with wrestling tournaments, parades, 
concerts by the 200-member Klan band, and an auto race (unhap­
pily for the sponsors, won by a Catholic). Picnics were especially 
popular, the most memorable drawing over 100,000 persons. The 
fraternal side of the order attracted veteran lodge joiners such as 
Klansman No. 1 5 ,3 5 7 ,62 a native of Ohio who paid his ten-dollar 
klectoken at the age o f sixty-eight. He had come to Denver in 1879 
after graduating from the University o f Michigan School of Law 
and became active in four fraternal lodges to which he devoted con­
siderable time. He had served his lodges as secretary, recorder, 
grand captain general, grand warden, and grand sword bearer, 
among others. Two years after joining the Klan, he died. For others 
the Klan was their first foray into the mystic life o f the lodge. Some­
what akin to the lodge men were those seeking fun, adventure, and 
a share o f the secret. Membership became for a time faddish; “ev­
erybody wanted in the Ku Klux Klan because it was the thing to 
do.” 63 But such ties were usually fragile and dissolved after only a 
few meetings.64
The kleagles wielded the Klan’s economic club to convince the 
reluctant. Employees filled out application blanks to get or keep 
jobs.65 Scores enlisted to increase business or prevent a boycott. 
Store owners quickly exploited their membership and proudly dis­
played Klan window stickers. Salesmen waited at the entrance to 
meetings and showered Klansmen with business cards and sales 
pitches. Business firms flashed their names across screens erected 
at the gatherings as the men were ordered to “Trade only with 
Klansmen.” 66
The Klan, despite its 100 percent American image, did not prey 
upon the tensions arising from Denver’s Red Scare. Denver was bat­
tered in 19 19  and 1920 with frightening newspaper headlines, anti­
radical legislation, and Palmer raids. The Red Scare climaxed in Au­
gust, 1920, with the tramway strike, which left seven dead and the 
city under martial law. The Klan never raised the Bolshevik threat 
because the issue was no longer relevant. “ Nobody,” said a former 
Klansman, “took them seriously.” 67 Phantom issues were decidedly 
less potent than those grounded in existing local tensions.
Once a white Protestant decided to become a Klansman, joining 
was a simple matter. It was also a quick process, usually lasting a 
week to ten days from application to naturalization. Most often con­
tact was made through lodge, union, church, or familial channels, 
for each Klansman was a part-time kleagle instructed to reach 
needed men. The Denver Klan’s 138 paid organizers would then
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follow up these leads and process the applicants. Willing recruits 
who escaped these efforts could clip Klan application coupons from 
the daily newspapers. Later Klansmen encouraged their wives, 
mothers, and sisters to form an auxiliary. Foreign-born Protestants 
enrolled in the Klan-sponsored Royal Riders o f the Red Robe and 
the American Crusaders. Denver Klansmen even organized their 
children.68
The multifaceted image and platform of the Ku Klux Klan of­
fered something for everyone. The result was a loose coalition of 
diffuse, unorganized camps distinguished by their particular needs 
and fears. Distinct groups are discernible although the mosaic is 
blurred, for few took out membership on the basis o f a single fea­
ture o f the Klan program. Involvement in Klan affairs, as in all or­
ganizations, varied in intensity depending upon the individual, with 
allegiance contingent upon performance. As soon as the movement 
proved unable to fulfill its promises, the defections began. Aside 
from the opportunists, the coerced, and the faddists whose influ­
ence was minimal, several salient groupings can be identified. The 
Klan contained a small hard core o f true believers eager to save the 
world from marauding Catholics, Jews, and blacks. An allied bloc, 
less steeped in the rhetoric o f prejudice, reacted to immediate 
threats to their homes and neighborhoods. The lodge men found 
the mysteries o f Kloranic ritual more satisfying than minority bait­
ing. None o f these groups alone or combined, however, was suffi­
cient to propel the movement to power. Success came only when the 
Klan merged their grievances with demands to restore law and 
order to Denver. Many o f those concerned about the spreading law­
lessness were not particularly bigoted. They tolerated the rabid pas­
sions o f fellow Klansmen primarily because o f the white Protestant 
heritage o f distrust and the minority connection to crime. The Den­
ver Klan’s law and order emphasis reflected its drawing strength 
and the needs o f its membership. Klan leaders representing the dif­
ferent interests guaranteed, however, that no issue was neglected. A 
rough balance, through careful juggling, was thus effected under 
Dr. Locke’s steadying hand which precluded any major radical 
thrusts. Unfortunately, small bands o f Klansmen could not be easily 
restrained from independent action.69
The Denver environment proved congenial to Klan mobiliza­
tion success. City government could not solve a stressful crime prob­
lem or suppress what appeared to be a coordinated minority upris­
ing against Protestantism. Denverites who believed that they had 
been abandoned by local authorities could only look to themselves
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and the Ku Klux Klan for their salvation. Unfulfilled fellowship and 
spiritual needs, too, sought an outlet. In John Galen Locke the Klan 
found a charismatic leader who generated zealous enthusiasm 
among his followers. Locke, assisted by capable and energetic lieu­
tenants, molded the Klan into a solution for almost every concern. 
Their skillful planning and execution made the organization a po­
tent force in local affairs. In addition, the Klan encountered no sub­
stantial counterattack. A man did not fear his minister’s censure or 
neighbor’s scorn when he enlisted in the secret society. The move­
ment operated in a community devoid o f widespread public hostility 
and a meaningful opposition. The risks were few, the rewards un­
limited. With all variables tilted in the Klan’s favor, it is not surpris­
ing that nearly 17,000 Denver men passed through the portals o f 
the Invisible Empire. Still, the Klan had one other hurdle to clear on 
the road to power. It had to attract the support o f men and women 
whose needs or frustrations lacked the intensity to cause member­
ship yet were sufficient to evoke sympathy for Klan aims. For this 
population, too, the interplay o f Klan leadership, local tensions, 
governmental responsiveness, and community perceptions was cru­
cial in confirming allegiance. Victory with these men and women 
would guarantee Klan aims, for it would yield controlling influence 
over Denver’s formal decision-making process.70
V
The Denver Klan’s program and growing strength dictated po­
litical action, and the first opportunity came in the Denver mayoral 
election o f 1923. The hooded order secretly supported Benjamin F. 
Stapleton against the Republican incumbent Dewey Bailey. Staple­
ton, a Democrat, had been born in 1869 on a farm near Paintsville, 
Kentucky. A veteran o f the Spanish-American War, he had served 
Denver as judge, police magistrate, and postmaster. His political 
stance, however, was unclear. A Democratic party leader described 
Stapleton as ‘just a name. There was nothing against him, there was 
nothing for him. He was an unknown entity.” 71
Stapleton announced his candidacy on March 30, pledging a 
war on crime and vice, lower taxes, and an efficient and frugal city 
government. He counted among his allies the Denver Post, the Den­
ver Express, the Italian-American Social Club, and liberal Democrats 
Governor William Sweet and Morrison Shafroth. Organized labor, 
through the Denver Labor County Central Committee and the Colo­
rado Labor Advocate, also aided his effort. Stapleton was the Klan’s
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obvious choice; he was a close friend of Dr. Locke and Klan member 
No. 1,12 8 . Rumors of Stapleton’s Klan affiliations surfaced through­
out the campaign, and he condemned the Klan to appease his Jew ­
ish and Catholic supporters. “True Americanism/’ he declared, 
“needs no mask or disguise. Any attempt to stir up racial prejudices 
or religious intolerance is contrary to our constitution and is there­
fore un-American.” 72 His word was accepted, and a coalition of Klan 
and anti-Klan forces swept him into office over an incumbent taint­
ed with corruption and linked to organized crime.73
Mayor Stapleton quickly implemented many o f his campaign 
promises. The new administration stressed economy in all munici­
pal agencies and cut excess jobs. Shake-ups in the police department 
weeded out the inefficient and corrupt. Police units intensified their 
anticrime efforts, probing Little Italy for bootlegging sites and plan­
ning operations to drive prostitutes from the city’s residential dis­
tricts. In less than a month District Attorney Van Cise detected a 
dramatic drop in criminal activity, tracing it to the city’s offensive 
against bootleggers, prostitutes, and gamblers. Although Stapleton 
appointed a few Catholics and Jews to office, the Klan’s mark was 
very much in evidence. The mayor named fellow Klansman Rice 
Means as manager of safety and later city attorney. Klansman Reu­
ben Hershey succeeded Means as manager of safety after first serv­
ing as manager o f revenue. Klansmen filled the offices of clerk and 
recorder, manager of improvements and parks, and city accountant, 
among others. The police department was heavily infiltrated, with 
seven sergeants and dozens o f patrolmen all card-carrying Klans­
men. Yet, despite pressure, Mayor Stapleton refused for almost a 
year to appoint a Klansman as chief o f police.74
In 1923 and 1924 the Klan’s influence upon the court system 
became apparent. Stapleton designated Klansmen Henry Bray and 
Albert Orahood as justices o f the peace. They joined another Klans­
man already on the bench, District Judge Clarence Morley, the 
Klokan of the Denver klavern. The threat o f Klan justice emanated 
not only from the ju dge ’s bench but also from juries drawn from 
Klan membership lists. Klan ju ry tampering intensified after the 
1924 elections.75
Stapleton’s electoral coalition began to crumble six weeks after 
his victory. On Ju ne 26, 1923, Klansmen distributed notices inviting 
Denverites to a free lecture about Klan principles to be given the fol­
lowing night at the city auditorium. Some of the placards were 
nailed to the doors o f Temple Emmanuel and the Immaculate Con­
ception Cathedral. The mayor authorized the Klan’s use o f the
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building, citing the right of free speech and assurances “that there 
will be no attack made upon color, race or creed.” 76 The Denver E x­
press rejected Stapleton’s position: “The cultivation and support, 
even unofficial, o f such an organization places a premium upon law­
lessness. When that support becomes official— it will inspire every 
fanatic, every hoodlum, every bigot, every mischief-maker to believe 
that he is a law unto himself. That way lies anarchy.” 77 The NAACP, 
labor leaders, liberal Democrats, Denver’s Elks, prominent Jews, and 
the Ancient Order o f Hibernians protested the mayor’s action in 
vain.78
Four thousand persons attended the lecture, but they never 
heard a word about the Ku Klux Klan. G. K. Minor, Klan lecturer 
from Texas, began his talk with the proviso that if anyone objected, 
he would cancel the meeting. Fathers Francis Walsh and Thomas 
Kelley o f the cathedral, both wearing their World War I army uni­
forms, immediately stood up in protest. Shouts drowned out their 
words. Within minutes Rice Means ordered the hall emptied to pre­
vent violence. A week after the incident the city council passed a bill 
prohibiting the Klan from again using the municipal auditorium.79
Later in 1923 Klansmen erected eleven wooden crosses in dif­
ferent parts o f Denver and simultaneously set them ablaze. None of 
the Klansmen were caught. When questioned about the matter, Sta­
pleton replied that the police department was unable to find any evi­
dence of the cross burnings. The city council demanded that the ad­
ministration conduct a full investigation, but no further action was 
taken.80
There were other examples of Klan militancy. Klansmen threat­
ened to boycott businessmen advertising in the Denver Express and 
Denver Catholic Register. Mimeographed lists of proscribed Catholic 
merchants were circulated at Klan gatherings. Members routed 
their kavalkades past West Colfax synagogues and mocked wor­
shipers. Crosses burned before Catholic churches. Anti-Catholic 
Klansmen brought ex-“nun” Mary Angel to Denver where she de­
livered sixty lectures which, according to the Denver Catholic Register. 
“ for utter foulness . . . simply could not be surpassed. It was the 
vomit not o f the red light district, but of hell’s depths. . . .” 85 Jewish 
activists and Catholic priests were also subjected to physical harass­
ment and death threats; “ feeling ran so high that just the sight o f a 
white collar set them off.” 82
Denver Klansmen were implicated in at least two acts o f vio­
lence. On October 27, 1923, five Klansmen kidnapped Patrick Walk­
er, a member o f the Knights o f Columbus, drove him to a spot near
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Riverside Cemetery, and clubbed him with the butts o f their re­
volvers. Three months later, in January, 1924, Jewish attorney Ben 
Laska was forced into a car at gunpoint, taken to the outskirts o f the 
city, and beaten with blackjacks. The Klansmen admonished Laska, 
“Don’t get these bootleggers off. Don’t defend them. This is your 
first warning. The next will not be so light.” 83 Apparently Laska 
heeded the warning, because he subsequently became the Grand 
Dragon’s attorney. Monsignor Gregory Smith, reflecting on the Klan 
days, was surprised there was not more violence: “We had our hot 
heads, they had their hot heads. . . . We were screaming for justice 
but you always have some that don’t wait for the wheels o f justice to 
turn. They were terrible times.” 84
While such acts are reprehensible and to be condemned, it is 
also necessary to consider them as tactics in a struggle for power. 
Klansmen, now protected from government retaliation, attempted 
to strengthen their position in the community. These incidents dem­
onstrated to members and nonmembers that the Klan intended 
to carry out its pledge to shackle minorities. They also served to 
heighten movement unity and to hamper the mobilization o f re­
sources by anti-Klansmen. Bigotry is thus only a partial answer. The 
quest for power also plays an explanatory role.
Despite Mayor Stapleton’s pro-Klan stance and invisible creden­
tials, he was not pliable enough to suit the Grand Dragon. Stapleton 
had used the Klan to win office and had sought Locke’s advice, but 
he never succumbed completely to the organization’s dictates. The 
mayor’s repeated refusal to appoint a Locke lieutenant as chief 
o f police precipitated the break. To punish Stapleton, the Grand 
Dragon decided to circulate a recall petition. Just as the Klan was 
readying its campaign, other Denverites began a drive to gather sig­
natures in favor o f the mayor’s recall. This second group charged 
the administration with raising taxes, allowing crime to flourish, and 
engaging in antilabor activities. These accusations masked the 
movement’s real motivation, to rid city hall o f Klan domination. The 
mayor judged his position untenable and capitulated to Klan de­
mands. “Stapleton,” cautioned Locke, “you went back on us once. 
We have decided to support you again. We will elect you. But if  you 
ever go back on us again, God help you!” 85
Stapleton named William Candlish as Denver’s new chief o f po­
lice in return for Klan support. Candlish was a former newspaper 
editor, state senator, and radium experimenter with no previous po­
lice experience. His only qualifications were his Klan membership 
and his subservience to Locke. Chief Candlish made the police de­
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partment an instrument o f the Klan’s will. Candlish asked all Protes­
tant policemen to fill out Klan membership applications; those who 
accepted were rewarded with choice assignments, shorter hours, 
and promotions. The rest joined Jewish and Catholic police officers 
working night shifts on undesirable beats. Candlish’s men began en­
forcing forgotten city ordinances to harass Jewish and Catholic 
shopkeepers. More frightening was a Candlish edict, based upon an 
old Denver law, prohibiting Greek, Japanese, Chinese, Mexican, and 
black businessmen from employing white women. The Klan was so 
sure o f its control that it even requisitioned men and vehicles from 
the department.86
Candlish’s appointment accelerated the momentum of the anti- 
Klan recall forces. It was final proof, observed the Denver Express, of 
a “gigantic conspiracy” bent upon “ the seizure and control of every 
department o f city, county, and state government.” 87 On March 29, 
1924, two weeks after Candlish assumed his post, Philip Hornbein 
and John B. O ’Malley filed a petition containing 26,000 names, 
enough to force a special election on August 12. The recall move­
ment selected former mayor Dewey Bailey as its candidate. The 
choice was unfortunate in light o f the candidate’s reputed under­
world connections and earlier defeat by Stapleton. Bailey’s antilabor 
record also dogged his efforts. The Denver Labor County Central 
Committee condemned him “for allowing armed thugs to parade 
the streets o f Denver and to shoot into gatherings of unarmed cit­
izens, for refusing to enforce the minimum wage law for men em­
ployed on city work, and for his alliance with powerful interests vio­
lently antagonistic to labor.” 88
Bailey based his campaign on one issue, Denver’s invisible gov­
ernment. “ I f  I am elected mayor o f Denver,” he promised, “there 
will be no nightgown tyranny in this town.” 89 Throughout the sum­
mer o f 1924 pro-recall speakers Charles Mahoney, Ben Lindsey, 
Sidney Whipple, and Hornbein assailed the Klan and Stapleton’s se­
cret ties. In a surprise move the Denver Democratic County Assem­
bly endorsed recall, denouncing “any administration that permits it­
self to become the working tool of the Ku Klux Klan.” 90 The Denver 
Post in its first major confrontation with the Klan reiterated the re­
call’s theme, “S h a l l  th e  Ku K lu x  K lan , an Anonymous S ecret 
Masked So ciety  R u le  Denver, o r  S h a l l  th e  People R ule Den­
ver? . . . A l l  O th e r Issues, H owever Im portant They May Seem, 
Sink in to  A b so lu te  Insign ificance.” 91
Arrayed against recall were organizations as formidable as they 
were diverse, the Anti-Saloon League, the Denver Labor County
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Central Committee, the Colored Citizens League, and the Denver 
Ministerial Alliance. The Stapleton campaign also drew strong sup­
port from the Rocky Mountain News, Denver Times, Denver Democrat, 
and the Colorado Labor Advocate. The anti-recall forces contended 
that Stapleton was innocent o f any gross abuses or malfeasance and 
should be allowed to remain in office. Disgruntled political job 
seekers and bootleggers in league with yellow journalists had engi­
neered the recall to seize power for their selfish ends. The Klan is­
sue was merely a ruse to distract the voters.92
Despite other sources o f support, however, Stapleton’s most 
powerful ally was the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan dominated the Sta­
pleton campaign, contributing more than $15,000 and scores of 
election workers. The Klan supplemented these efforts with two in­
cidents manufactured to draw hesitant Protestants to the polls. In 
Ju ne a bullet shattered a window in the Highlands Christian Church 
just after its Klan minister had received a donation from a delega­
tion o f Klansmen. Two days before the election the Reverend James 
Thomas, a Klansman, told his congregation that the district attorney 
had just uncovered a Knights o f Columbus plot to arm the city’s Ca­
tholics. Van Cise dismissed the ministers story as absurd. On July 
14, 1924, Mayor Stapleton addressed a Klan gathering on South 
Table Mountain and reaffirmed his commitment: “ I have little to 
say, except that I will work with the Klan and for the Klan in the 
coming election, heart and soul. And if I am re-elected, I shall give 
the Klan the kind o f administration it wants.” 93 Police Chief Cand- 
lish later clarified Stapleton’s words: “Another term with the mayor, 
and the red necks and slimy Jews would crawl into their holes and 
pull the holes in after them.” 91
Election day was peaceful as the city cast the heaviest vote in its 
history. Stapleton swamped Bailey at the polls, piling up 55 ,130  
votes to 23,808 and winning all sixteen election districts. The may­
o rs strongest support came from districts R, S, and T  in South Den­
ver, which were carried by a six-to-one margin. Stapleton was routed 
only in the West Colfax Jewish precincts. Noting the size of the Sta­
pleton vote, the Denver Post remarked, “The victory yesterday proves 
beyond any doubt that the Ku Klux Klan is the largest, most cohesive and 
most efficiently organized political force in the State of Colorado today."95 
The Klan and its leaders had managed Stapleton to victory by refus­
ing to do battle on the invisible government issue. By avoiding the 
subject, the winning coalition o f strange bedfellows was forged. 
Organized labor was especially proud o f its contribution, claiming
34
Queen City of the Colorado Realm
“a large share o f the credit for the tremendous majority. . . 
Moreover, Klan campaigners shrewdly capitalized upon anti-Klan 
blunders, especially the naming o f Bailey as the recall candidate. 
Many who opposed recall as a matter o f principle or who detested 
Bailey chose Stapleton without regard to his position concerning the 
Klan. Thus enough indifferent or sympathetic non-Klansmen had 
voted with the minority to defeat the recall.97
Denver Klansmen awaited the election returns on South Table 
Mountain. When the Stapleton tide became overwhelming, they sig­
naled their victory with fiery crosses visible in Denver. The auto­
mobile caravan that descended the mountain after the ceremony in­
dicated a redirection o f Klan energy. Bumper stickers proclaiming 
“ I ’ll vote again for Ben” were now covered with those heralding 
“Morley for Governor.” 98
VI
The Klan owed much of its success to the men who had shaped 
its local identity and charted the course to power. Who were the 
leaders o f Denver Klan No. 1? What were the backgrounds of those 
who represented the rank and file, eased factional wrangling, and 
set priorities upon resource distribution? The names of Dr. Locke’s 
chief lieutenants and Klan leaders elected in 1924, 1925, and 1926 
were obtained and biographical data compiled for each man. The 
resulting socioeconomic grouping was as diverse as it was homoge­
neous. Age and place o f birth information was gathered for twenty- 
five o f the thirty-six leaders. Klan officers ranged in age from 
twenty-one to sixty-seven years with a mean age of 42.4 years. Al­
though men in all age groups appeared in the hierarchy, those thirty 
to thirty-nine years old (ten) and fifty years and older (eight) were 
overrepresented and those in their twenties (two) were underrepre­
sented when compared to Denver’s native white male population. 
While every section o f the United States except the Pacific Coast re­
gion contributed to the leadership, the largest blocs of Klansmen 
were born in the Middle Atlantic states (five) and Colorado (six). 
The sizes o f the birthplaces o f twenty-one men are known and are 
primarily towns with a population o f 2,500 or less (nine) or cities of
100,000 or more people (seven). Military service data, available for 
three-quarters o f the men, indicate that twenty never served in the 
armed forces, one was a Spanish-American War veteran, and four 
had participated in World War I. It is surprising, considering the
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youth o f many o f the leaders, that so few had served in 19 17 - 18 . 
The Klan’s leaders were mostly married men, with only four re­
maining single and one divorced."
Information concerning length o f residence and fraternal affil­
iations also reflects sharp contrasts. Klan officers resided an average 
o f 14.5 years in Denver before joining. The figure, however, is mis­
leading and hides considerable variation. Eight o f the leaders were 
recent arrivals, having lived in the community three years or less. At 
the other extreme, long-time residents in Denver, eighteen years or 
more, constituted one-third o f the group. Over two-thirds o f the 
leaders resided in the city for seven years or more. Eighteen, or half, 
o f the leaders had no fraternal membership in a lodge other than 
the Ku Klux Klan. All but one o f the rest belonged to two or more 
fraternal orders. O f those with multiple memberships, fifteen were 
Masons, eleven Knight Templars, and eight Odd Fellows. Klansmen 
were, in addition, active in the Elks, Lions, and Woodmen of the 
World. The city’s elite clubs, such as the Denver Club, Denver Coun­
try Club, Cherry Hills Country Club, Lakewood Country Club, and 
University Club, had no Klan leaders among their members. Four 
Klan officers belonged to the Denver Athletic Club, which was one 
level below these organizations. Only one Klan leader was listed in 
the Social Register. Three o f the five men eligible were members of 
either the American Legion or the Veterans o f Foreign Wars.100
Although the Klan leaders differed considerably as to age, 
length o f residence, and number o f fraternal ties, they showed strik­
ing similarity in occupational status (see Table 1). Twenty-six o f the 
men held occupations in the two highest status groups. Only three 
men were engaged in manual labor. The most frequently occurring 
occupations were small businessman (eight), clergyman (four), law­
yer (four), manager o f a firm (four), and physician (three). When 
compared to the occupational distribution for all male Denverites, 
Klansmen in the high and middle nonmanual categories are vastly 
overrepresented and all other groupings decidedly underrepre­
sented. The men’s occupational histories before joining the Klan in­
dicate that twelve were upwardly mobile, eleven were in the same 
status group as when they first entered the Denver work force, and 
only one was downwardly mobile. There is little change in these to­
tals when occupations held while Klansmen are considered. For 
some o f the men, high occupational status may well have coun­
teracted the detrimental effects o f short-term residence and youth 
upon their chances o f joining the Klan hierarchy.101
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Table 1. Occupational Distribution o f the Leaders of the Denver 
Klan, 1924—26, Compared with the Occupational Distribution 







High nonmanual 12 33 4-7
Middle nonmanual M 39 14-5
Low nonmanual 4 1 1 22.3
Skilled 2 6 18.0
Semiskilled and service 1 3 21.0
Unskilled 0 0 l 3-5
Unknown 3 8 6.0
Total 36
source: Denver City Directory, U.S. B ureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census o f the United 
States, 19 2 0 : Occupations, IV, 1095- 98.
Just a rung below the city’s elite, the leaders o f the Denver Klan 
were sufficiently attractive, socially and economically, to draw re­
cruits. They were primarily business and professional men whose 
sobriety and respectability shielded the Klan from charges o f irre­
sponsibility and radicalism. Skillfully they exploited lodge and busi­
ness contacts to lure like-minded men of similar status. As they did, 
the Klan’s reputation was further enhanced. Middle aged, often 
with families, they were the models o f decorum, quite convincing 
when they voiced parental fears for the future o f Denver’s youth. 
The Denver Klan’s advantage was obvious— their leaders not only 
looked the part, they acted it.
VII
“They came from City hall and from the suburbs,” observed a 
Denver Express reporter stationed outside a Klan meeting. “Tall, 
short, young and old— some well dressed by tailors and some from 
Curtis Street second hand stores.” 102 The hood and robe concealed 
the identities o f the Klan’s rank and file. Membership lists were 
closely guarded, and rarely did the names o f ordinary Klansmen ap­
pear in the newspapers. Sometimes friends, neighbors, and even
37
HO O D E D  EMPI RE
wives were unaware of the binding invisible tie. Fortunately, the so­
cial and economic characteristics of these Denver Klansmen can be 
ascertained because the official Roster of Members as well as the 
1924 Membership Applications Book have been preserved. To test 
the long-held observation that early-joining Klansmen differed in 
socioeconomic status from late joiners and to examine membership 
patterns over time, the 16,727 knights listed on the roster were di­
vided into three groups: those recruited before January, 1923; be­
tween January, 1923, and May, 1924; and after May, 1924. January,
1923, was chosen as an end date for the early joiner group because it 
approximated the Klan’s shift from its formative stage to a more ag­
gressive and open involvement in the community. Membership in 
the early joiner group was determined by examining newspapers, 
addresses, death certificates, and the resignation, suspension, and 
banishment dates entered in the roster. The total early joiner popu­
lation was 1,000 men from which two names were excluded, one a 
duplicate and the other a newspaper spy. Those men entering the 
Klan after May, 1924, were designated late joiners. This division was 
based upon the Denver Klan’s decision to open its rolls and launch a 
major membership drive at the end of May, 1924, in preparation for 
the mayoral recall election. The Membership Applications Book 
records the names o f 13 ,353  prospective Klansmen and their dates 
o f application from May 27, 1924, to the end of the year. Applicants’ 
names were matched to those appearing in the roster to set the be­
ginning number for the late joiners. More than 1,200 men filled out 
application blanks but never joined. Also included in the late joiner 
population were 1,550 men who enlisted in 1925. The late joiners 
thus numbered 13 ,735  from which seven duplicate or spies’ names 
were excluded. Three hundred seventy-five men were randomly se­
lected from the early joiner population o f 998 and 583 men from 
the 13,728 late joiners. No sample was taken from the group joining 
between January, 1923, and May, 1924, because the data accumu­
lated would not have compensated for the resources and time ex­
pended. With a confidence level of 95 percent and confidence inter­
val o f ±4  percent, a sample o f 375 is acceptable for a population of
1,000 and 583 for 20,000. Thus, if an indefinitely large number of 
samples o f size 375 or 583 were drawn, the results from 95 percent 
o f these samples would be within 4 percent o f the “true” values of 
the two populations. With the data compiled upon these 958 sample 
members, assertions concerning the roots o f the Klan response may 
be examined. Was the Invisible Empire primarily a movement of so­
cially and economically marginal men? Was the Klan a symptom of
working-class authoritarianism? Or did the Klan’s diverse appeal at­
tract a cross-section o f the white, Protestant, male population?10* 
The Denver Klan was an organization of mature men and not 
the young. The mean age of early joiners upon entering the Klan 
was 39.9 years and did not differ significantly from the late joiners at 
37.8 years (Table 2). The late joiners were evenly distributed along 
the age continuum, while early joiners thirty to thirty-nine years of 
age constituted over 40 percent of their group. Similar proportions 
of men in their forties and those over fifty belonged to each Klan 
group with the sharpest difference occurring in the group of thirty 
to thirty-nine year olds. The late joiners in almost every category 
more closely resembled the city’s native white population. With 85 
percent of the early joiners and 75 percent of the late joiners thirty 
years or older, the movement was hardly an uprising of callow, 
thrill-seeking young people. Stability is also reflected in marital sta­
tus statistics. More than 75 percent of both groups were married, 22 
percent single, and only 1 percent divorced. These figures com­
pared to 58 percent married, 30 percent single, and 2 percent di­
vorced of the adult male population.104
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Table 2. Age Distribution of Denver Klansmen, 19 2 1-2 5 , 
Compared with the Age Distribution of Denver’s Native White Male 








Under 20 — 1.4 —
20—29 *5-5 23-4 30.0
30~39 4 M 294 26.5
40-49 24.1 24.8 20.1
50 and older 19.0 20.9 2 3 4
Total 244 286
source: Sam ple data; U.S. B ureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United States, 
19 20 : Population, II, 308 .
The Midwest, not the South, was the Klan’s chief spawning 
ground. Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and the rest o f the states of 
the east and west north-central regions furnished the bulk of Den­
ver’s Klan population (Table 3). Although one-third o f Denver was 
native to the state, Colorado-born Klansmen comprised less than a
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fourth o f the two sample groups. This discrepancy, however, might 
only reflect the inclusion o f children eighteen years and younger in 
the census figures for Denver. Curiously, one man born in England, 
one in Ireland, and two in Germany appeared in the sample. All 
four were long-time residents and were probably granted admission 
because o f friendship or deceit. Information regarding the size of 
birthplaces for one-third o f the late joiners (201) and one-half o f the 
early joiners (183) reveals a rural and small-town background. Over 
50 percent o f the late joiners and 45 percent o f the early joiners 
were born in or near towns with a population o f 2,500 or less, 66 
percent and 62 percent respectively in towns o f 10,000 or less. 
Fewer than one-fourth o f the late joiners and one-fifth o f the early 
joiners were born in cities o f 100,000 or more.
Table 3. Distribution o f Birthplaces o f Denver Klansmen, 19 2 1—25, 
Compared with the Distribution o f Birthplaces o f Denver’s Native 








New England 3-3 1.0 2.2
Middle Atlantic 8.3 6.4 9.0
East north-central 23.0 25-3 19-3
West north-central 24.0 34-2 21.3
South Atlantic 5.0 4.0 2-5
East south-central 5.8 5.0 3.6
West south-central 4.6 0.4 3-4
Mountain (excluding Colorado) 2.1 0.4 2.4
Colorado 23.0 22.6 35-2
Pacific — 0.3 1.1
Foreign-born 0.8 0.4 —
Total 241 283
source: Sam ple data ; U.S. B ureau  o f  the  Census, Fourteenth Census o f the United States, 
19 2 0 ; Population, II, 666. ..
An overwhelming majority o f both early and late joiners never 
served in America’s wars. When the unknown category is disre­
garded, two-thirds o f the early joiners (154) and three-quarters of 
the later arrivals (203) stayed home during wartime. Seventy-three 
(32 percent) o f the early joiners entered the service in 19 17  and one
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man in 1898. The figures for late joiners are even lower; sixty-five 
men (24 percent) served in World War I and one man during the 
Spanish-American War. In the 1920s few Klansmen shared their 
military experiences in either the American Legion or the Veterans 
of Foreign Wars, comprising just 2 percent and 4 percent o f the 
memberships respectively. In the ranks, as in the leadership, re­
cently discharged military veterans were noticeable by their absence. 
Missing past crusades to save American freedom and democracy, 
perhaps many saw the Klan as a means to compensate for lost op* 
portunities to serve.
A striking contrast between early and late joiners appears in re­
gard to membership in fraternities other than the Klan. Seventy-six 
percent (447) o f the late-joining Klansmen had no known fraternal 
ties. O f the remaining 136 men, forty-three (7 percent) belonged to 
two or more lodges. Forty-eight percent o f the early joiners had no 
known fraternal ties, but 34 percent were members o f two or more 
orders. The Masons provided a second fraternal home for 85 per­
cent o f the early-joining Klansmen and 79 percent o f the late joiners 
with at least one lodge tie. Klansmen also appeared in the ranks of 
the Knight Templars, Rotarians, Lions, Elks, and Odd Fellows but in 
much smaller numbers. Denver’s elite clubs listed only a handful of 
Klansmen among their members. The Denver Athletic Club con­
tained the most, forty Klansmen or 3 percent o f its total member­
ship. The notion that early joiners tended to have more fraternal 
affiliations than late joiners is supported by gamma ( + .56), a mea­
sure o f association. These differences reflect changes in the meth­
ods o f recruiting between the Klan’s arrival and the stage of inten­
sive organizing. Early in the Klan period the lodge was a prime site 
for contacting non-Klansmen. Later, as the saturation point was 
reached in the lodge room, other recruiting techniques were brought 
into play. A changing membership also indicated a transition in the 
Klan’s meaning and appeal.
Klansmen were both long-time residents and recent migrants to 
the city. Early joiners resided in Denver an average 13.5 years as 
compared to 9.5 years for the late joiners (Table 4). Thirty-one per­
cent o f the early joiners and 20 percent o f the later members resided 
in Denver eighteen years or more. Fifty-three percent of the later 
joiners as opposed to 37 percent o f the early joiners lived in Denver 
six years or less; 41 percent to 27 percent, three years or less. The 
visible impression that early joiners tended to reside in Denver for 
longer periods is supported by Pearson’s coefficient of contingency 
(-53)-
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Table 4. Length o f Residence o f Denver Klansmen, 19 2 1-2 5  
(Prior to Joining).
Early Joiners Late Joiners
Years ■ 1 . N Percent N Percent
1 - 3 99 27 242 41
4 -6 39 10 73 12
7-9 17 5 40 7
10 - 1 3 46 12 28 5
14 - 17  . 35 9 53 9
18 and over 1 1 7 31 114 20
Unknown 22 6 33 6
Total 375 583
source: Denver City Directory.
These fraternal and residential data bear directly upon the hy­
pothesis o f mass society theorists which ties social movement activ­
ism to a weakened network of community groups. According to 
Seymour Lipset, the ranks of extremist movements are filled with 
“marginal men”— “the personal failures, the socially isolated, the 
economically insecure, the uneducated, unsophisticated and au­
thoritarian persons at every level o f society.” 105 Sociologist William 
Kornhauser contends, “Within all strata, people divorced from com­
munity, occupation, and association are first and foremost among 
the supporters o f extremism. The decisive social process in mass so­
ciety is the atomization o f social relations; even though this process is 
accentuated in the lower strata, it operates throughout society” '06 
Early joiner information demonstrates, however, that rather than 
being divorced from social groups, nearly 20 percent were involved 
in outside organizational affairs and over one-third were thor­
oughly enmeshed. It is important to bear in mind for both early and 
late joiners that these figures are conservative because of the un­
availability o f complete fraternal membership rosters. Probably 
many affiliations remain uncovered. The existing evidence indicates 
that the majority o f early Klan recruits were approached through 
Denver’s network o f civic, social, and fraternal organizations. These 
fraternal and social connections appear to have accelerated the 
movement’s early momentum. On the other hand, a large percent­
age o f early and late joiners seem to fit the mass society stereotype of 
uprooted and marginal men. Short-term residence and isolation
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from community affairs did cause many to see the secret order as a 
beacon of security and stability in an unpredictable environment. 
But too much emphasis should not be placed upon what was actually 
an uninfluential minority. Men usually joined the Klan at the urg- 
ings o f lodge brothers, relatives, or close business associates. Appli­
cants were required to complete a detailed, personal information 
questionnaire which included the names o f five references, pref­
erably Klansmen. Employer and peer pressure, not a lack of self­
esteem, carried others into the order. The Klan could also serve as a 
conduit into the larger community. In the klavern a Denver new­
comer could connect with established figures of outside clubs and 
fraternities. Finally, a brief residence in Denver and a lack of frater­
nal ties did not necessarily imply a different motivational or value 
orientation. Joining the Klan reflected an attachment to the commu­
nity, a desire to protect it. Protestants of diverse socioeconomic sta­
tus and background reacted similarly to the Jewish bootlegger, the 
Italian drug peddler, and the Jesuit priest.
Historian Kenneth Jackson’s suggestion in The Ku Klux Klan in 
the City that residents in the “zone o f emergence” were particularly 
susceptible to hooded appeals is not applicable to the Denver case. 
There was no distinct belt o f contested neighborhoods in the city be­
cause minority expansion was irregular and sporadic. Eastern Euro­
pean Globeville and Little Jerusalem were spatially isolated and not 
perceived as disruptive o f existing residential patterns. Further, 
Denver, except for the location of its black ghetto, does not fit the 
ethnic core-m iddle class rings model of many eastern cities. Thus, 
while the situational factor o f neighborhood transition explains the 
motivation o f some Klansmen, no visible pattern of Klan settlement 
emerges. Residentially there were four major pockets of Klansmen: 
North Denver—Berkeley, the area between the Platte River and 
Cherry Creek, South Denver, and Capitol Hill. Twenty percent of 
the late joiners and 14 percent of the early joiners lived in North 
Denver-Berkeley, a middle-class neighborhood with small, single­
family homes and well-kept lawns. The residents of the area, on the 
western boundary o f Little Italy, were especially sensitive to the 
threat of immigrant encroachment. Another 20 percent o f the late 
joiners resided in the strip of land between the Platte River and 
Cherry Creek, a densely populated, run-down section of the city. 
Below Alameda Avenue, in South Denver, were the homes of 13 
percent o f the early joiners and 17 percent of the later recruits. 
South Denver was a relatively new area and, like North Denver, 
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Twentieth avenues, housed 33 percent o f the early joiners and 14 
percent o f the late joiners. More affluent than South Denver, Cap­
itol Hill was a heterogeneous area o f large mansions, small homes, 
and exclusive apartments. Other concentrations o f Klansmen ap­
peared in Park Hill, downtown Denver, and around the Five Points 
black ghetto. As expected, the sparsely settled areas east of Colorado 
Boulevard and west o f the South Platte River produced few recruits. 
The residential distribution is further evidence of the Klan’s varied 
appeal. No neighborhood, whether wealthy, middle class, decaying, 
old, or new, was off limits to the klavern’s kleagles.107
Occupational differences between the two groups were consid­
erable (Table 5). Early joiners engaged in high and middle non­
manual occupations comprised 5 1.5  percent o f their group, while 
just 2 1 percent o f the late joiners shared an equal status. At the same 
time, 43 percent o f the late joiners labored in occupations below low 
nonmanual as compared to 16.5 percent of the early joiners. Only in 
the low nonmanual category do the groups contain similar propor­
tions o f men. Within the early joiner sample the most numerous oc­
cupations were manager of a firm (fifty-four), small businessman 
(forty-two), salesman (twenty-three), lawyer (seventeen), office clerk 
(seventeen), and physician (sixteen). Salesman (forty-eight), small 
businessman (forty-six), and office clerk (thirty-eight) also predomi­
nated in late joiner ranks along with laborer (thirty-seven), driver 
(twenty-five), and mechanic (twenty). These occupational differ­
ences were significant, with late joiners tending to hold fewer high- 
status jobs than early joiners (gamma, -.56).
The late jo iner’s occupational distribution was a cross-section of 
the wider Denver structure in all but the unskilled category. Con­
versely, high and middle nonmanual job holders among the early 
joiners are heavily overrepresented relative to the Denver popula­
tion. When the two samples are united, the early joiners, skewed as a 
result o f recruiting bias, disrupt the representative nature o f the 
later joiners. In the combined Klan membership, the high and mid­
dle nonmanual categories are overrepresented, the low nonmanual 
bloc equivalent, and all blue-collar divisions underrepresented. 
Thus a larger proportion o f men in the upper occupational groups 
appeared in the Klan than did in the outer environment. Semi­
skilled and unskilled workers were the least likely to share the se­
crets o f the Invisible Empire. The numerical domination of clerical 
and blue-collar workers in the Ku Klux Klan is, therefore, mislead­
ing. The Klan attracted a greater number o f men holding low non­
manual and manual jobs not because o f the alleged intolerance or
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Table 5. Occupational Distribution of Denver Klansmen, 19 2 1—25, 





Status Group ' N Percent N Percent Percent
High nonmanual 58 15-5 *5 3-o 4*7
Middle nonmanual 135 36.0 107 18.0 ! 4-5
Low nonmanual 76 20.3 140 24.0 22.3
Skilled 32 8.5 110 19.0 18.0
Semiskilled and service 28 7-5 102 17.0 21.0
Unskilled 2 O.5 40 7.0 *3*5
Unknown 44 1 1 . 7 69 12.0 6.0
Total . 375 583
source: Denver City Directory, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United 
States, i g i o :  Occupations, IV, 1095—98.
status anxiety o f these groups but, rather, because o f the character 
o f Denver’s economy. There were simply more Denverites in oc­
cupations below the middle nonmanual line than above it, and the 
Klan reflected this distribution. Hence, what at first glance seems 
to have been a movement of the lower middle and working classes 
was actually a wider based organization, a somewhat distorted mir­
ror image o f the population encompassing all but the elite and 
unskilled.
The pre-Klan occupational mobility histories o f 54 percent of 
the early members and 41 percent o f the later arrivals were sur­
veyed. They reveal that before entering the Klan over half of the 
early joiners were nonmobile, one-third were upwardly mobile, and 
one-tenth were downwardly mobile. Occupationally static late join­
ers formed 48 percent o f their group, upwardly mobile 29 percent, 
and downwardly mobile 18 percent. There is little change in these 
percentages when occupations held as Klansmen are considered.
In light o f the Klan’s initial recruiting techniques, it is not sur­
prising that the early joiners resembled the Denver leadership so­
cially and economically. Klavern officers had first turned to their 
close friends, relatives, lodge brothers, and business associates when 
seeking men. There were no significant differences between the 
early joiners and the leaders as to age, number of fraternal ties,
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length and place of residence, or occupational status. While similar 
to the late joiners in age and place of residence, leaders tended to 
have resided in Denver for longer periods and to hold more frater­
nal memberships. The leaders were far more likely to have high-sta- 
tus occupations than the late joiners (gamma, .79).
Selective recruiting explains much of the socioeconomic varia­
tion between early and late joiners. Early joiners were contacted 
through restricted lodge, business, and professional channels while 
the later joiners were conscripted in a mass membership drive. The 
leaders and early joiners were economically and fraternally one step 
below Denver’s elite while the late joiners closely approximated the 
outer society. Significant differences were observed in length of resi­
dence, number o f fraternal ties, and occupational status. That is, 
early joiners tended to live in Denver for longer periods, belong to 
more lodges, and hold higher-status jobs than late joiners. Diversity 
within the two blocs helped lessen intergroup differences. A sizable 
bloc o f early joiners had lived in the city only a short time before 
entering the Invisible Empire. Also, men in high and middle non­
manual occupations comprised 2 1 percent o f the late joiner sample. 
Similarly, common life and generational experiences united the het­
erogeneous membership. The knights were mature men with fam­
ilies. The majority had roots in the farms and small towns of Colo­
rado and the Midwest. Almost all had remained on the home front 
during World War I. The men shared issue interests as well. Regard­
less o f circumstances, they formed informal factions based upon 
their specific needs and concerns.
Unfortunately, the religious affiliations of only 1 1  percent of 
the 958 sample members could be ascertained. To determine more 
clearly the denominational support of the Denver Klan, the stance 
of individual Protestant congregations was examined. A Denver 
church was designated as Klan-supporting if (1) its minister was a 
Klansman, (2) it advertised in the Klan newspaper, or (3) its trustees 
allowed fake ex-“nun” Mary Angel to speak to the congregation. If 
these criteria are employed, thirty Denver churches, almost 20 per­
cent of the Protestant total, are tarnished. One-third of the Method­
ist, one-fourth of the Baptist, and five of seven Disciples of Christ 
churches had Klan links. The Congregationalists and Presbyterians 
emerge only slightly less tainted. None of the city’s Episcopalian or 
Lutheran churches succumbed to Klan blandishments.108
The Denver case supports the conception of a highly diversified 
membership. The Klan’s complex appeal, rooted in a shared Protes­
tant identity and cache o f symbols, was designed to attract men from
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every station on the socioeconomic spectrum. Excluding the elite 
and the unskilled, the Klan rank and file was a near occupational 
cross-section o f the local community. Modifications in recruiting 
methods and issue salience enabled any white Protestant, regardless 
o f background, to find a home in the Invisible Empire. Denver s 
early joiners were, as a group, prominent men holding high-status 
occupations and multiple fraternal memberships. The later arrival 
o f men more closely resembling the general population did not pre­
cipitate a mass exodus o f the first recruits. Resignation notations did 
not fill the membership records because late joiners were welcomed 
as Klan voters and allies in internal factional battles. Common gen­
erational experiences and backgrounds also seemed to lessen dis­
harmony. The young, the elite, and the proletariat were the only 
groups that could not be accommodated under the invisible panoply.
Sheltering half o f the state’s hooded population, the Denver or­
ganization was the center o f Colorado Klandom. The Klan’s initial 
objective had also been the first Colorado community to fall under 
the sway o f invisible government. The Denver Klan’s cafeteria of ap­
peals, molded to time and local events, drew strength from govern­
mental inaction and unresponsiveness. White Protestant men from 
almost all socioeconomic strata and backgrounds responded to the 
call to save their homes and community from disruptive groups. 
The credit for the Klan’s success rested with its able leaders, for they 
attracted and then held this heterogeneous membership together. 
They made it possible for the movement to be simultaneously an 
agency for law and order, a fraternal home, and, for the newly ar­
rived, a way station bedecked with the symbols of the small town. 
Operating in an atmosphere of tolerance and unhindered by op­
position sniping, the Denver Klan’s rise to power was swift. But was 
Denver unique? How would other communities differing in size, 
economic base, and minority populations react toward the Klan? 
Could the Klan operate effectively if a resistance organization 
adopted a strategy of head-on confrontation? Were local cadres 
available to lead new Klans or would they have to be exported from 
Denver? The answers to these questions were unclear when the 
Klan directed its offensive toward Pueblo and Colorado Springs, the 
state’s second and third largest cities. Their fate as invisible colonies 
or free cities hinged, as had Denver’s, upon the interplay o f the four 
key variables in the mobilization process.
4.8
T H R U S T  T O W A R D  T H E  S O U T H
CHAPTER THREE
There is no room in the Pikes Peak region fo r the Ku Klux Klan, or fo r 
any other organization of like purpose. Organized religious and racial 
hatreds are foreign to American thought and dangerous in their threat to 
individual freedom. . . .  It is fanaticism raised to high power, the more 
dangerous because it moves secretly and under cover of darkness.
Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph, Decem ber 2 , 1923
I f  the Klan is a means by which public sentiment may be made effective 
fo r  the maintenance of public morality, fo r the enforcement of law, fo r 
the support o f the public courts and officers, and fo r the preservation of 
good government. . .  it should be commended and approved.
Pueblo Chieftain, J u n e  29 , 1923
Klan organizers left Denver in 1921  and 1922 for the cities and 
towns o f southern Colorado. Their receptions ranged from eager 
acceptance to bitter hostility. In Colorado Springs the Klan recruited 
only 2,000 men and could not capture political control. Inept Klan 
leadership, responsive authorities, and an absence o f volatile issues 
isolated the secret order from potential knights and nonmember 
supporters. Most important was the presence o f a strong anti-Klan 
resistance which employed its own as well as government resources 
to blunt Klan influence. Denied access to an adequate resource base, 
the Klan challenged but could not sway decision makers. Because 
Colorado Springs was one o f the few cities in the state to defeat the 
Klan, it offers more than just another instance o f hooded activity. It 
also provides an opportunity to study the variables making for Klan 
failure. Conditions in Pueblo, on the other hand, created the neces-
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sary milieu in which the Klan thrived. As in Denver, Klansmen suc­
cessfully vied for power and eventually became the arbiters of com­
munity policy.
I
Colorado Springs in 1920 was the state’s third largest city with 
30,605 inhabitants, an increase o f only 3.5 percent since 1910.  The 
city was not a commercial center nor did it attract much industry. 
Tourists, health seekers, and the wealthy flocked to the resort at the 
base o f Pikes Peak, generating the community’s prosperity. Still, 
manufacturing accounted for nearly a fourth o f the total employ­
ment. The “City of Churches” was overwhelmingly Protestant, 
counting only 500 Jews and 2,965 Catholics among its citizens. 
Slightly more than 1,000 blacks and 2,600 foreign-born immigrants 
resided in Colorado Springs in 1920, both groups numbering few^er 
than in the previous decade. Unlike Denver, Colorado Springs con­
tained no conspicuous ethnic neighborhoods, and Catholics, Jews, 
blacks, and immigrants lived throughout the city.1
Kleagles were ordered to Colorado Springs in July, 1921 ,  short­
ly after the Klan’s first public demonstration in Denver. Following 
standard Klan procedure, they prepared a recruiting package and 
secretly approached the city’s law enforcement officials and promi­
nent men. But in less than a month the kleagles’ activities were ex­
posed. The Colorado Springs police department placed the organiz­
ers under surveillance and Chief Hugh Harper vowed to take action 
if the Klan violated the law. Only a handful o f Colorado lawmen 
took a similar stance. The Klan’s “mysterious nature” and “romantic 
history,” said Harper, were a “ temptation to the hot-heads and the 
firebrand. I believe that there is good prospect that the new Ku Klux 
Klan may take men into its roster who act first and think afterward. 
That can only mean a calamity in any community, sooner or later” 2 
Exposure made the Klan’s task more difficult; resistance and indif­
ference made it impossible. The city’s two major newspapers, the 
Colorado Springs Gazette and the Colorado Springs Evening Telegraph 
responded to the Klan intrusion with a steady barrage of hostile ar­
ticles and cartoons which lifted only after the danger had passed. A 
Colorado Springs man who welcomed the Klan declared, “The pub­
lic was antagonistic, it looked with suspicion on the Klan and the 
efficiency o f local officials made it unnecessary.” 3 The kleagles left 
the city without organizing a local Klan.4 ^
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Nine Months later, in April, 1922,  the Reverend Edward His- 
lop, pastor o f the First Methodist Episcopal Church, and three 
members of his congregation received threatening letters signed 
“Ku Klux Klan.” The following month a note was mailed to Fredrick 
H. Bair, superintendent of the Colorado Springs Board of Educa­
tion, ordering him to discharge all woman teachers whose husbands 
were employed. The warning concluded, “You will be held person­
ally, directly and rigidly responsible if any such teacher is so elected. 
K.K.K.” 5 Chief of Police Harper, however, discounted Klan involve­
ment, citing the petty nature o f the threats and the letter writer’s 
failure to use the official seal and stationery of the Invisible Empire.6
Seeming to belie Harper, the editor of the Colorado Springs Eve­
ning Telegraph received a letter on June 14, 1922, with the official 
Klan seal. The “ K.K.K. Publicity Committee,” in a rambling procla­
mation, disclosed the existence o f a local chapter of the secret frater­
nity. “This organization is founded upon the principles of justice, 
liberty and patriotism. The preservation o f these ideals is its object; 
the suppression o f un-American and anti-American activities is its 
work.” The Klan further promised to assist police in maintaining 
law and order, praised the civic work o f the Chamber of Commerce, 
and guaranteed the success of the Community Chest fund drive. 
Curiously, it attacked ex-servicemen’s organizations and specifically 
the American Legion for advocating a cash bonus for veterans. 
“Our patriotism,” boasted the Klansmen, “springs from love of 
home and country, and no true American can demand pay for re­
sponding to that call.” The veterans’ groups were advised to check 
their rosters, for their members were deserting in large numbers “to 
join their comrades and business and professional associates in pro­
moting Americanism under the cross.” The letter closed with a 
veiled threat: “ Needless to say, the sentiment of every lodge, of 
every secret and fraternal order, regarding those matters of vital in­
terest to the K.K.K. is known to us. In this we permit no violation of 
any oath nor care to learn matters o f private concern. We desire only 
to know when and where aid or correction is needed in order that 
we may act promptly as upright American citizens.” 7 Klan literature 
was distributed in the streets of Colorado Springs the following day, 
confirming fears o f a renewed offensive.8
The reaction was immediate. The leadership of the American 
Legion dismissed the Klan’s assertions, protesting that “ there is no 
place for it in Colorado Springs.” 9 James F. Jewell, department com­
mander o f the Grand Army of the Republic, supported the Legion­
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naires in a Colorado Springs speech: “The Ku Klux Klan is an 
organized band of lawbreakers. Its practice should be curbed, for no 
organization outside o f the government should be allowed to take 
the law into its own hands. . . .” 10 Colorado Springs businessmen 
made tentative plans to organize an anti-Klan body. In addition, the 
Reverend Charles A. Fulton o f the First Baptist Church condemned 
the Klan before his congregation. The Klan’s probe was quickly 
withdrawn, but not before it had caused severe damage. The Klan’s 
letter, appearing so soon after the forged threat notes, was a major 
tactical blunder, for it saddled the local organization with an image 
o f lawlessness and irresponsibility. The ill-conceived letter also alien­
ated several segments o f the population and made them more sus­
ceptible to future anti-Klan mobilization. With the retreat of the 
Klan, vigilant anti-Klansmen dispersed.11
The Invisible Empire became visible again in Colorado Springs 
on Ju ly  4, 1923.  Klansmen climbed to the summit of Pikes Peak to 
initiate a class o f recruits and to mark Colorado’s anointment as a 
realm o f the Ku Klux Klan.12 At the completion o f the ceremony the 
Klansmen ignited a thirty-foot cross, disrupting Independence Day 
celebrations in Colorado Springs. The cross burning furnished the 
Klan a dramatic opportunity to announce that thirty men had 
joined Pikes Peak Klan No. 1 1 ,  the recently organized klavern for 
Colorado Springs and El Paso County. The engagement of the film 
B irth  o f  a Nation  at a local theater the day before the Klan’s ap­
pearance assumed greater significance. The Colorado Klan fre­
quently used the motion picture to launch intensive recruiting 
drives.13
Anti-Klansmen organized to meet the renewed challenge. The 
“Buck-Shot Brigade” decreed: “There will be no parading of the 
flaming cross in Colorado Springs, and the lights of our streets will 
burn each night without interruption. The police o f our city will be 
trusted to carry out their duty and only as a last resort will we come 
forward and break up any activity of masked men in our city, where 
all denominations live in peace and harmony from the day of 
founding o f our fair city.” 14 C. C. Hamlin, editor and publisher of 
the Colorado Springs Gazette and Colorado Springs Evening Telegraph, 
flayed the Klan in scathing editorials.15 “ Its code,” charged the Ga­
zette, “ is such that fewr save the most viciously biased would openly 
subscribe to it. The protection o f anonymity, the refuge of moral 
cowardice, alone brings members to it.” 16 Pledging to “ tear the 
masks from the hooded mobs,” Hamlin and his staff prominently
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displayed news articles highlighting Klan violence and corruption 
while maintaining a steady flow of anti-Klan commentary. The 
newspapers even refused to report information concerning Klan 
lectures or public meetings.
This time, however, the Klan did not flee Colorado Springs. 
Denver kleagles arrived in the city and began the lengthy process of 
contacting men and convincing them to join. Colorado Springs’ 
thirty Klansmen furthered their advance by furnishing names and 
even enlisting new members themselves. As in Denver, Klansmen 
initially relied upon organizational ties to mobilize potential mem­
bers. The Masonic lodge was an especially fertile source of recruits. 
Horace Ragle, a Klan founder and Mason, openly proselytized at 
lodge meetings. Another Mason, Darius Allen, contended that the 
Colorado Springs Klan “was made up mostly of people of the Ma­
sonic order. But they were the most belligerent members, they 
weren’t the rank and file.” 17 The Pikes Peak Baptist Church was an­
other center of Klan strength, offering men and its minister to the 
cause. The family tie was also important in Klan enlistment. Klan 
relatives lessened the onus of membership and provided effortless 
access for their kin. For example, one Klansman and his wife joined 
because their relatives had been members of the Reconstruction 
Klan as well as the current Invisible Empire. To hasten recruitment, 
Klansmen distributed literature and klavern admission cards to all 
eligible Protestants. “Real men,” read the cards, “whose oaths are in­
violate are needed. Upon . . . the recommendation of your friends 
you are given an opportunity to become a member of the most 
powerful secret non-political organization in existence, one that has 
the most sublime lineage in history. . . .” 18 Similar appeals, along 
with application blanks, were mailed from Denver to 700 Colorado 
Springs business and professional men. The Denver stamp was thus 
firmly affixed, and the Pikes Peak klavern could not shake the local 
stigma of being a pawn of outsiders. Rumors also spread that the 
Klan was attempting to infiltrate the Colorado College student 
body.19
The Colorado Springs Klan manipulated the Catholic menace, 
repeating the usual refrains concerning priestly corruption and 
scheming Knights of Columbus. The kleagles further claimed that 
large numbers of Catholics were seeking political office in an at­
tempt to seize the city government. When these allegations col­
lapsed in the face of Catholic passivity, the Klan was forced to sell 
itself as insurance against a potential papal plot. The danger was not
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immediate and, according to the former Klexter, the Klan’s focus 
“seemed to be more anti-Pope than anti-Catholic.” 20 Colorado 
Springs Klansmen did not organize boycotts or burn crosses to in­
timidate Catholics; friendships with Catholics w^ ere maintained. 
“Put only Americans on Guard” became the Klan’s main solution to 
Colorado Springs’ Catholic “problem.”
Lawr and order, the Klan’s other major thrust, also failed to 
arouse much enthusiasm. Bootleggers were present in Colorado 
Springs and El Paso County, but vigorous law enforcement kept 
their activities at a minimum. During the early 1920s the city was 
spared any serious outbreaks of crime. Parental concern about 
“flaming youth” and changing moral values did, however, create 
Klansmen and women. In the winter and spring of 1923 “social in­
vestigator” Elizabeth S. Morse lashed the community for its immoral 
ways in a series of reports to women’s groups and parent-teacher as­
sociations. Morse warned parents about adolescent petting parties 
and formulated rules to prohibit “the suggestive form of dancing.” 
She reserved her sharpest words for the parked car, “which we see 
as we drive along the highway at any hour of the night, drawn to one 
side of the road, and which in every single instance conceals some­
one’s son or daughter . . . brother or sister. That darkened, cur­
tained auto is the greatest evil of the age, and it is time we protest—  
that we demand that this shameful practice shall be abolished.” 21 
While anti-Catholicism and anxiety about moral laxity drew 
men, these grievances lacked the urgency to energize the move­
ment. Government officials, except upon the moral reform prob­
lem, w^ ere responsive to citizens’ demands, and community conflict 
was kept at a minimum. With conditions relatively tranquil, the Klan 
had the greatest recruiting success with its non-issue features of fra- 
ternalism and fellowship. No attempt was made to enroll men on the 
basis o f issues outside the immediate environment. Thus Colorado 
Springs kleagles never preached against the evils of the newr urban 
orientation of American life. Nor was Denver crucified as a sister 
city of either Sodom or Gomorrah. Except for difficulties with 
“flaming youth,” Klansmen seemed quite comfortable in the twen­
tieth century. If the leadership had been content to administer a 
lodge, the Klan might have settled into a more placid and conven­
tional existence. But, at the insistence of the Grand Dragon, Klan 
officers arrayed the order as a contender for power. Pikes Peak Klan 
No. 11 stood, at its height, upon a membership base of 2,000 men, 
but fraternalism w7ould prove a poor foundation upon w'hich to 
build nonmember support.22
54
Thrust toward the South
II
The Klan attracted men throughout El Paso County, but the 
majority resided in Colorado Springs and its suburbs. Klan strength 
concentrated in the city’s southern and western precincts which 
were predominantly lower middle and working class. The city’s cen­
tral and affluent northern districts were heavily anti-Klan. Colorado 
Springs’ twenty-five Klan leaders were drawn from all socioeco­
nomic strata of the Protestant population except the elite. Just over 
one-third of the men held occupations in the two highest status 
groups, far below Denver, where nearly three-quarters of the lead­
ers belonged in these categories. Unlike other klaverns, Klan No. 11 
drew heavily from the working class, choosing eight or almost one- 
third of its officers from blue-collar ranks. Such a high percentage 
may be a reflection of the influence and numbers of a large working- 
class Klan population or of the opposition’s ability to deter signifi­
cant numbers of men of higher occupational status from joining. 
Those holding nonmanual occupations were also unfamiliar with 
power and did not play prominent roles in the city’s political or eco­
nomic affairs. A long-time resident observed that, except for John 
Little, a former district judge and Exalted Cyclops, “ I can’t think of 
anyone with any promise . . . who was ever active or affiliated in the 
Klan.” 23 The leaders differed sharply as to their length of residence 
in the city. Fourteen of the men had lived in Colorado Springs for 
seven years or less, eleven Klansmen three years or less. At the same 
time, six men had resided in the community for seventeen years 
or more. The mean length of residence for the Klansmen was 8.6 
years, significantly lower than the 14.5 years averaged by Denver’s 
leaders. Thus Klan leaders suffered not only external constraints 
but personal inadequacies as well. Occupationally, the men com­
manded little influence or respect. Their short residence in the com­
munity probably restricted knowledge of local people and condi­
tions. So necessary to Klan success in Denver, the leadership variable 
in Colorado Springs must be assigned a negative value.24
III
In 1923 Klansmen quietly recruited and initiated new members 
at weekly meetings in the Woodmen of the World Hall on Colorado 
Avenue and Twenty-fifth Street. Regular outdoor konklaves took 
place in a field fifteen miles east of Colorado Springs, and special 
ceremonies were held in Manitou and the Garden of the Gods, a
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spacious mountain park west o f the city. Lodge meetings were de­
voted to discussions of activities, ritual work, and an occasional so­
cial evening with Klanswomen. A few Klan troubles did surface. The 
Jayhawker American, a Kansas Klan newspaper, reported that the Col­
orado Springs organization was “progressing steadily, taking advan­
tage of the experience of too rapid choice of alleged Americans.” 25 
Internal dissension thus appears to have been another in a growing 
list o f deficiencies that required remedy. Confidence men were also 
in the city posing as kleagles and collecting klectokens. Aside from a 
few cross burnings the Klan avoided overt provocation.26
The strength o f the anti-Klan forces dissipated without direct 
confrontation and a visible foe. Agitation was suspended except in 
the Colorado Springs newspapers, which continued their campaign 
to drive the Klan from the city. Newspaper editorials evoked an oc­
casional condemnation of the Klan from the pulpits. The Reverend 
Celian Ufford of All Souls Unitarian Church denounced the Klan as 
“hypocritical, un-American and ridiculous. This nation . . . cannot 
long tolerate even partial dictatorship from any sort of empire, 
especially when that empire’s members are a mob of sore-heads pa­
rading about under the cloak of sheets and pillow cases.” 27 The Rev­
erend Raymond Burke in a speech to an assembly of Colorado Con- 
gregationalists and evangelist A. E. Lickey similarly censured the 
Klan. Only the Colorado Springs Pillar o f Fire Church publicly de­
fended the organization.28
The Colorado Springs Ku Klux Klan chose nearby Fountain, 
Colorado, as the site of its first and only public appearance. On Jan­
uary 6, 1924, sixteen hooded and robed Klansmen filed into the 
First Baptist Church and presented the Reverend C. F. Thomas 
with a fifty-dollar donation. Reports that Thomas was working as a 
day laborer to support his family spurred the Klan’s gift. Thomas 
gratefully accepted the money and remarked to his congregation, 
“If America is to be saved, as saved she must be from untimely 
thralldom, take it from me, the K.K.K. is the salvation of America 
today.” 29 The donation caused an uproar in the church. The board 
of trustees defended the congregation against a Klan smear, con­
tending that the majority opposed the “un-American” order. A week 
after the incident the board accepted Thomas’s resignation. The 
Klan followed the church visitation with an attempt to polish its law 
and order image. On January 22 Klansmen burned a huge cross to 
note the closing of the Colorado Sheriffs’ Association convention. 
As the cross burned, the sheriffs received a bouquet of roses and a
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letter praising their efforts against crime and “un-American tenden­
cies.” The sheriffs ignored the Klan’s offering.30
The Klan shrank from these two rebuffs and, except for an oc­
casional recruiting ploy and fiery cross, was silent for over a year. 
Colorado Springs Klansmen exerted little influence in the 1924 pri­
mary and general elections. Their only candidate denied Klan 
membership and still lost. Not until April and May, 1925, did the 
Klan surreptitiously grab for municipal government control, but 
again anti-Klansmen rallied to block the attempt.
Without effective leadership and explosive issues, Pikes Peak 
Klan No. 11 was never able to establish itself as a necessary presence 
or even to develop a clear identity. The Klan enlisted 2,000 men, but 
for a town the size of Colorado Springs, this figure is surprisingly 
low; that is, a greater proportion of the population of small towns 
and cities tended to join the Klan than in Denver. Inexperienced 
leaders suggested issues and then discarded them, finally having to 
rely primarily upon a fraternal message. Seemingly oblivious to the 
lodge joiner membership, they later unwisely pushed their reluctant 
charges toward political action and subsequent defeat. Unstable lead­
ership also lessened the Klan’s impact. Four men served as Exalted 
Cyclops during the short life of the Colorado Springs Klan, two of 
whom were deposed before the expiration of their terms. Internal 
dissension similarly struck the women’s auxiliary. In addition, the 
Klan could not find an issue to arouse the community. The city’s Cath­
olics, Jews, and blacks were quiet and posed no threat to white Protes­
tant rule. Law enforcement officials were coping well with the crime 
situation while Colorado clergymen deflated Klan claims to Protes­
tant purity. The order did not even possess sufficient political and 
economic leverage to force hesitant men to conform. An uninspired 
leadership combined with an insipid program failed, moreover, to 
erase the Colorado Springs Klan’s early reputation for recklessness. 
Impotence and isolation stemmed not only from a disinterested and 
insufficient membership but from the failure to attract the support 
of tolerant or sympathetic non-Klansmen. As in all Colorado towns 
and cities, Colorado Springs Klansmen were a minority unable to 
gain power without the backing of this crucial bloc. Their votes, 
instead, went to the candidates of a vigorous anti-Klan movement 
which exercised considerable influence upon public opinion.31
The anti-Klan resistance effort was the most important cause 
o f the Klan’s failure to win power. Although unable to prevent the 
formation o f klavern No. 11, the opinion-making public had early
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forced the Klan on the defensive. Colorado Springs newspapers and 
churches refused to remain neutral and assailed the Klan as a threat 
to the harmony and prosperity of the community. The city and 
county governments and especially the police department resisted 
all Klan entreaties. The Colorado Springs city council refused even 
to grant a parade permit to the secret society. The El Paso County 
Republican and Democratic parties similarly remained free of Klan 
influence. Colorado Springs’ multipronged attack had created a 
mood of anti-Klan intolerance, thus sharply inhibiting a kleagles 
ability to enlist recruits.32
Much of the anti-Klan’s advantage was rooted in the caliber of 
its membership. Anti-Klansmen organized the bipartisan Citizens’ 
Committee to counter the Klan’s challenge in the spring, 1925, mu­
nicipal and school board elections. The committee’s membership list 
was a roll call of the social, economic, political, and intellectual elite 
of Colorado Springs. The president of Colorado College, the city 
manager, several city councilmen, and a Republican national com­
mitteeman joined Colorado Springs labor leaders, ministers, and 
prominent business and professional men in opposition to the Klan. 
The twenty-six men who constituted the executive committee of the 
organization included a former Colorado governor, the county at­
torney, the managing editor of the Colorado Springs Gazette and Tele­
graph, and several millionaires.33 Three-quarters of the committee­
men engaged in high nonmanual occupations while the remainder 
followed middle nonmanual pursuits. More than one-half of the 
Klan’s leaders were employed in occupations below middle non­
manual. Almost one-third of the committee’s leaders were listed in 
Who’s Who in Colorado, and several were members of the exclusive El 
Paso Club. None of the Klan’s officers shared these distinctions. Ac­
cording to a former Colorado Springs anti-Klansman, “These are 
the fellows that ran the town.” 34 Occupationally and socially more 
prestigious than their Klan counterparts, the anti-Klansmen had 
also lived in Colorado Springs for longer periods. Twenty-three of 
the men resided in the city for thirteen years or more. Only one 
member of the executive committee, a Colorado College professor, 
had lived in the community for less than three years.35
The opposition repeatedly condemned the Klan for breeding 
hatred and attempting to usurp the functions of government. But 
altruism and libertarian sentiments, while crucial, were not the only 
motives of the anti-Klan. Many Colorado Springs businessmen 
turned to the Citizens’ Committee fearing that Klan-engendered 
strife would disrupt the tourist trade and hinder the economic de-
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velopment of the region. The Klan as a movement of the powerless, 
led by relative unknowns, also threatened to dislodge the commu­
nity’s ruling elite from its positions of political influence. Unwilling 
to share power or even allow the Klan access to decision-making, the 
elite responded in two ways. Elite group members launched, di­
rected, and financed the Citizens’ Committee to mobilize private re­
sources necessary to secure their control over the community. In 
addition, government officials, at the prompting of the elite, con­
demned the Klan, denied it privileges, and threatened to dismiss 
any employees who joined the secret society. The utilization of these 
public and private resources was sufficient to deny the Klan influ­
ence in the city. The combination of antipathy to hooded rule and 
self-interest proved overwhelming/6
The frustrations and failures of Pikes Peak Klan No. 11 were 
duplicated in only a few scattered Colorado communities. Colorado 
Springs Klansmen had early become targets of derision, unable to 
justify their existence. The reverse of the Denver Klan experience 
had occurred. In Colorado Springs it was the anti-Klan organization 
which had a galvanizing issue, strong leadership, and the support of 
a united opinion-making public. Easy access to abundant govern­
ment and private resources combined with high marks on the mobi­
lization variables sealed the Klan’s fate. The Klan’s internal and ex­
ternal weaknesses were glaringly apparent in the early months of
1924, a year before its final defeat. The life of the Colorado Springs 
klavern was prolonged only because an overt incident sufficient to 
mobilize the anti-Klan forces had not previously materialized. ,
IV ' ■ \
In Pueblo on Sunday night, April 29, 1923, the congregation of 
the Broadway Christian Church gathered as usual for evening ser­
vices. In the middle of the second verse of the hymn “Oh Sometimes 
the Shadow's Are Deep,” the doors of the church swung open and 
three hooded and robed members of Pueblo Klan No. 5 marched 
down the aisle toward the Reverend Gus Rarhage. The Klansmen 
handed Ramage an envelope containing twenty-five dollars, a gift 
from the 1,600-member klavern for a favorable sermon delivered a 
few days before. The Klan enclosed a letter with the donation which 
Ramage read to his startled congregation:
We are a Christian militant organization and are ever ready
to stand behind the Protestant Church as long as it remains
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Protestant. We are not Anti-Catholic, Anti-Jew, Anti-Negro, or 
Anti-anything, but are p r o - A m e r i c a n . We stand by the Govern­
ment of the United States, its Constitution, and Laws and pro­
tect same unto d e a t h  . . .
We are strictly American and stand for f r ee  p u b l ic  s c h o o l s ,
FREE PRESS, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, WHITE SUPREM­
ACY, PROTECTION OF OUR PURE WOMAN-HOOD and THE ELIMINA­
TION OF GRAFT IN PUBLIC OFFICES and will assist THE OFFICERS OF 
THE LAW IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE.37
The Klansmen departed after joining the congregation in prayer.
The Ku Klux Klan’s first public appearance shocked Pueblo. 
Only five months before the Pueblo Chieftain had assured residents 
that the city was free o f Klansmen. No news of local Klan meetings 
or recruiting had been reported and kleagles were thought to be far 
off. Especially frightening was the Klan’s claim of 1,600 recruits. 
Fears were justified a week later when more than 1,000 uniformed 
Klansmen burned a forty-foot cross illuminating Pueblo’s north 
side. The Klan had secretly arrived early in 1922 and found Pue­
blos Protestants ready for organizing.38
The Klan’s target was a major manufacturing center with 181 
factories employing almost 10,500 men and women. The Colorado 
Fuel and Iron Company, the largest steel plant west of Chicago, 
dominated Pueblo’s industrial life and engaged nearly 6,000 work­
ers. Pueblo’s population in 1920 was 43,050, an increase of only 
1,300 people since 1910. The city’s 1,395 blacks comprised just 3.2 
percent of the population, an absolute and relative decline from the 
previous decade. In 1916 there were only 100 Jews in Pueblo, but by
1926 the number had increased twelvefold. One-third of the city 
was Roman Catholic.39
Surprisingly, the Pueblo Klan did not stress the Jewish influx or 
the large Catholic minority when recruiting men. Kleagles repeated 
local complaints concerning Jewish economic power and Catholic 
political maneuvering, but this was not the main impulse. A Klan 
advertisement declared, “We sing no hymns of hate against the Jew. 
He is interested in his own things and we are exercising the same 
privilege of banding our own kind together. . . .” 40 Similarly, busi­
nessman Henry Robinson observed that religious bigotry “was in the 
background . . . they weren’t pushing it.” 41 More important in rais­
ing Klansmen and klectokens was the coupling of certain elements 
in the foreign-born community to the breakdown of law and order.42 
The Colorado Fuel and Iron Company’s steel mills and coal
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mines attracted Austrians, Slovenes, Greeks, Japanese, and thirty 
other nationalities to Pueblo. By 1920 immigrants accounted for 17 
percent of the population, with an additional 17 percent second- 
generation Americans. Most settled in heavily Eastern European 
Bessemer, just west of the C.F. and I. plant, and the Grove district 
near the Arkansas River. The city’s two largest ethnic groups, the 
Mexicans and the Italians, established separate colonies. The major­
ity of Pueblo’s 1,882 Mexicans lived two miles east of the city in Salt 
Creek. Poorly paid and without adequate housing, they occupied 
the society’s lowest rungs. Long before the Klan’s appearance, re­
ligious and cultural differences had generated prejudice, discrim­
ination, and sometimes violence. As late as 1919 a Pueblo mob 
stormed the city jail and lynched two Mexicans accused of murder. 
The Italians occupied Goat Hill on Pueblo’s east side. The earliest 
immigrants arrived in the late nineteenth century and converted the 
redlight district into “an old world Italian village.” 43 The self-con­
tained settlement observed traditional holidays, spoke Italian, and 
supported three weekly newspapers. Less traditional ties to Italy 
were also maintained; in 1923 plans were made to organize a local 
chapter of Mussolini’s Blackshirts.44
The heterogeneous foreign-born population was a constant 
source of irritation. Native-born Puebloans considered the immi­
grants’ isolation and interdependence to be self-imposed barriers 
to assimilation. The Klan early accepted these judgments, maintain­
ing “that a divided allegiance means no allegiance. There can be no 
half Americans, and any sort o f hyphen absolutely makes impossible 
any kind of loyalty to the American government, its ideals and 
institutions.” 45 The image of the immigrant as lawbreaker, how­
ever, outweighed these apprehensions. A Pueblo grand jury re­
vealed that “ninety percent of the bootleggers and gamblers are for­
eign born and that a great many of these are not even naturalized 
citizens.” 46 Commissioner of Public Safety George J. Stumpf con­
curred: “Our greatest handicap . . .  [in fighting crime] is our great 
foreign population, as most of the lawbreakers are aliens, prin­
cipally Italians. . . .” 47 The newspapers printed the nationalities of 
law violators, thus strengthening the immigrant identification with 
crime.
Much of Pueblo’s heightened criminal activity stemmed from 
prohibition law violations. Unswayed by traditional Protestant mo­
rality, immigrants failed to equate winemaking and bootlegging with 
sin. Litde Italy, in particular, refused to go dry and continued to 
supply the city’s needs. The police responded with door-to-door li­
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quor searches in Little Italy and the Grove district with Italian 
names dominating arrest reports. Even more alarming was a series 
of murders linked to the liquor trade. Between 1922 and 1926 ten 
men were killed in the Italian neighborhood, casualties of a w'ar for 
control between two “blackhand” factions. In 1923 the blackhand 
feud spread to Bessemer when two Italian homes were bombed. All 
of the murderers and bombers evaded capture. Members of the po­
lice prohibition squad also received death threats with the black- 
hand symbol.48
Pueblo County roadhouses offered another challenge to law 
and morality. “Road houses,” charged Federal Judge J. Foster Symes, 
“are the worst type of places where liquor is kept and sold . . . be­
cause in these houses young girls are ruined and boys are led 
astray.” 49 The parked automobile, another symbol of changing stan­
dards, was seen more frequently along rural Pueblo roads. Despite 
protests, officials failed to close the resorts or clear the highways.
Rampant bootlegging, unsolved murders, and notorious road­
houses eroded the community’s confidence in its police force. The
1923 Pueblo grand jury lamented, “If it is true that all officers are 
doing their duty, then the feeling of the jury can be expressed: 
‘Good Lord have mercy on us!’” 50 Frustration produced angry 
accusations of police corruption which official denials failed to 
assuage. To be concerned about the crime situation, then, was not 
evidence of fanaticism or abnormality. Nor were such grievances 
confined to Klansmen. All law-abiding citizens feared for their own 
safety and that of their families in the face of the authorities’ ineffec­
tiveness. The key difference between Klansmen and other Pueb- 
loans w^ as the formers’ belief that they could do something about the 
problem. Many agreed with the editor of the Pueblo Chieftain when 
he wrote, “Much of the present spirit of lawlessness, and much of 
the inclination to seek an instrument o f justice outside of the courts 
and the public officers, is due to the general belief that crime is not 
punished as it ought to be. . . .” 51
The Klan presented itself as just such an “instrument of jus­
tice,” able to succeed where law enforcement officials had failed. 
Klan organizers judged the crime problem so acute that other ap­
peals were either neglected or treated perfunctorily. Methodist min­
ister and Klan sympathizer T. C. Collister dramatically exhorted 
Pueblo to service: “If our officials cannot enforce the law we should 
teach them how7. I have no respect for the official who winks at the 
law. There have been many battles in past times, but none greater 
than this. We are in a fight to keep mens homes bright— to protect
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our wives and our children.” 32 Klansmen awaited only the oppor­
tunity to do their duty.
During 1923 the Pueblo Klan gathered strength and proudly 
displayed it. In June the Pueblo klavern hosted a meeting of Denver, 
Aguilar, La Junta, and other southern Colorado Klansmen. An esti­
mated 3,200 Klansmen assembled in a field north of the city to initi­
ate 200 men. Following the naturalization ceremony, the crowd of 
Klansmen and their families were entertained with speeches, songs, 
and a barbecue dinner. Klansmen ignited crosses again in Septem­
ber when several hundred more recruits took the oath. These ac­
tivities were major social events attended by entire families, serving 
also as lures to attract new members. During the winter Klansmen 
were compelled to meet in the more mundane International Order 
of Odd Fellows Building at Seventh Street and Grand Avenue. The 
Pueblo Klan closed the year with its exclusive greeting: six crosses 
were burned in and around the city on Christmas day. The incident 
was never investigated.53
Pueblo’s opinion-making public did not resist Klan encroach­
ments. The Pueblo Chieftain had repeatedly rebuked the organiza­
tion in 1921 and 1922. Just a few months before the Klan’s ap­
pearance the editor contended that “the people’s government can 
tolerate no rival. The processes of justice can never be administered 
successfully in secret by irresponsible agents acting independently 
of the law or in defiance of the public officials. . . .” 54 The Klan’s 
presence in Pueblo triggered a sharp shift in position. The new 
stance was broached in an editorial in the June 29, 1923, edition. 
“Under present conditions,” remarked the Chieftain, “almost all that 
can be said about this organization must begin with an 'if.’” The 
newspaper opposed the Klan if it fostered religious intolerance or 
assumed the role of a vigilance committee. Yet the editor found the 
Klan’s “mystery” and “mummery” healthy outlets for civilized men. 
Moreover, the Klan could harness support for law enforcement, 
good government, and public decency and as such “should be com­
mended and approved.” 55 The Chieftain avoided further comment 
about the local organization. The Pueblo Star-Journal, the city’s other 
major newspaper, similarly ignored the issue. Puebloans never or­
ganized an opposition movement to challenge Klan assertions and 
battle for the public’s mind. The failure to mobilize probably re­
flected the success of the Klan’s leaders and program. By keying it­
self to very real community concerns about law and order, avoiding 
confrontation with established groups, and refraining from racial 
and religious offenses, it escaped even the minimal resistance en­
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countered in Denver. Former U.S. Congessman John A. Martin de­
livered Pueblo’s only recorded anti-Klan speech. On Flag Day in
1924 he denounced the Klan but advised his listeners not to “take 
this organization too seriously, it cannot live and will not live.” 56 
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The Klan built strong bases o f support in the Reverend T. C. 
Collister’s Northern Avenue Methodist Church near Bessemer, the 
Reverend George Lowe’s East Side Baptist Church, and the Broad­
way Christian Church. Lowe was especially influential, serving as 
the local klavern’s Exalted Cyclops. Again the Klan followed the pat­
tern o f employing pre-existing groups as the foundation for mobi­
lization. Data concerning age, place of birth, and military service 
were available for sixteen o f the Pueblo Klan’s twenty-six leaders. 
Twelve of the men joined the Klan when they were forty years of 
age or older; the leaders’ mean age was 44.5 years. Only two men in 
their twenties were able to penetrate the ranks of the middle-aged 
leadership. In light of their ages it is not surprising that eleven 
never served in the nation’s armed forces, while four had volun­
teered for duty in 1898 and one was a veteran of World War I. 
Pueblo Klan leaders, like their Denver counterparts, were not recent 
migrants, having lived in their city an average of 14.8 years. Only 
eight of Pueblo’s twenty-six Klan officers, as compared to nearly 
two-thirds in Colorado Springs, had lived in the city seven years or 
less; one-fifth, as opposed to nearly one-half, had lived there three 
years or less. Long residence in the community facilitated the for­
mation o f fraternal ties. Fraternal membership information was ob­
tained for fifteen o f the leaders and reveals that all but four wore 
two or more lodge pins. The most popular fraternity was the Ma­
sons, to which thirteen of the Klansmen belonged. Obviously, few 
held memberships in the American Legion or the Veterans of For­
eign Wars. In Pueblo, as in Denver, the marginal were absent and 
the fraternally integrated present in Klan leadership positions.57
Klan leaders were also well established in their careers. Almost 
three-quarters o f the men held high or middle nonmanual occupa­
tions while only three wore blue collars. Doctors and lawyers ap­
peared in the hierarchy, yet more than one-fourth of the leaders 
were small businessmen, with the rest scattered among fifteen dif­
ferent occupations. Their occupational histories reveal that twelve 
were in the same occupational status group during the 1920s as 
when they first entered the Pueblo work force. Three others were
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moving upward occupationally and three were downwardly mobile. 
When occupations held as Klansmen are considered, the upwardly 
mobile group increased to six men with no change in the other cat­
egories. Secure fraternally and economically, the Klansmen had, 
in addition, settled down to family life. Only one member o f the 
Pueblo leadership remained unmarried. Apparently the outcasts, 
and failures o f society were unable to penetrate the hierarchy. The 
respectability and prestige of the Pueblo officers matched the Den­
ver leaders and likewise stimulated Klan growth.58
VI
On January 28 the 1924 Pueblo grand jury assailed the police 
department in a scathing report about crime conditions. The jury's 
investigation exposed dozens of “vice dens” where prostitutes, gam­
blers, and bootleggers conducted business unhampered. The report 
sparked renewed demands for law and order as well as action inde­
pendent of the police. The next day police officers padlocked thirty- 
one of the offending businesses but failed to calm the furor. The 
grand jurors called a law and order meeting for February 8 to orga­
nize the Law Enforcement League. Invitations were sent to civic, 
fraternal, and social organizations warning: “Almost from coast to 
coast Pueblo is being proclaimed the haven for the unemployed and 
encouragement given, probably inducements also, for the weary 
Willies and other ne’er-do-wells to flock hither. . . .  It behooves us to 
spread the word that we’re cleaning house, and that henceforth o u r  
HOUSE WILL BE KEPT CLEAN.” 59
Klan representatives George Lowe and A. P. DeVore, the Great 
Titan of the Southern Provinces, were among the 800 men and 
women who attended the meeting. The gathering enabled residents 
to express their grievances concerning inadequate police protection 
and particularly the absence of liquor law enforcement. Klansman 
DeVore also focused attention upon local immorality: “Last night in 
a trip about the city and suburbs I counted 27 automobiles parked at 
secluded spots along the highway.” 60 The meeting concluded with 
the creation o f a committee assigned to formulate plans for in­
creased public participation in law enforcement. Ten men, includ­
ing Lowe and DeVore, were appointed to the committee a week 
later.61
The Klan, perhaps as a result o f its minority position or to tac­
tically reassert its leadership upon the issue, decided to act indepen­
dently of the league. On February 23 and 24 DeVore and fellow
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Klansman Sheriff Samuel Thomas led fifty men on liquor raids into 
south Pueblo. The raiders targeted forty-two suspected bootlegging 
sites but made only seven arrests because they lacked search war­
rants. A disappointed member of the raiding party claimed that “the 
places we went to were tipped off and that is why we couldn’t get 
anything.” 62 Thereafter, Klansmen and their sympathizers contin­
ued the fight in their own weekly law and order meetings. “We need 
men,” said Reverend Lowe, “who will carry the load and not throw it 
off. . . . Just as long as I can lift my voice and my feet will carry me I 
am going to stay on the job until the town is cleaned up.” 03
The Klan’s stand for law7 and order was well received in Trin­
idad, Walsenburg, and other southern Colorado towns. As in Pue­
blo, immigrants and corrupt police officials w7ere blamed for the 
crime epidemic. Judge David M. Ralston of the Las Animas County 
court charged the bootlegging traffic to “foreigners, who by educa­
tion and training believe in the use o f intoxicating liquors.” The 
bootleggers, he continued, “are well organized and, in a community 
such as ours, wield considerable political power” 64 A Trinidad 
Klansman declared, “The authorities of this country have absolutely 
turned their back and refused to even attempt to rid this community 
of violators of the Eighteenth Amendment. . . . We have absolute 
proof that the deputy sheriffs . . . are, or have recently been in the 
bootlegging business.” 65 Three hundred fifty Klansmen paraded 
the streets of Walsenburg on January 19, 1924, to protest the mur­
ders of the chief of police and his deputy by an Italian bootlegger. 
The Klansmen marched in silence before cheering crowds, their 
banners linking the planks of the Klan platform: “The Bootlegger 
Must Go,” “America for Americans,” and “We’re for Restricted Im­
migration.” The Klan was needed, wrote a Walsenburg member, be­
cause “the environment with these law violators running loose is not 
fit to raise children. . . . Our law enforcers are rotten and will not 
arrest or prosecute any man, no matter what his crime. . . .” 66 The 
crime situation was not a fabrication. Some immigrants were dis­
obeying the law, and government officials either connived in its vio­
lation or were unable to deal with the widespread problem. Un­
protected by the authorities, many citizens assumed responsibility 
for their own safety by joining the Ku Klux Klan. Their solution, 
whether right or wrong, was an act of confrontation, not avoidance, 
of an immediate crisis.67
Southern Colorado Klansmen, although preoccupied with the 
law and order issue, devoted much attention to charity. The Klans­
men o f Trinidad raised $1,000 for the local Christian Church and
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$100 for the Italian Presbyterian Church. Klansmen also visited the 
African Methodist Church and donated $254. In Olney Springs 
Klansmen contributed to the Methodist Episcopal Church in appre­
ciation for a pro-Klan sermon. Pueblo Klansmen demonstrated 
their support of the public schools with a flag presentation in Au­
gust. Image building and publicity were as responsible for these acts 
as humanitarianism. But the Klan’s focus began to shift from charity 
and law enforcement in the spring and summer of 1924. In Colo­
rado Springs, Pueblo, Trinidad, Walsenburg, and the rest of Colo­
rado, Klansmen drafted plans to capture political control of their 
cities, counties, and state.68
Although only forty-two miles apart, the Klan experiences of 
Colorado Springs and Pueblo were decidedly antithetical. In Colo­
rado Springs the Klan met early and effective resistance. City offi­
cials, religious leaders, veterans’ and lodge groups, members of the 
elite, and the newspapers formed a united front to curtail Klan re­
cruiting and influence. Responsive government authorities and pas­
sive minorities denied the Klan issues with which to excite the Prot­
estant community. The leaders of Pikes Peak Klan No. 11, moreover, 
were too conservative, too willing to follow John Locke’s orders in­
stead of their own instincts. The Klan thus found both avenues to 
power, informal infiltration of government agencies and formal 
electoral efforts, blocked. Conversely, Pueblo kleagles encountered 
Protestants quite receptive to the Klan program, having already 
forged the immigrant link to crime. Preached by leading Puebloans, 
the Klan solution snared men and women fearful of uncontrolled 
foreign-born lawbreakers. Pueblo citizens did not oppose the Ku 
Klux Klan; on the contrary, they welcomed it. The evidence gath­
ered from Pueblo’s and Colorado Springs’ encounters with the Klan 
bolsters the conclusions reached in the Denver case. Considering the 
circumstances, the Klan was a realistic response to legitimate griev­
ances and needs. Normal men created and participated in the orga­
nization because local problems threatened to disrupt accustomed 
lifestyles. Acceptance or rejection, influence or impotence, again 
proved to be a function of the four variables of leadership, issues, 
governmental responsiveness, and community perceptions.
CHAPTER FOUR
TR IU M P H  AT T H E  POLLS
The Klan is in politics and in deep. I f  you dont believe it, ask Al Smith.
G. K. Minor
National lecturer, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan
On May 13, 1924, Klan leaders from all over the state secretly 
gathered in Denver to mark the first anniversary of the Colorado 
realm of the Invisible Empire. Grand Dragon Locke called the 
klorero to order at 10:00 a .m . and then yielded the rostrum to 
speakers who expounded upon such customary Klan themes as 
“Law Enforcement,” “ Klannishness,” and “Americanism ” With the 
speeches completed, Locke focused the meeting’s attention upon 
“Future Activities,” the upcoming primary and general elections. 
He outlined a plan of political organization designed to win Colo­
rado’s two U.S. Senate seats, the governorship, control o f the state 
legislature, and scores of county offices. Every county was assigned a 
Klan major who appointed a captain to each bloc of six precincts. 
The major also selected a committee of three “emergency men” 
capable of managing any component of the county organization. 
Captains designated a sergeant for each precinct, who in turn chose 
corporals if more than six Klansmen resided in his area of respon­
sibility. To the sergeants and corporals was handed the primary mis­
sion o f corraling voters, registering them, and inducing them to 
vote. The organization demanded strict discipline and a regular 
flow of information up the chain of command. “Our success,” con­
cluded the report, “is found in the abnegation of self. This is the 
realization o f the dream o f a movement as silent as the tomb— as 
impending as death.” 1 Locke later boasted that Klan regulations
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were modeled “on those of the United States army, where the com­
mand o f a superior officer is never questioned . . . and where the 
honor of one is the honor and responsibility of all. Formed on mili­
tary lines it has the added advantage of secrecy maintained by the 
uniform worn by the members. In secrecy resides the element of 
mystery; mystery shrouds strength and members and fear as well/’ 2
With the political structure perfected, the Klan’s next task was 
to enlarge its voting bloc and financial base. In the spring of 1924 
membership drives were launched throughout the state. Locke 
toured northern Colorado and the Western Slope founding new 
Klans and chartering provisional organizations. The Denver Klan, 
preparing also for the mayoral recall election in August, increased 
its kleagle sales force, promising a salary of $100 per week in ex­
change for fifty new recruits and $500 in klectokens. Other Eastern 
Slope cities and towns followed Klan No. i ’s lead in a more modest 
fashion. By election day Klan leaders could muster the votes of 
35,000 to 40,000 knights of the Invisible Empire in Colorado.1'
The Klan’s electoral campaign eschewed violence and terror­
ism. To overcome its minority position, the Klan chose a route well 
traveled in American history by similarly situated conservatives and 
liberals. The Klan accepted the rules for acquiring power, only fol­
lowing them more diligently than their opponents. The secret or­
ganization’s preparations, discipline, and purpose at the political 
grass-roots level surprised its blundering adversaries and delivered 
control o f one of the state’s major parties. Absorbing new resources, 
continuing their intensive efforts, and taking advantage of chal­
lengers’ miscalculations, Klansmen were able to triumph where 
many more conventional actors had failed. The minority had begun 
by outmaneuvering the majority and finished by commanding it.
I
In January, 1924, Democratic Governor William E. Sweet an­
nounced his bid for re-election, kicking off the state campaign. 
Elected in 1922 despite allegations of “socialistic tendencies,” Sweet 
worked for a more equitable distribution of the tax burden, state aid 
to farmers through the construction of crop storage warehouses, 
and recognition of labor’s right to bargain collectively. Sweet was 
also Protestant, dry, and bitterly anti-Klan. Two months later thirty- 
six-year-old Morrison Shafroth, a Denver attorney and son of a for­
mer U.S. senator, entered the race for the short-term Senate seat va­
cated when Samuel D. Nicholson died in 1923. His replacement,
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Senator Alva Adams, declared his candidacy for the full-term Sen­
ate seat held by Lawrence Phipps. Shafroth and Adams, like Sweet, 
strongly opposed the Ku Klux Klan. Their candidacies aroused only 
meager resistance, thus affirming the decidedly anti-Klan complex­
ion of the Democratic party. Also indicative, the Democratic state 
convention met in May to choose delegates to the national con­
vention and condemned the Klan by name, a feat which the na­
tional body could not duplicate. The Klan, although repulsed on the 
state level, did successfully infiltrate several county Democratic 
organizations.4
The Republican party proved more susceptible to Klan influ­
ence. Former Governor Oliver Shoup’s decision not to seek office 
threw the race wide open for gubernatorial candidates. The leading 
contender and favorite o f the party hierarchy was Lieutenant Gov­
ernor Robert F. Rockwell, a rancher from the Western Slope. Rock­
well sensed the power o f the Colorado Klan and chose a neutral 
stance to avoid alienating anyone. “I do not regard,” he wrote, “the 
Ku Klux Klan or any other secret organization an issue in this cam­
paign, and I will not be drawn into any controversy over the merits 
or demerits o f any such organization.” He was also careful to add, “I 
am a Protestant and my family have been Protestant residents of this 
country for almost three hundred years.” 5 The Klan’s candidate was 
District Judge Clarence Morley, a member of the Denver Klan and a 
loyal follower of John Galen Locke. Morley made no attempt to dis­
guise his Klan ties, hiring the leader of the Klan’s foreign-born aux­
iliary as campaign manager and speaking at numerous Klan gather­
ings. At one meeting he told his fellow Klansmen: “Not for myself, 
mind you, do I wish to run, but for the benefit of the Klan. We must 
clean up the statehouse and place only Americans on guard.” 6 To 
provide Republicans with an anti-Klan alternative, former Lieuten­
ant Governor Earl Cooley announced his candidacy. If elected, he 
pledged to purge Colorado of this “sinister organization conceived 
in graft, bigotry and plunder [which] has entered our state for the 
sole purpose of creating turmoil, setting neighbor against neighbor, 
exciting class and racial hatreds, [and] injecting religious intolerance 
into our political affairs. . . .” 7
The Grand Dragon endorsed Klansman Rice Means, Denvers 
city attorney, for the short-term Senate vacancy. A decorated vet­
eran of the Spanish-American War and World War I, Means had 
joined the Klan after failing to parlay his military achievements into 
political success. Means’s toughest opponent was Charles Waterman,
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a corporate lawyer from Denver. Waterman had the backing of 
the party’s old guard but was so poor a campaigner that, it was 
claimed, “whenever he shakes a hand, he loses a vote.” 8 Western 
Slope attorney Charles Moynihan also contested the seat, basing his 
campaign on the fact that he alone of the three candidates resided 
outside of Denver. Senator Lawrence Phipps was unchallenged in 
his bid for renomination, yet was given little chance of defeating 
Alva Adams in November. Phipps’s troubles stemmed from an un­
distinguished voting record compounded by his votes against tight­
ening the prohibition laws. Secretary of the Interior Hubert Work 
acknowledged the problem in a letter to former Postmaster General 
Will H. Hays: “It is going to be a big job to get the tide turned in 
favor of Phipps. Everyone admits, ‘He is a good Senator, then adds, 
‘But we can not elect him.’” 9 Phipps, a non-Klansman, believed the 
Klan held the key to his re-election. In return for its endorsement, 
Phipps allegedly contributed a major share of the Klan’s campaign 
funds. Democratic leader Charles Ginsberg described Phipps’s pre­
dicament: “He couldn’t appeal; he couldn’t go out on the street and 
go in front of a labor group and get a vote out of them. But he could 
organize them under Locke. And they’d vote for him religiously be­
cause that was the direction from headquarters. They didn’t know 
why, but they were told to vote for him and they did. . . . He bought 
an organization that he couldn’t have built in any other way.” 10 
Klansmen, their candidates designated, made ready to capture the 
machinery of the Colorado Republican party.11
II
Republican and Democratic county assemblies met in late July 
to nominate candidates for local office and delegates to the state 
convention. The vote for Morley and Means delegates provides a 
rough measure of the centers of Colorado Klan strength. Robert 
Rockwell and Charles Moynihan swept the Western Slope counties, 
with the Klan managing to pick up less than 6 percent of the dele­
gates. On the local level the Klan was slightly more successful. In 
Grand Junction, the largest city on the Western Slope, a few Klans- 
men concealed their secret ties and gathered enough votes in the 
Democratic and Republican conventions to be designated on the 
September primary ballot. The Klan captured one-third of the 
Republican delegates from eastern Colorado, showing significant 
strength in the agricultural counties of Kit Carson, Phillips, and
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Washington. The El Paso County Republican convention cast a 
strong anti-Klan vote, assigning one-third of its delegates to Earl 
Cooley and none to Morley. Colorado Springs Klansman John Little 
denied his membership and was thus able to campaign for the Re­
publican nomination for district attorney in the Fourth Judicial Dis­
trict. All other El Paso County races were free of Klan intrigue.12
Means and Morley delegates fared little better in southern Col­
orado. Anti-Klansman Cooley won almost half of his delegates in 
this region, including a majority of the Otero County contingent. 
Pueblo Klansmen could deliver only one-fourth o f the delegation 
to Morley and one-fifth to Means. The Klan’s poor showing was, 
to a large extent, the result o f the bipartisan nature o f the Pueblo 
klavern; penetrating both county parties, it could not concentrate its 
strength. This tactic, however, enabled the order to assume a non­
partisan stance in the primary and endorse a slate of Klansmen and 
Klanswomen from the two parties.13
Fremont County was the Klan’s bastion in southern Colorado. 
Based in Canon City and Florence, the Klan was so powerful that it 
could split its forces and still dominate the county’s two political par­
ties. Klansmen saturated Republican precinct meetings on July 29 
and captured the party organization. They elected their own com­
mitteemen and women as well as two-thirds of the delegates to the 
county convention. The next day Klan delegates caucused at the 
Canon City klavern and agreed upon convention motions, commit­
tee assignments, and candidate nominations. They did their work 
well— Morley and Means won all twenty state delegates and the en­
tire Klan county slate was designated. The Klan staged an equally 
impressive coup in the county Democratic convention where the 
chairman and three-fourths of the delegates were members of the 
Invisible Empire. Fremont County Klansmen did not agonize about 
possible conflicts between their opposing slates. “Some of the can­
didates nominated,” observed the Florence Paradox, “are to receive 
the support o f the Klan, while others are placed there as dummies 
and will be sacrificed for members o f the Klan on the Democratic 
ticket.” 14
Klan candidates received their greatest support in the Denver 
area. Delegates pledged to Morley and Means swept a majority of 
the precinct selection contests and took control o f the Republican 
county assembly. To increase its leverage, the Klan stationed Denver 
police officers at the entrance to the meeting with orders to deny ad­
mittance to “anyone who was not a member of the klan and, except
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delegates, no one but klansmen had tickets.” 15 Under the guiding 
hand of Dr. Locke, who sat in the mayor’s box in the rear of the au­
ditorium, Klansmen committed 75 percent of their 223-member 
delegation to Morley and 55 percent to Means. The entire Klan 
ticket for county legislative and judicial offices was placed on the pri­
mary ballot. A resolution proposing legislation to open Klan mem­
bership rosters and to prohibit the wearing of masks in public was 
tabled in committee; those objecting were shouted down. The Dem­
ocratic county convention which met at the same time was free 
of Klan influence and passed a resolution denouncing the secret 
society.16
The Republican state convention met in Denver on August 6, 
with the Klan holding less than one-third of the 1,053 delegates. 
Charles Moynihan and Charles Waterman both outpolled Rice 
Means in the Senate race, and Robert Rockwell’s margin over Clar­
ence Morley was two to one. Although the Klan’s candidates were 
beaten for the top designations on the ticket, they did receive enough 
votes to win a place on the primary ballot. “As a result of the action 
of the assembly,” remarked the Denver Post, “a klansman will oppose 
a nonklansman for each office in the primary election. The issue is 
clearly drawn.” 17 The Klan also shrewdly shifted a sufficient number 
of delegate votes to Earl Cooley to ensure his primary designation. 
Rockwell, Moynihan, and Waterman supporters, encouraged by the 
Klan’s impotence, basked in their strong convention showings con­
fident o f success in the September voting.18
The Democrats also gathered in Denver for their state con­
vention. Governor William Sweet set the tone of the meeting with a 
well-received anti-Klan address. Sweet and Alva Adams won their 
party’s designation uncontested while Morrison Shafroth looked 
forward to only token opposition in the primary. But the Democrats, 
like the Republicans, had their Klan wing; a disguised Klansman 
won the nomination for lieutenant governor without opposition. In 
addition, all o f the Democratic candidates for state office in 1924 
were Protestant and native-born.19
The Republican primary campaign began in earnest two weeks 
after the state convention. Both Moynihan and Waterman tried to 
assume the role of party unifier and conducted conservative cam­
paigns designed to cultivate support among all party factions. Rob­
ert Rockwell was also unwilling to jeopardize his front-runner posi­
tion and pursued his preconvention strategy of avoiding the Klan 
issue. “No one,” he wrote, “seems to know what strength the Klan
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will develop and whether it will vote as a unit or not.” He further 
confided to his friend, “You are right in feeling that I should not 
antagonize the K.K.K.s. It certainly is the farthest from my desires 
to do so.” 20 Rockwell stubbornly maintained this course despite Earl 
Cooley’s repeated attempts to badger him to take a stand. Disquiet­
ing reports o f rising Klan momentum denied the wisdom of Rock­
well’s strategy. The Klan invaded Rockwell territory on August 24 
with a political rally and picnic at Brookston on the Western Slope. 
A worried Rockwell supporter from Hayden, Colorado, warned, 
“Several thousand attended and they are wild for Morley— the Klan 
is working a 24 hr. shift and it is going to be hard to beat them.” 21 In 
Grand Junction several hundred members of newly organized Mesa 
County Klan No. 35 staged a dramatic, silent parade through the 
downtown business district. Within two weeks of the Klan’s first ap­
pearance in Grand Junction, Merle Vincent cautioned Rockwell, 
“Local conditions here are difficult to describe. You have a great 
many supporters, but the Morley Klan organization is evidently 
strong.” He later added, “It has reached the point here where some 
men talk o f little else and others are afraid to discuss it at all.” 22 The 
news from the Eastern Slope was equally discouraging. Special 
trains from Greeley, Brush, Fort Morgan, and Denver brought 
Klansmen and their families to Loveland for a parade and political 
meeting. An estimated 20,000 Coloradans, “the largest crowd ever 
seen in Loveland,” gathered at the fairgrounds and “loudly ap­
plauded” speakers favoring the candidacies of Clarence Morley and 
Rice Means.23
Morley, sure of his Klan support, played down his secret debts 
to expand his base among Republican voters. He promised to cut 
government spending, tighten the prohibition laws, and help farm­
ers raise agricultural prices. Morley also attempted to prove his reg­
ular Republicanism with staunch declarations of loyalty to the na­
tional platform and the Calvin Coolidge-Charles Dawes ticket. 
Morley’s identification with the Klan was so strong, however, that 
such posturing probably convinced few non-Klansmen. Means’s 
Klan backing was less secure and he found it necessary to harp upon 
the need for strong immigration laws and the dangers of foreign- 
language newspapers. Means had only praise for the Ku Klux Klan, 
describing it as “the greatest institution for good in America to­
day.” 24 If elected, he vowed to launch God’s program for the mental, 
moral, and physical purification of the United States. This program 
entailed federal regulation of all public and private schools, strength­
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ening of the prohibition and immigration laws, and military training 
for every American. “Unless this be done/’ Means said, “we can not 
carry out the plan which God intended shall be carried out by this 
people.” 25
The Klan issue was muted in Colorado Springs, Greeley, Grand 
Junction, and Pueblo local elections. Lines were drawn tight, how­
ever, in Fremont and Denver counties, as anti-Klansmen rallied 
from their convention defeats and mobilized for political action. A 
week before the primary election Fremont County Republicans and 
Democrats organized the anti-Klan Independent party and en­
dorsed candidates for county offices. The party platform declared 
in favor of prohibition, law and order, and government economy, 
making the Klan the sole topic of the campaign. The anti-Klan front 
became even more formidable when it harnessed the enthusiastic 
support o f the Canon City Daily Record, the county’s largest news­
paper. Although the complete Independent party ticket would not 
appear until the November election, the anti-Klan group hoped that 
its candidates already on the primary ballot would be bolstered by a 
strong vote of support.26
In Denver too prominent Republicans led by District Attorney 
Philip Van Cise formed the Visible Government League to fight the 
Ku Klux Klan. The League organized a successful petition drive 
which gathered enough signatures to field an anti-Klan county 
ticket in the Republican primary. The Klan stepped up its campaign 
activities to meet the challenge. Klan leaders decreed that failure to 
register to vote was sufficient grounds for suspension from the In­
visible Empire. Regular Klan business was postponed and biweekly 
klavern meetings were devoted to political speeches, campaign pep 
talks, and the initiation of new voters. Candidates awaited the sum­
mons of the Grand Dragon to appear on South Table Mountain and 
pledge fealty to the Ku Klux Klan. The secret order’s endorsement 
proved quite expensive. Grand Dragon Locke vowed that the Klan 
“would not support any man . . . [who] did not sign his name to the 
dotted line, to all the promises and pledges that the Klan would de­
mand.” 27 Candidates also signed undated resignation forms in re­
turn for the Klan nod.28
The climax of the Denver campaign occurred on September 4, 
when Philip Van Cise rented the city auditorium and invited Den­
verites to an expose of Klan secrets. His talk, entitled “Morley and 
the Courts— The Klan Boycott,” w^ as an incisive condemnation of 
Klan attempts to ruin Catholic businessmen, influence judges and
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juries, and disrupt the Republican party. But Van Cise was never 
heard. On Locke’s orders, Klansmen and women flooded the hall, 
comprising 70 percent of the audience. Although instructed to re­
main silent, they could not contain their anger. The result was, in 
the words of a Denver Express reporter, “a scene never duplicated in 
Denver in all its history, a scene which in its violence and threatened 
violence carried the mind back to the French Revolution. A meeting 
hall packed with enraged, shouting, shrieking men and women 
gone mad with fanatic klan-frenzy.” 29 For over four hours they 
howled, jeered, and shook their fists as Van Cise fruitlessly tried to 
speak. Klan leaders and forty police officers were called but failed to 
quiet the crowd. Finally, at a little after one in the morning, Van Cise 
gave up and walked out o f the auditorium while the knights sang 
“Onward Christian Soldiers.” 30
The incident gave added impetus to a wave of anti-Klan edi­
torials appearing just before the primary. The Colorado Springs Ga­
zette and Telegraph abandoned its long-standing policy of neutrality 
during primary contests and denounced the Klan-tainted candi­
dacies o f Morley and Means. The Pueblo Chieftain similarly rejected 
Morley and endorsed Rockwell in the interests of Colorado and the 
Republican party. The Denver Post also joined anti-Klan ranks and 
declared its support for Rockwell, Moynihan, and the entire Visible 
Government League slate. The editor of the Boulder News Herald 
dramatically warned voters of the dangers confronting Colorado: 
“The right of free speech would be destroyed. The blacklist and the 
boycott would be used against all citizens who would not be slaves to 
the Klan kaisers. Sheriffs would select Klan juries. Klan judges and 
juries would dispense injustice under the Klan oath. . . . Fear, ha­
tred and strife would succeed community co-operation and good­
will. Heaven would become hell!” 31
On primary election day, September 9, the Colorado Klan 
played its final card. Klansmen throughout the state placed “pink 
tickets” under the doors and in the mailboxes of their neighbors. 
The tickets listed every candidate for public office and classified 
each as “Protestant,” “Catholic,” or “Jew.” Protestant candidates ob­
jectionable to the Klan were denoted with a star, meaning “unsatis­
factory because o f Roman Catholic Affiliations and Friendships.” 
Robert Rockwell, Charles Moynihan, and Charles Waterman were 
among those characterized as “ K n o w n  E n e m ie s  o f  A m e r ic a n  I n ­
s t i t u t i o n s ”  because o f their alleged papist ties.32
The Klan minority took advantage of Colorado’s primary law
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which permitted voters to choose ballots regardless of their party af­
filiation. Locke concentrated the order's strength in the Republican 
primary, reminding his men, “We are not Democrats or Republicans 
but Klansmen/’33 Klan bloc voting, combined with a split in non- 
Klan ranks, produced a sweep for the Invisible Empire. Klan candi­
dates won nomination for every state office except the superinten­
dent of public instruction, which was lost by only thirty-one votes of 
more than 100,000 cast. Clarence Morley and Rice Means were 
nominated even though they received only 48 percent and 43 per­
cent respectively of the total vote. Morley beat Rockwell and Cooley 
in Denver by a smaller than projected margin but ran surprisingly 
well outside o f the city. The Klansmen carried Pueblo, nineteen east­
ern and southern counties, and Routt and Moffatt counties on the 
Western Slope. Rockwell captured the rest of his Western Slope base 
and showed strength in all sections of the state. His most serious set­
back occurred in northern Colorado, which he expected to win 
easily. Instead, a heavy Klan turnout sharply reduced Rockwell’s 
winning margins in Boulder and Larimer counties and handed 
Weld and Logan counties to Morley. The decisive factor, however, 
was Earl Cooley’s anti-Klan candidacy, which siphoned away 7,700 
votes that would have tipped the election to Rockwell. In the Senate 
race non-Klansmen Moynihan and Waterman together gathered a 
majority in all but eight of Colorado’s sixty-three counties. Again, a 
large Klan vote in Denver, Pueblo, and Weld County provided the 
margin of victory. An apathetic Republican majority had thus fallen 
victim to the concerted efforts of a determined minority.34
A disillusioned Robert Rockwell probably echoed the thoughts 
of Moynihan and Waterman in an election postmortem: “I did not 
think that in this day and age forty or fifty thousand 100% Ameri­
cans would allow themselves to be voted as a unit for any man or 
bunch of men. It was a question of religious prejudice without re­
gard to personal qualifications, economic condition, lower taxes or 
the other issues which ordinarily make up a campaign.” 35 Rockwell 
specifically laid his defeat to Cooley’s candidacy, the pink ticket 
smear, and particularly the Klan’s political organization. “The Klan 
leaders,” he decided, “voted their membership almost as the Kaiser 
handled the Prussian army.” 36
Election results at the county level were mixed. Colorado 
Springs and El Paso County voted overwhelmingly against the 
Klan’s state ticket and its sole candidate for local office. In Mesa 
County on the Western Slope Klansmen were involved in three con­
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tested races, two of which they lost. Other Mesa County Klansmen 
were nominated without opposition. Pueblo Klansmen not only car­
ried their county for Morley and Means but placed many of their 
candidates on both sides of the November ballot. Every Fremont 
County Klan and Independent party designee was selected. Huge 
Klan majorities in North Denver, South Denver, and the Cherry 
Creek—Platte River area snowed under Van Cise’s Visible Govern­
ment ticket. Except for two district judgeships, Klansmen won every 
legislative and judicial contest in the Denver Republican primary.37
The Klan takeover of the Republican party fixed the course of 
the fall campaign. Although Colorado Democrats campaigned vig­
orously for farm relief, the rights of labor, and against Teapot 
Dome, they leveled their heaviest guns at the Ku Klux Klan. The 
Democratic state party platform sternly rebuked the Klan for at­
tempting “to inject questions of religious belief or church affiliation 
into American politics. . . . Such a course is destructive of peaceable 
and friendly relations among the citizens of our country and is in 
disregard and violation of the fundamental principles of our consti­
tution.” 38 William Sweet, Alva Adams, and Morrison Shafroth criss­
crossed the state denouncing the Klan before innumerable party 
gatherings. They rallied disaffected Republicans such as Philip Van 
Cise and Earl Cooley to the Democratic side. Colorado’s Republican 
national committeeman C. C. Hamlin bolted and advised party 
members that support o f Morley and Means “is in no sense a test of 
party allegiance or of loyalty to the party’s presidential nominee, Mr. 
Coolidge.” 39 Many rank-and-file Republicans heeded their leaders 
and deluged the Democrats with letters offering aid and encourage­
ment. The Denver Post, Boulder News Herald, Colorado Springs Gazette 
and Telegraphy and other Republican newspapers also turned from 
the nominees o f their party. Colorado’s La Follette-Progressive 
party provided additional support, unofficially backing Democratic 
anti-Klansmen on the state level.40 ,
More important than these defections were the new resources 
available for Klan use. Klan candidates, as the party’s official repre­
sentatives, laid legitimate claim to the organization’s vote-getting 
machinery and to its respectability. The Klansmen had also obtained 
the Republican birthright, the allegiance of dedicated party-line 
voters. This tie was so firm that many men and women voted for
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Klan Republicans against their personal principles. Thus the Colo­
rado Statesman, the state’s black newspaper, could not abandon the 
party of Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt. It advised its 
readers to vote on election day “for the continuance of the Re­
publican party which had weathered the gale for all times.” 41
The Klan leased the entire second floor of the Brown Palace 
Hotel for its campaign headquarters. Non-Klan party regulars were 
allotted only two rooms and were bypassed in political decision­
making. The Klan’s strategy was to ignore the Invisible Government 
issue and wrap its candidates in the mantle of Coolidge Republican­
ism. The state party platform thus contained planks promoting law 
and order, the Constitution, and the national Republican ticket. 
Non-Klansmen received a faithless pittance: “We condemn all at­
tempts to breed race and religious dissension and to make political 
capital therefrom.” 42 Throughout the campaign Morley and Means 
assured voters of their moderation and denied any radical plans to 
disrupt the peace or prosperity of the state. Tested Klan tactics, 
however, were not discarded. Pink tickets reappeared denouncing 
Shafroth and Adams for marrying Catholics (they had not) and 
Sweet as tainted by Roman influence. Kleagles meanwhile were out 
in force pursuing every lead to increase the Klan vote. Their success 
was visible at the weekly naturalization ceremonies where sometimes 
as many as 1,800 initiates were processed into the Invisible Empire.43
Klan candidates benefited not only from the Coolidge cam­
paign and a well-financed grass-roots organization but also from 
Democratic ineptitude. Incompetence was particularly character­
istic of the Morrison Shafroth campaign against Means. Shafroth 
ran a one-man campaign and refused to accept financial contribu­
tions. “We spent no money,” he said, “we had no paid workers. We 
had no paid advertisements. It was really a very foolish kind of a 
campaign.” 44
Senator Lawrence Phipps relied upon the support of the Ku 
Klux Klan but shunned its public embrace. He evaded the Klan is­
sue and campaigned for lower taxes, a protective tariff, and a good 
roads program under the slogan “A Vote for Phipps Is a Vote for 
Coolidge.” 45 Phipps, however, could not so easily shake his burden, 
for the Democrats never tired of linking his name with Morley and 
Means or accusing him of financing the Klan effort. Yet it was the 
Anti-Saloon League, and not the Democrats, which dealt the Phipps 
candidacy its most serious blow. The league blacklisted the senator 
for voting against a prohibition measure, a move which led several
79
HOODED EMPIRE
county Klans to endorse Alva Adams. The Klan organization tried 
to limit the damage by assuring voters that “in the main he has stood 
firmly by the president and his party. We have not approved his ev­
ery act, or his every vote, but we have respected, and do now, his 
independence and determination to do what he believed to be 
right/’46 Despite some defections, most Klan tickets, pink and other­
wise, listed Phipps’s name at the head of the column of approved 
candidates.47
The Klan versus anti-Klan nature of the campaign placed orga­
nized labor in an ambiguous position. Union men had seemingly 
formed a united front in June, 1924, when the Colorado State Fede­
ration of Labor condemned the Klan and urged its members not to 
join. The convention also endorsed Robert M. La Follette for presi­
dent and Sweet, Adams, and Shafroth for state office. But behind 
this outward display o f solidarity was an organization afflicted with 
dissension and drained of its influence. Union men were entering 
the Invisible Empire in such numbers that “a circle within a circle” 
was formed for those members with both Klan and union cards. 
When questioning candidates for public office, the Grand Dragon 
deferred to this body, asking each politician his views of labor 
unions and, if elected, his plans to advance the rights of the work­
ingman. The Colorado Labor Advocate and the Denver Labor Bulletin 
supported the Democratic state ticket yet never assailed Phipps, 
Morley, or Means for their relationships with the Klan. In fact, nei­
ther newspaper even acknowledged the Klan’s presence in the pri­
mary or general elections.48
The resurgence o f anti-Klan groups in Fremont and Denver 
counties diverted voters’ attention from the state races. The In­
dependent party o f Fremont County reappeared in October and 
named a complete legislative and judicial slate to oppose Klansmen 
on the Republican and Democratic ballots. Both sides refitted their 
organizations and waged a bitter campaign in the newspapers, 
meeting halls, and streets. A cycle of denunciation, first of papal in­
trigue and Tammanyism and then of hooded despotism, had by 
election day divided voters into two antagonistic camps.49 Denver’s 
Visible Government League, partially recovered from its primary 
mauling, worked for the election o f “Independent Judiciary” candi­
dates to the county, juvenile, and district court judgeships. The Klan 
harassed the league’s candidates as it had in the primary election. 
Klansmen and Klanswomen saturated league meetings, heckled 
speakers, turned off lights, and exited en masse to disrupt proceed­
ings. Ben Lindsey, candidate for re-election as juvenile judge and a
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target o f these tactics, likened these Klanswomen to the “women be­
fore the Tribunal at the French Revolution demanding the blood of 
their victims.” 50
Lindsey and Lewis R. Mowry, the Republican candidate for dis­
trict attorney, were singled out and made the prime quarry of the 
Denver Klan’s campaign. Lindsey, the father of the juvenile court 
system, had become vulnerable after twenty-three years on the 
bench. He had alienated Catholics as well as Klansmen with his vig­
orous espousal o f birth control and companionate marriage. Lind­
sey's active role in the movement to recall Mayor Stapleton and his 
continued opposition to invisible government had further hardened 
the Klan’s determination to remove him. Lewis Mowry received 
Klan support in the primary but sinned when he refused to take out 
membership in the order. The Klan threatened to blackmail him by 
exposing his relationship with a “pretty self-declared ‘golddigger’” 
unless he conformed to its demands. Mowry refused to cower and 
on the day before election was forced to confess his indiscretion. His 
Democratic opponent was more attentive to the Klan’s wishes and 
won its endorsement.51
On November 4 voters went to the polls under clear skies and 
gave the Republicans and the Ku Klux Klan control of Colorado. 
Calvin Coolidge ran ahead of the state ticket, taking 57 percent of 
the vote and sixty of sixty-three counties. Despite evidence of wide­
spread ticket splitting (Klan candidate vote totals were 7 percent be­
low Coolidge’s), Morley, Means, and Phipps profited from the “ Keep 
Cool with Coolidge” wave which engulfed the Democrats in 1924. In 
the Denver area, the Greeley-Fort Collins region, and Fremont 
County, Morley and Means amassed sizable leads which the Demo­
crats could not overtake in the rest of the state. The Klansmen car­
ried all but four counties east of the Rocky Mountains and made 
strong inroads into the traditionally Democratic mountain and west­
ern plateau counties. The Democrats even had trouble in Pueblo 
County, where Morley barely lost and Means won. Phipps’s support 
was not as evenly distributed, and he relied heavily upon an 18,000- 
vote margin in Denver to defeat Alva Adams. The power of the 
Klan’s endorsement was also reflected in other returns. Klan-sup- 
ported candidates were elected to the offices of lieutenant governor, 
secretary of state, attorney general, superintendent of public in­
struction, and state supreme court justice. Only two Democratic can­
didates for state office survived the Republican landslide; both had 
the endorsement of the Ku Klux Klan.52
Klan-backed Republicans and Democrats won legislative and
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judicial oflices in Boulder, Pueblo, Weld, and many other Colorado 
counties. Fremont County Klansmen defeated the Independent 
party decisively in every race but two. Returns were equally gratify­
ing in Denver, where only three district judgeships and the juvenile 
court escaped Klan nets. Ben Lindsey was narrowly re-elected by a 
margin of thirty-five votes out of more than 88,000 cast. His oppo­
nent, Klansman Royal Graham— whom the Denver Post accused of 
“judicial corruption, personal dishonesty and criminal conduct”—  
filed for a recount alleging voter fraud in a West Colfax precinct.53 
Simultaneously, a grand jury drawn from Klan membership lists in­
dicted six precinct workers for violating election statutes. Charges 
against five of the accused were later dismissed, but one pleaded 
guilty and served six months in prison. Denver District Judge Julian 
Moore, however, refused to throw out the votes of the disputed 
precinct and after a recount awarded the election to Lindsey. In
1927 the case was appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court, which 
reversed Moore’s decision and named Graham the winner even 
though he had committed suicide two years earlier.54 In a final ges­
ture of anti-Klan defiance, Lindsey burned his court records and 
left the state for California.55
A week after the election Imperial Wizard Hiram Wesley Evans 
and the Grand Dragons of Georgia, Indiana, and Kansas arrived in 
Denver to bask in the Colorado Klan’s victory. Dr. Locke, Governor- 
elect Morley, and Judge Albert Orahood, as well as a phalanx of 
newspaper reporters and photographers, greeted the Evans entou­
rage at Union Station. After welcoming ceremonies were com­
pleted, a motorcade flanked by Denver police officers brought the 
Imperial Wizard to the Brown Palace Hotel for conferences with 
state Klan leaders. The climate had certainly changed since 1921 
when the Klan’s first Imperial Wizard, William Simmons, had found 
it necessary to enter the city surreptitiously. The high point of 
Evanss visit came that night when he addressed a Klan meeting at 
the Cotton Mills stadium in South Denver. An estimated 35,000 per­
sons, including 5,000 new recruits, heard the Imperial Wizard laud 
Locke, his knights, and the future leaders of the state of Colorado.56
Like most social movements, the Klan controlled only a minor­
ity share o f the electorate. To gain power and thus effect its ends, 
the Klan could either infiltrate an existing party or form a new polit­
ical vehicle. Colorado Klansmen chose the more realistic route and 
the more amenable Republican party. Organizing on the precinct 
level, they were able to control enough delegate selection contests to
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win primary designations for their candidates. The massing of 
hooded strength in the Republican primary and the splits in non- 
Klan ranks produced victory for Morley and Means. The Klan’s fall 
campaign, bolstered by the addition of new resources, was a finely 
calibrated effort designed to forge a legitimizing link to Coolidge 
Republicanism and to ensure that all sympathetic voters went to the 
polls. The triumph in November testified to the skill and dedication 
of Klan strategists. Mastering the means to power, however, would 
prove far simpler than exercising it.
CHAPTER FIVE
UNDER INVISIBLE RULE
I want a conservative administration. I do not want any legislation that 
will bring on rancor or class hatred. . . .  I have no intention of turning 
the world upside down.
Governor-elect Clarence Morley
In a radio address on January 13, 1925, Governor Clarence 
Morley predicted: “Never has there been such a bright future be­
fore us as the year 1925 presents/’ 1 The governor spoke to all Colo­
radans, but in particular to the men and women of the Ku Klux 
Klan. The Colorado realm of the Invisible Empire reached the 
height o f its power in the winter of 1924—25. It had won control of 
the statehouse and scores of county courthouses throughout Colo­
rado. The Klan commanded the political summit of the Rocky 
Mountain state but did not press for discriminatory legislation 
against Catholics, Jews, or blacks. Nuremberg laws were not the Col­
orado Klan’s style. Nor did the Klan executive initiate a policy of 
planned persecution against minority groups. The organization’s 
purpose was to make government again responsive to the Protestant 
majority. To effect this end, the Klan attempted to fill state agencies 
with loyal and dependable men. Physical control of government, 
rather than new legislation, would restore the balance in favor of 
the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant. The Klan’s grip, however, was 
more tenuous than it knew, and the trappings of office proved insuf­
ficient to assure success. Hostile legislators and bureaucrats blocked 
Klansmen, leaving them impotent even as they held the symbols of 
authority. The movement lost the battle for influence after it ap­
peared to have won it. Instead of visions of a new dawn, Klansmen 
and Klanswomen witnessed the beginning of their empire’s decay.
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The new governor of Colorado was a small, bespectacled man 
who had been born on a farm near Dyersville, Iowa, in 1869. A sec­
ond-generation American, Clarence Morley had come to Colorado 
in 1890 and was a member of the 1899 graduating class of the Den­
ver University Law School. Morley had found escape from a medi­
ocre law practice in Republican politics and had been elected district 
judge in 1918. Despite his position, he was considered “one of the 
minor pee wees of the community. . . .  A kind fellow who hoped ev­
erything would go well.” 2 While a district judge he was introduced 
to John Galen Locke and the newly arrived Ku Klux Klan. The 
judge received membership card No. 953 and was elected a Klokan 
or investigator for the Denver Klan in 1924. Locke exerted an al­
most hypnotic influence over Morley, becoming larger than life and 
even an instrument of divine will. According to Morley, “In times of 
trouble the Almighty always sends some men to lead us. God sent us 
George Washington when we needed a leader in our struggle with 
England. God sent us Abraham Lincoln to preserve the union. And 
God has sent us John Galen Locke to lead our city out of its terrible 
condition of chaos and trouble.” 3 There was little question where 
power resided in the new administration. Weak and blindly loyal, 
Morley was in constant telephone communication with Glenarm 
Place seeking the Grand Dragon’s advice and instructions. The 
Republican Colorado Springs Gazette characterized the governor 
as “a mere figurehead, an automaton responding as the strings are 
pulled.” 4 A friend of both men agreed: “Morley was only a charwo­
man. He took the orders. He scrubbed the buckets, he mopped the 
floors. He turned on the lights, he turned off the lights. He did as he 
was told. And it never occurred to him that he ought to have an in­
dependent thought.” 5
Clarence Morley took the oath of office on January 13 at the 
Denver auditorium before galleries packed with cheering members 
of the Invisible Empire. His inaugural address, interrupted fre­
quently by applause, outlined the Klan’s cure for Colorado’s ills. To 
fetter the Catholic hierarchy, Morley proposed legislation prohibit­
ing the use of sacramental wine, thereby outlawing the Mass, and a 
measure creating a woman’s reformatory as an alternative to the 
“sinister” Houses of the Good Shepherd. These two proposals, how­
ever, were primarily gestures to the Klan’s anti-Catholic wing, and 
the administration did little to ensure their passage. The governor 




repeal o f the public defender act, a symptom of “spineless enforce­
ment of our criminal laws. . . ,” fi To protect the interests of 
organized labor, Morley recommended passage of alien exclusion 
laws which wrould forbid immigration and the ownership of prop­
erty.7 The most important section of the governor’s message con­
cerned the abolition of more than a dozen government boards and 
agencies, including the State Tax Commission, the Board of Correc­
tions, the State Board of Health, and the Board of Nursing Exam­
iners. Morley justified their extinction on the basis of efficiency and 
economy, but his reasoning failed to mask a broader purpose. The 
state constitution severely restricted the governor’s policy-making 
and appointment powers. “There is no one,” remarked the Boulder 
Daily Camera, “he can fire except the private secretary he brought 
with him unless he has a trial before a civil service commission. Two- 
thirds of the members of all boards and bureaus were there before 
he was elected and he can only name one-third of the membership 
o f each.” 8 When a Morley bill abolishing a government bureau was 
introduced into the legislature, a companion bill recreating the 
agency under a new name wras placed into the hopper. Passage of 
the administration’s bills would enable the governor to weed out 
Catholics (14 percent of all state employees) and realize his slogan 
“Every Man under the Capitol Dome a Klansman.” A Klan machine, 
firmly entrenched in the administrative bodies of the state govern­
ment, would thus be created to continue hooded rule after the Mor­
ley years.9
Just four hours after taking office, Morley tested the limits of 
his power. The governor dismissed National Guard Adjutant Gen­
eral Paul P. Newlon and his two aides in what was labeled an econ­
omy move. Newlon, however, refused to vacate his post, and a dis­
trict court later invalidated Morley’s order. Although repulsed at the 
upper echelon, the Klan had more success among the guard’s junior 
officers and men with standard recruiting techniques. Those offices 
which Morley could distribute were quickly given to Klansmen. The 
defeated Republican candidate for secretary of state, E. J. Wal- 
linger, a member of the Royal Riders of the Red Robe, was ap­
pointed as budget and efficiency commissioner. John Galen Locke 
was made an honorary colonel in the National Guard and assigned 
as the governor’s aide de camp. A delegation of men sent to the Good 
Roads Convention in Texas read like a who’s who of Colorado Klan- 
dom. Other Klan appointees had to aw'ait the approval of the Senate 
before taking office.10
Clarence Morley did not allow his duties as governor to inter­
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fere with his Klan obligations. The governor appeared regularly at 
Denver klavern meetings and always found time for the organiza­
tion’s special events. He invited Locke to accompany the Colorado 
delegation to the Coolidge inaugural and while in Washington at­
tended a formal dinner hosted by the Imperial Wizard. In 1926 
Morley led a column of 500 Denver men down Sixteenth Street, 
stopped in front of a clothing store, and demanded the dismissal of 
all employees lacking the proper secret credentials.11
II
Governor Morley confidently presented his legislative propos­
als to the overwhelmingly Republican Twenty-fifth General Assem­
bly. Republicans held a lopsided majority of fifty-two to thirteen in 
the House of Representatives, an increase of nineteen seats in the 
November election. Klan influence in the lower chamber was con­
siderable because many of the Republicans and some of the Demo­
crats were Klansmen or were elected with the order’s support. “The 
house is klan,” wrote a statehouse reporter, “to the extent they some­
times carry their night shirts in a package with them so they will not 
have to go back home . . . when a meeting is scheduled for that eve­
ning.” 12 The Klan bloc was large, but it did not control enough votes 
to pass legislation. It was thus forced to ally with non-Klansmen who 
were loyal to the Republican party and therefore to the current 
administration.13
The Klan’s hold on the Senate was far more precarious. Morley 
forces could count on the votes of only twelve Republicans, despite 
the party’s twenty-one-to-fourteen advantage. Minority leader Billy 
Adams’s persuasive abilities and disciplinary tactics solidified the 
Democrats against administration promises and kept all but three 
votes from the Klan. The balance of power was held by nine Repub­
licans, six of whom were holdovers elected in 1922 and thus free of 
Klan debt. Administration senators attempted to court these un­
aligned Republicans— except for Trinidad’s Jewish Senator Simon 
Fruedenthal— but were immediately rebuffed. On the first day of 
the legislative session Senators David Elliott (Colorado Springs), 
Frank Kelly (Salida), L. A. Puffer (Colorado Springs), and Henry 
Toll (Denver) walked out o f the party caucus and refused to abide by 
the majority’s decisions concerning committee assignments. Sena­
tors W. E. Renshaw of Idaho Springs and John Dickinson of Hugo 
backed the insurgents and threatened to bolt if the committee ques­
tion was not reviewed. Two days later Klan leaders conceded and
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named Puffer and Elliott chairmen of the powerful Finance and 
State Affairs committees respectively; other dissenters received 
choice committee assignments. These concessions temporarily mol­
lified the rebels but proved disastrous for the Morley administra­
tion. Anti-Klan senators now occupied key positions from which 
they could influence the legislative process and disrupt the Klan s 
agenda.14
The period for the introduction of new legislation ended on 
January 2 1, with 1,080 bills submitted for consideration. The ad­
ministration’s legislative package, which constituted only a fraction 
o f this number, had grown since Morley’s inaugural address. More 
agencies were slated for extinction, such as the Bureau of Labor Sta­
tistics, the State Civil Service Commission, the Pure Food and Drug 
Commission, and the State Industrial Commission. To ensure that 
no offending bureaus had escaped detection, a Klan senator from 
Denver introduced a bill abolishing all departments and institutions 
not specifically created by the state constitution. The responsibilities 
o f the marked boards, like those discussed earlier, were transferred 
either to new agencies or to existing departments already in Klan 
hands. The duties of the State Industrial Commission, for example, 
would mainly devolve to the office of Deputy State Labor Commis­
sioner Carl DeLochte, the Grand Ragon of the Klan’s foreign-born 
auxiliary. Similarly, a Klan proposal to reorganize the Colorado Fish 
and Game Department was no more than a move enabling the gov­
ernor to replace the incumbent commissioner and his deputies with 
men performing the same functions under different titles. Morley, 
stung by the outcome of the Newlon affair, also lobbied for a bill 
which empowered the governor to appoint and dismiss the adjutant 
general o f the National Guard.15
Individual Klan members in the Denver House delegation 
framed their own regressive legislation independent of the gover­
nor’s office. Representative Charles Bigelow proposed a bill which 
prohibited epileptics, drug addicts, drunkards, or persons charged 
with a felony from marrying. Marriages between Orientals and 
whites would also be barred in Colorado. Klanswoman Minnie C. T. 
Love introduced legislation which authorized the sterilization of epi­
leptics, the retarded, and the insane if procreation might result in 
“defective or feeble-minded children with criminal tendencies. . . .” 1(3 
Love authored another piece of legislation which attempted to abol­
ish sectarian and institutional schools maintained wholly or in part 
by “public moneys.” While private self-sustaining schools were ex­




fended as funds raised by “taxation, community chests, charity or­
ganizations or public drives.” 17 Fellow Klansperson E. S. Hawkins 
called for the repeal o f Colorado’s civil rights laws which guaranteed 
persons of all races and religions equal access to public accommoda­
tions. Other Klan bills appearing on the legislative calender would, 
if passed, abolish the Denver juvenile court, enforce Sunday closing 
laws, and strengthen prohibition enforcement.18
Not all o f Morley’s or individual Klanspersons’ recommenda­
tions were punitive or prejudicial. The governor ordered Klan 
members to support legislation establishing a minimum wage for 
women and outlawing working conditions detrimental to their 
health and morals. Klansmen and Klanswomen spearheaded the 
effort to obtain the legislature’s approval of a constitutional amend­
ment giving Congress the power to prohibit child labor. Representa­
tive Minnie Love sponsored a bill advocating the distribution of 
birth control information and the manufacture and distribution of 
contraceptives. Klanswomen Louise Patterson of Pueblo and Mar­
tha Long of Denver jointly introduced an act to allow women to 
serve as jurors in Colorado’s courts. These examples of progressive 
legislation present an interesting and unnoticed side of the Ku Klux 
Klan. But the list is too small and overshadowed to significantly 
cleanse the organization’s traditional reputation.19
Republican floor leaders in the House, confident of easy and 
early passage of the administration’s program, neglected their legis­
lative homework. They were shaken from their complacency when a 
sharp reaction greeted the first major administration measure. 
Democrats picked apart the provisions of the bill abolishing the 
Board of Nursing Examiners and convinced more than a dozen Re­
publicans and some Klanswomen to defect. To regroup their forces, 
administration supporters quickly pushed through a motion for a 
weekend adjournment. Republicans were herded into conferences 
and drilled in the catechisms of party discipline. Recalcitrant mem­
bers who resisted the call o f party loyalty were threatened with the 
defeat of their favorite bills and, when applicable, expulsion from 
the Invisible Empire. Party leaders proved effective teachers; not 
only did the nursing bill pass, but in the following two weeks more 
than half of the governor’s program was approved. Among the mea­
sures passed along to the Senate were the adjutant general act, the 
women’s minimum wage bill, and bills abolishing the State Tax Com­
mission and the Board of Corrections. Later in the session the Colo­
rado Fish and Game Department reorganization act and bills elim­
inating the State Industrial Commission and State Civil Service
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Commission were approved. The sacramental wine bill never left 
committee. Anti-Catholics portrayed the bill simply as another at­
tempt to plug a loophole in the prohibition laws, denying that it was 
aimed at any particular religious group. Catholics, Jews, and even 
the Women’s Christian Temperance Union denounced the bill and 
called for its defeat. The Right Reverend Irving Peale Johnson, 
Episcopal bishop of Colorado, predicted that the measure “would 
automatically make criminals similar to those who were outlawed by 
Caligula and Nero, for, if it came to an issue, some of us would be 
compelled by conscience to obey God rather than men at any cost to 
life or liberty.” 20 These protests, combined with the governor’s lack 
of support, encouraged legislators already wary of the bill’s intent to 
disregard the arguments of anti-Catholic Klansmen. Other Klan 
measures, both progressive and regressive, never reached the floor 
for consideration.21
Morley’s supporters were on the defensive in the Senate. Anti- 
Klan Republicans renewed their rebellion, refusing to attend their 
party caucus because the vote of its majority was binding upon all. 
Instead, they joined with the Democrats to form a bipartisan major­
ity against the administration. The anti-Klan bloc pursued a strategy 
of delay rather than confrontation, hoping to smother Morley’s bills 
quietly in committee under the weight of procedural motions and 
debate. The strength of the anti-Klan forces on key committees 
made this plan possible. They controlled the State Affairs Commit­
tee, which received almost half of the House bills, and wielded 
enough votes in the Finance Committee to postpone consideration 
of another third of the governor’s program. Morley and his Senate 
supporters, aware of their minority position, intensified their efforts 
to effect a realignment of forces. The governor met several times 
with Republican rebels and attempted to coax them back into the 
fold with appeals to party loyalty and promises of support for their 
bills. When persuasion failed to have the desired effect, threats were 
employed. Democratic Senator Joseph Grigsby was warned that the 
House would not appropriate funds for the Pueblo state fair and 
state hospital unless he voted with the Klan. Morley also used the 
appropriations for the University of Colorado as a bargaining coun­
ter. Earlier in the session the governor ordered university president 
Dr. George Norlin to dismiss all Catholic and Jewish professors or 
suffer a drastic cut in funds. Although the financial bludgeon failed 
to impress Norlin, it was later resurrected to coerce the university’s 
friends in the Senate. Meanwhile, the House of Representatives ap­
plied pressure by refusing to act upon any Senate measures until
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House bills were reported out of committee. Administration Re­
publicans supported their threat with a vote returning a Senate bill 
under consideration to committee. The Senate called the House’s 
bluff and adjourned for a three-day holiday. The stalemate between 
the two chambers continued until the end of the session. Equally 
subtle intimidation appeared on each legislator's desk every Wed­
nesday in the form of the Denver Klan’s Protestant Herald. On page 
one, bordered in black, were the names of the Republican insur­
gents. “Cut this list o f T r a it o r s  out for future use,” advised the Her­
ald. “It will come in handy.” 22
The first formal test o f strength between Klan and anti-Klan oc­
curred on February 27 when the Judiciary Committee reported out 
H.B. 435, abolishing the State Department o f Charities and Correc­
tions. The bill was defeated by a margin of twenty to fifteen, with 
nine Republicans joining eleven Democrats to save the agency. 
Within two weeks of this victory anti-Klan senators accomplished a 
major feat by taking complete control of the Calendar Committee. 
This committee determined which bills the Senate considered and 
could kill any bill simply by refusing to place it on the agenda. All 
five members of the committee were anti-Klansmen, thus forestall­
ing the possibility of an unorthodox bill escaping through a minority 
report. The committee allowed only three administration measures, 
the nursing examiner’s bill, the Fish and Game Department reorga­
nization act, and a proposed constitutional amendment eliminating 
the party primary, to reach the Senate floor. Each was defeated 
overwhelmingly.23
“There is an old saying,” mused a Denver newspaperman, “that 
the legislature which does nothing is a good one. Measured by that 
standard, the twenty-fifth is one of the best assemblies the state has 
had in many years ” 24 The legislature adjourned in deadlock on 
April 16, with 85 percent of the 1,080 bills introduced in January 
lying stillborn in committee. Among the more noteworthy pieces of 
legislation awaiting the governor’s signature were bills which for­
bade picking the blue columbine, allowed counties to exterminate 
prairie dogs, and authorized convicts to manufacture license plates. 
Morley s package o f thirty-seven bills abolishing or reorganizing 
state agencies was decisively defeated. The House passed nineteen 
administration measures, but only one, a bill eliminating the de­
funct Board of Horseshoe Examiners, survived Senate scrutiny. Just 
two Klan-endorsed bills became state law: one requiring schools to 
fly the American flag and the other making ownership or operation 
of a still a felony. Their program in ruins, Klansmen in the House
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took a measure of revenge on their Senate opponents by refusing to 
appropriate funds for the University o f Colorado, the Pueblo state 
fair, and the Adams Normal School in Alamosa. Frustrated and con­
fused Klansmen even killed their own proposal to allow children to 
leave school daily for religious instruction because it drew the sup­
port o f Catholics and Jews. Governor Morley also took vengeance on 
those who had humiliated him. He crippled the State Tax Commis­
sion, the State Board of Health, the Public Examiner’s office, and 
several other agencies with vetoes of their staff salary appropria­
tions. Soon after adjournment the staunchly Republican Pueblo 
Chieftain reached a popular verdict on Clarence Morley and Klan 
rule: “It is unfortunate for Colorado that the Morley administration 
must be prolonged after it has been conclusively demonstrated as 
the worst failure ever inflicted upon the people. . . ” 25
Governor Morley was slightly more successful filling govern­
ment jobs than passing legislation. Unable to legislate the state’s 
boards and bureaus out of existence, he chose as his best alternative 
to appoint trusted men to existing vacancies. Morley placed before 
the Senate a list o f twenty-five appointees that included the Exalted 
Cyclopses of Canon City, Colorado Springs, and Fort Collins, as well 
as many prominent Denver Klansmen. The Senate promptly con­
firmed ten o f his choices, rejected two, and tabled thirteen. When 
the legislative session ended, the governor gave two-year recess ap­
pointments to the disappointed nominees. Over half of the men, 
however, never assumed their posts. Eight recess appointees of the 
previous administration refused to relinquish their offices and con­
vinced the courts that Morley’s appointments were illegal because 
the Senate had not confirmed them. The only important appoint­
ment left unchallenged was to the Public Utilities Commission; the 
remainder were unsalaried positions on minor boards. Begun with 
such great hopes, the Morley administration had utterly failed to 
achieve its goals. The dream of a self-perpetuating Klan machine 
entrenched in government to safeguard Protestant rights was dead. 
With it went a large measure of confidence in the Klan and its 
leadership.26 -
III
Colorado’s confrontation with invisible power was confined to 
the executive branch of the state government after the Klan’s legis­
lative chastisement. On June 10, 1925, Governor Morley evoked a 
forgotten antiliquor law and commissioned fifty-two prohibition
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agents with all o f the authority vested “in the district attorneys, sher­
iffs, constables and police officers of the state. . . .” 27 By the end of 
the year Morley’s prohibition force numbered almost 200 men, 
three-quarters of whom kept their identities secret. Morley reacti­
vated the law not so much to strengthen prohibition enforcement 
but to repay campaign debts, provide employment for jobless Klans­
men, and to honor the realm’s leading men. Thus, along with Grand 
Dragon Locke and Great Titans A. P. DeVore and Gano Senter, a 
wide assortment of klabees, kligrapps, nighthawks and kludds from 
every den in Colorado received appointments.28
Although Morley’s intentions were benign, the dangers inher­
ent in his plans became apparent when several agents took their 
commissions seriously. Just nine days after his appointment agent 
R. N. Mason, the Exalted Cyclops of the Trinidad Klan, led a raid­
ing party on a random search for liquor. Mason’s men battered in 
the doors o f fifty homes without identifying themselves, drew re­
volvers, and lined up the frightened men and women for search. 
The raid was a success; thirteen people were arrested and 500 gal­
lons of wine were seized. Judge A. T. Hollenbeck, however, released 
the prisoners because “a man’s home being his castle is not subject to 
search and seizure, even with search warrant unless there is absolute 
proof that the laws o f the United States are being violated.” 29 His 
decision ruled out further wholesale raids in the Trinidad area 
based upon speculation and insufficient evidence. On the day fol­
lowing the Trinidad incident, Morley agents staged a night raid in 
Weld County. Armed raiders, lacking criminal or search warrants, 
ransacked several suspected residences and hauled twelve men to 
jail. The presiding justice of the peace levied fines for possession 
which he subsequently divided with the dry agents. The Greeley News 
censured the actions of these officials and angrily asked: “Has Colo­
rado come to a stage in her development where that sort of thing is 
to be permitted? Is there no law that must be observed any more 
except the liquor law?” 30 In Denver Morley’s men used their search 
for liquor to cover harassment of anti-Klan leaders. Similar vio­
lations of constitutional rights occurred throughout Colorado in
1925. In light o f their tactics it is surprising that the dry law en­
forcers shot only two people, one a suspected bootlegger and the 
other a fellow agent.31
Such examples of prohibition law enforcement unleashed a 
firestorm of protest. Denver’s District Attorney Foster Cline de­
nounced Morley’s “un-American, secret spy system” and threatened 
to jail any agent who violated the law.32 Thomas Clennan, warden of
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the Denver County jail, refused to accept any prisoners taken by 
“the governor’s Russian helpers.” 33 Joel E. Stone, the district at­
torney for Adams, Arapahoe, Clear Creek, Jefferson, and Gilpin 
counties, also lodged a complaint accusing the agents of graft and 
brutality. Governor Morley answered his critics by praising the 
force’s “excellent and effective wrork.” M But charges of wrongdoing 
and corruption undercut Morley’s defense. Agent J. E. Johnson, a 
former convict, was arrested for accepting a bribe. Fred Kuensel of 
Denver was exposed as a U.S. Army deserter and Carl C. Burns of 
Pueblo as a convicted burglar. Another agent was imprisoned for his 
central role in a bootlegging ring. Public indignation finally forced 
Governor Morley, on December 31, 1925^0 revoke the commissions 
o f his dry officers. In 1926 Morley returned to his original purpose 
and appointed fifty-eight former agents to nonsalaried, honorary 
positions in a remodeled prohibition corps. After an uneventful 
year their services were terminated by newly elected Governor Billy 
Adams.35
Clarence Morley ended his term with a final act of homage 
to his friend John Galen Locke. The governor named Locke to a 
six-year term on the State Board of Medical Examiners, an appoint­
ment not requiring Senate confirmation. Ironically, some anti- 
Morley members of the new General Assembly attempted to block 
the appointment by first abolishing the board and then recreating it 
under a new title. Resistance was minimal, however, because the 
Klan issue was no longer relevant under the capitol dome. Morley 
was a beaten man w'ho had long since given up hope of creating a 
Klan machine in the state government. Klan holdovers in the Senate 
had resumed their party identities, and legislative battles were again 
contested along Republican and Democratic lines. The governor’s 
chair was now in the hands o f Billy Adams, the Klan’s former arch­
foe in the Senate. Morley’s only contribution to Colorado govern­
ment w7as a fleeting one, a small surplus in the state treasury.36
Many newly emergent movements seeking political and social 
change are frustrated once they are in a position to translate their 
program into government policy. The Colorado Klan was no excep­
tion. The Klan sought to make government more responsive by en­
acting a few laws and, most important, by placing its men in posi­
tions of authority. But the Klan and Clarence Morley were no match 
for the seasoned political operatives who knew the rules and tricks 
of the legislative arena. Naive, unaware of legislative procedures 
and nuances, Klansmen placed their opponents in strategic vantage
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points which enabled them to block Governor Morley s proposals. 
Checkmated in the legislature, the Klan then unsuccessfully con­
fronted stubborn bureaucrats jealous of their prerogatives. Their 
refusal to relinquish office or carry out the governors wishes was 
sanctioned by the courts and caused a complete breakdown in the 
Klan’s ability to govern. Trapped by their adversaries and their own 
blunders, Klansmen clung to power that existed in name only. Klan 
abuses were also kept to a minimum because of the absence of a 
planned strategy o f intimidation and of large numbers of hooded 
zealots ready to use extreme measures to gain their ends. Rather 
than the creation of a Klan eden in Colorado with only “Americans” 
on guard, the Twenty-fifth General Assembly presented the order 
with its most serious setback. The Klan’s defeat in state government 
drained it of credibility and contributed to a chain reaction which 
was to leave the eastern half of the Empire in ruins, the most popu­
lous klaverns factionalized and dispersed.
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CHAPTER SIX
T W I L I G H T  ON T H E  EASTERN SLOPE
. . . there is a common ground on which you must meet and that is Amer- 
icanism— when our soldiers went over seas they did not stop because there 
was someone in their regiment they did not like— they went and went 
together, then fought out their personal differences when they got home.
The situation that is facing the Klan is practically the same so cut out the 
foolishness until we get the enemy cleared out and things at home under 
a Protestant government.
Rocky Mountain American, May 1 , 1925
The Ku Klux Klan’s descent from the pinnacle of power was 
even more abrupt than its rapid climb. Coinciding with the frus­
trations encountered in the state legislature was a series of events 
which shook the foundation o f Eastern Slope Klan might. The de­
cline o f the Denver klavern resulted from the interaction between 
internal dissension and the reversal o f the variables critical to Klan 
growth. The Klan, like all social movements built upon a heteroge­
neous platform and membership base, was prone to disagreements 
concerning strategy, priorities, and control. Dissidents expanded 
their influence and mounted challenges when the movement’s for­
tunes waned. Klan setbacks appeared in many forms: a loss in pro­
gram salience, governmental failure, and debasement of the leaders’ 
images. When energy and hostility were directed inward, the Klan 
lost its drive and opened itself further to enervating dissension. As 
the key props of leadership, Klan governmental responsiveness, 
and issues were withdrawn, members’ attitudes changed. Negative 
community perceptions further confirmed a Klansman’s belief that 
the order no longer fulfilled his needs. The Denver Klan could not 
stanch the flow because few sanctions or traditions were available to
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dissuade the disaffected. Thus a downward spiral, gradually in­
creasing in speed, had begun. Internecine combat and outside ad­
versity generated defections which, in turn, eliminated the store of 
resources needed to exercise influence. As more and more men and 
money followed the path outward from the Invisible Empire, the 
fight over the spoils became meaningless.
Internal dissension, program failures, and discredited leaders 
were not the only causes o f decline. The Pueblo Klan found success 
and a subsequent inability to react to a new status equally devastat­
ing. In Colorado Springs public opinion makers, taking advantage 
of Klan leadership and issue weakness, rallied their city to a crusade 
that overwhelmed the men of the Pikes Peak klavern. These Eastern 
Slope defeats led national Klan officials to reassert their authority 
over the state organization. Their efforts, however, could not stop 
the decay that left Colorado’s major klaverns sapped of their influ­
ence, vitality, and members.
I
John Galen Locke and Denver Klan No. 1 confidently awaited 
the beginning of 1925. The Klan’s phenomenal growth and elec­
toral successes in 1924 had shattered the opposition and left the In­
visible Empire virtually unchallenged. Press releases emanating 
from the basement headquarters o f the Grand Dragon on Glenarm 
Place were reckoned as important as those distributed by the mayor 
or even the governor. But the Klan’s eagerness did not spring from 
a desire for renewed combat. Nineteen twenty-five was to be a year 
of consolidation, a time to bask in the organization’s triumphs. In 
the new year, too, came evidence that the Klan was attempting to 
discard its image of notoriety and become a respected pillar of the 
community.
The Denver Klan began 1925 with a nine-day boxing and wres­
tling tournament given for the amusement of its members and ail 
Denverites. A few months later the city was invited to the Cotton 
Mills Stadium for an evening o f musical entertainment by the 200- 
piece Imperial Klan Band. On June 25 a large crowd of men and 
women jammed Lakeside Park for the first annual picnic and outing 
of the Denver Klan. Klan leaders became less reticent about their 
memberships, and their names and pictures appeared in the news­
papers. Banquets honoring Klan notables were even broadcast over 
radio station KLZ for Denver’s listening pleasure. The frenetic re­
cruiting pace o f 1924 gave way in the more relaxed atmosphere.
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Only 1,550 men were admitted into the Invisible Empire in the first 
six months of 1925, a sharp decline from the bumper harvests ol the 
previous year.1
Despite its sense of self-assurance and control, the Klan re­
mained wary of any sign of opposition. Klansmen lobbied Senators 
Rice Means and Lawrence Phipps for the removal of their long-time 
adversary Frank C. Howbert as Denver’s collector of internal reve­
nue. In April 400 hooded Klansmen, some armed with revolvers, 
disrupted a meeting o f the United Sons of America, a newly formed 
anti-Klan organization. Police officers called to the scene refused to 
halt the Klan demonstration. Following Governor Morley’s failure 
in the legislature, Klansmen were busy circulating petitions to place 
on the ballot a constitutional amendment abolishing the state civil 
service. If the amendment passed, Morley could expel all Catholics 
in state government service and appoint acceptable Protestants to 
their positions.2
The Klan was not as invincible as it appeared, for from beneath 
the surface came rumblings o f dissension. Dr. Locke’s dictation of 
the Klan’s course had alienated a group of its leading members, the 
most prominent of whom was Mayor Ben Stapleton. The mayor’s 
appeasement of the Klan and the subsequent defeat of recall in 
August, 1924, had only sharpened his discontent. Chafing under 
Locke’s commands, Stapleton had met secretly in September with 
old friend and fellow Klansman Harry Saunders to devise a plan to 
oust the Grand Dragon. The two men agreed to launch a paper Ku 
Klux Klan and to ask the courts to enjoin Locke and the Georgia- 
based organization from operating in Colorado. After five months 
of legal wrangling, however, the case had been dismissed and the 
new order’s articles of incorporation set aside. Saunders was ban­
ished from the Invisible Empire for his disloyalty. The mayor had 
been spared a similar fate because of his office and the Klan’s needs. 
Stapleton and his city hall coterie had retreated, hoping for another 
opportunity to revolt. In November, 1924, they had recruited a 
powerful ally, U.S. Senator—elect Rice Means. Means, angered by 
Locke’s lukewarm support during the campaign, hoped to convert 
the Klan into his personal vote-getting machine. While Locke rode 
the crest, the opposition commanded little influence with the rank 
and file. Still, Stapleton’s and Means’s positions gave them power 
bases from which to mobilize resources. The dissidents now waited 
for events that would heighten dissatisfaction and fire their cause.3
On January 6, 1925, six Klansmen kidnapped fellow member 
Keith Boehm, a nineteen-year-old East High School student. Boehm
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was taken to Dr. Locke’s office and under threat of castration mar­
ried a woman who was several months pregnant. Locke considered 
the matter entirely a Klan affair: “When I learned of what had hap­
pened . . .  I meant to see to it that young Boehm, as a Klansman, 
should do the manly thing.” 4 Philip Van Cise saw the incident dif­
ferently and reversed his policy of inactive hostility. The district at­
torney, in one of his last official acts, filed kidnapping and conspir­
acy charges against Locke and his men. Locke was arrested and his 
case assigned to Klan foe Judge Ben B. Lindsey of the juvenile 
court. After Lindsey disqualified himself, Ben Laska, the Grand 
Dragon’s attorney, engineered a series of venue changes until the 
case was remanded to a Klan judge who dismissed the charges on 
technical grounds. The kidnapping made Locke the object of public 
ridicule and raised questions in Klansmen’s minds about their lead­
er’s judgment and respect for law and order. Two years after the 
kidnapping the courts annulled Boehm’s forced marriage.5
To reassert his authority over the Denver police force and to 
embarrass the Klan, Mayor Stapleton launched the Good Friday vice 
raids on April 10, 1925. Bypassing Klan Chief of Police William 
Candlish, the mayor secretly deputized 125 American Legionnaires 
to execute the operation. The raiders were highly successful, arrest­
ing over 200 bootleggers, gamblers, and prostitutes. A series of fol­
low-up raids in May gathered almost 100 more offenders, con­
firming Stapleton’s commitment to his clean-up campaign. The 
arrests exposed a complex network of tipoffs, graft, and protection, 
at the center of which were the hand-picked men of the Klan vice 
squad. Fourteen police officers were suspended, all but two of whom 
were well-known Klansmen. Police hearings conducted after the 
raids substantiated the charges and forced the dismissal of two ser­
geants and ten patrolmen.6
The Klan, caught off guard by the mayor’s action, attempted 
initially to belittle its importance. Later it tried to turn the anticrime 
operation to Klan advantage. “ Have you noticed,” asked the Klan’s 
Rocky Mountain American, “the list of names of those arrested in the 
booze and vice clean-up of Denver? Looks like a page torn out of a 
city directory of the Holy City of Rome, with a sprinkling of Cork.” 7 
But the damage to the Klan’s image and prestige as a law and order 
organization was not so easily repaired. This was hardly the respon­
sive government the Klan had promised discontented Protestants. 
Many o f those who had joined the Klan in reaction against crime 
and vice conditions had to agree with the editor of the Denver Ex­
press■, who wrote, “It means the complete breaking down of the pre­
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tensions to purity of those who have openly boasted their control of 
city politics.” 8
The stain of scandal touched other members of the Denver 
Klan. The county’s undersheriff was found guilty of falsifying his 
expense account and confined in the penitentiary in Canon City. 
Governor Morley’s personal secretary was indicted for mail fraud. 
In the following year two o f Locke’s closest advisors were impris­
oned for embezzlement and two Klan police officers were suspended 
for violating the prohibition laws. Such instances of corruption, 
prominently displayed in the newspapers, heightened the anger 
and disgust o f the faithful who wore the now sullied sheets of the 
Invisible Empire. The Klan foundation had begun to crack. When 
membership ties loosened, resources needed to exert influence were 
withdrawn. Imperceptible at first, the downward spiral had started 
and picked up speed with the rising number o f Klan mistakes and 
failures.9
" II ^
The 1925 Colorado Springs municipal elections presented 
realm leaders with an opportunity to replenish their spent influ­
ence. Successful confrontation at the center of Colorado anti-Klan 
power would not only silence critics within the Klan but humble 
those hostile to the hooded order. Their miscalculation merely 
hastened the decline. In March incumbent city councilmen Ira Har­
ris, Martin Drake, and George Birdsall opened their campaigns for 
re-election and were promptly challenged by three political new­
comers, G. W. Bartlett, T. F. Rudy, and Frank Seeley. For four weeks 
the city was dragged through a listless campaign that aroused little 
fanfare and even fewer issues. Lethargy, however, was transformed 
into alarm just two days before the election. On April 5 newspapers 
revealed that the Colorado Springs Klan, silent for more than a 
year, was engaged in an all-out effort to defeat the incumbents. To 
swing the election to the Klan s candidates, Grand Dragon Locke or­
dered 100 kleagles to the Springs to assist members in getting out 
the vote for the “American Ticket.” On several occasions Locke, 
Chief Candlish, and Governor Morley motored from Denver in po­
lice department automobiles to direct the effort and bolster their 
troops’ morale. Opposition to the Klan, spearheaded by the Colorado 
Springs Gazette and Telegraph, began mobilizing to counter the now 
overt threat. One hundred fifty of the city’s most prominent busi­
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ness and professional men hastily organized the Citizens’ Commit­
tee and initiated a last-minute drive in support of the anti-Klan can­
didates. The faculty of the Colorado Springs Labor College closed 
ranks with the city’s elite and denounced the Klan’s “spirit of bigoted 
intolerance.” 10 On election eve the Colorado Springs Gazette in a 
front-page editorial warned citizens to “Vote Your Security”: “The 
election tomorrow has as its stake the future of Colorado Springs—  
whether it is to be ordered and directed and regulated by the people 
of this city, or . . .  an alien influence. The issue is of local self govern­
ment in the interest o f the whole people, or the conduct of munici­
pal business by a clique for clique purposes and gain.” 11
Colorado Springs Klansmen arose early on election day and be­
gan the final stage of their campaign. Newspaper reporters counted 
at least 100 automobiles, plastered with Klan placards, ferrying 
voters to the polls. Klansmen were dispatched to every precinct to 
watch for polling irregularities and to assist sympathetic voters with 
their choices. Overzealousness produced several disturbances, caus­
ing the eviction o f Klan workers from two polling places. A police 
officer and a newspaperman were assaulted in other scuffles with 
Klansmen. Despite these efforts, the inhabitants of Colorado Springs 
heeded the Gazette's advice, although by only a small margin. All 
three anti-Klan councilmen were barely re-elected, winning 52 per­
cent of the 10,200 ballots cast. The large Klan turnout, after so long 
a period of hooded inactivity, stunned the city’s newspapers and the 
Citizens’ Committee. “The threat o f masked government has been 
met,” observed the Colorado Springs Gazette, “but not in sufficient 
manner. The election is a warning even as it is a victory for honest 
citizenship.” 12 Relief and congratulations were short-lived, however, 
for the danger to visible government had not subsided. In May resi­
dents would elect a new school board, a prize which the Ku Klux 
Klan desperately wanted to win.13
One week after the municipal elections the members of the Cit­
izens’ Committee met to perfect and expand their organization in 
anticipation o f the school board fight. Several hundred of the city’s 
economic, political, and social leaders attended the meeting, elected 
an executive committee, and unanimously approved a declaration 
of principles.14 The members proclaimed:
Without cause, but only thru hysteria, friendships of long stand­
ing are being torn, business relations are being disrupted, the 
tolerance which is the basis of all good feeling is disappearing,
Twilight on the Eastern Slope
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and in its place is coming a bigotry that will be fatal to the com­
munity. Citizens are threatened. A campaign of persecution has 
been started.
We, therefore, . . . deprecate the organization and activities 
of the Ku Klux Klan, and its deadening and destructive influ­
ence, and do pledge ourselves, not merely to resist it, but to ex­
ert our utmost influence to counteract the evil which inevitably 
it exercises upon the community.15
Although the meeting was described as a rising of common citizens, 
invitations were mailed to selected individuals and no public an­
nouncements appeared until after the gathering adjourned. Colo­
rado Springs residents were later invited to subscribe to the declara­
tion of principles, which was placed on display in all of the city’s 
banks. An optimistic member of the anti-Klan group predicted, 
“When we are organized there will be no more Ku Klux Klan in the 
Pikes Peak region. The affairs of the city are going to be kept in the 
hands of our own people.” 16
The Citizens' Committee endorsed three respected and well- 
known Colorado Springs residents for the school board and waged a 
vigorous campaign to overcome the apathy endemic to such elec­
tions. The declaration of principles was reprinted daily in the news­
papers with instructions to sign, clip, and mail to committee head­
quarters. Prominent committee members went door to door in 
search of sympathetic voters and new recruits. Eloquent speakers 
recharged the spirit and energy of campaign workers at weekly 
meetings. Organized labor again pledged its support to the anti- 
Klan movement. Labor leaders A. P. R. Drucker (a committee mem­
ber), John Dingele, and W. J. Graham issued statements declaring 
Klan membership antithetical to unionism. Colorado Springs Chief 
o f Police Hugh Harper, also a member of the committee, tore at the 
Klan’s promise to preserve law and order. Throughout the nation, 
charged Harper, the Klan has caused “an almost complete failure of 
law enforcement and a total loss of [police] morale. . . .  It is said that 
thieves and crooks join the Klan to secure the protection of Klan po­
lice officers.” 17
During the campaign C. C. Hamlin’s Colorado Springs Gazette 
and Telegraph became the organ of the Citizens’ Committee. Readers 
opened their newspapers almost daily to blistering front-page anti- 
Klan editorials. Hamlin’s spies infiltrated the Klan and secured a list 
of leaders, application blanks, and klavern admission cards, all of
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which were promptly published. Even more damaging was the 
newspaper’s threat to print the names of every member of Pikes 
Peak Klan No. 1 1.18
The committee’s campaign overwhelmed the hooded fraternity. 
On May 4 a record number of Colorado Springs residents went to 
the polls and gave anti-Klan candidates 56 percent of their votes in 
the school board election. Two defeats in less than a month crushed 
the spirit of the Pikes Peak Klan. Its Klexter remembers the men’s 
frustration: “They just couldn’t win the battle, so they gave up.” 19 
Victory, on the other hand, strengthened the resolve of the anti- 
Klan movement. “The effort cannot cease,” said the Gazette, “and 
will not, until the broad menace . . .  of the Ku Klux Klan is defi­
nitely eliminated.” 20 Ralph O. Giddings, chairman of the executive 
committee, was more bellicose: “Those who are not with us must be 
counted against us.” 21
The returns from other Eastern Slope school board elections 
were mixed. Klan candidates for board of education positions were 
defeated in Fort Collins, Fort Lupton, Rocky Ford, and four other 
eastern towns. At the same time eleven communities located pri­
marily in the Greeley and Denver areas chose their board members 
from Klan ranks. Puebloans, casting a record school election vote, 
split the board between Klan and anti-Klan candidates. These victo­
ries, however, could not compensate for the damage inflicted in Col­
orado Springs. Grand Dragon Locke had risked his and the Klan’s 
prestige in a headlong encounter on a hostile battlefield. As a result, 
the Klan’s image of invincibility earned in the hard-fought contests 
o f 1924 was shattered. The spring elections of 1925 only strength­
ened the arguments of the Grand Dragon’s detractors.22
I ll
The Denver Klan, despite the kidnapping incident and police 
department scandals, achieved two final victories. On May 5 Klan 
candidates emerged from a field of six to win places on the Denver 
school board. Their success was as much the product of apathy and 
surprise as the Klan’s campaign organization. “We were sound 
asleep,” recalls Monsignor Gregory Smith. “We just never thought 
of it.” 23 Two weeks later Denverites went to the polls to elect a new 
nine-member city council. Remarkably, no organization was formed 
to mobilize anti-Klan voters even though the secret order’s inten­
tions were well known. Election returns gave six of the council seats 
to Klan-endorsed candidates. Once elected, the new councilmen
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made no attempt to conceal their obligations. The Reverend Carl J. 
Wells took his oath of office before thousands of cheering Klansmen 
at the Cotton Mills Stadium. Gus Reddish of North Denver ended 
a council speech with a verse from the Klan poem, “God Give Us 
Men.” Council President H. W. Risley, who was assigned Klan mem­
bership No. 12,894, was a frequent visitor at Dr. Locke’s headquar­
ters. Unfortunately for the Denver Klan, its control of the city coun­
cil lasted only five months. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that 
Wells had to relinquish his office to his non-Klan opponent because 
he had failed to satisfy the residency requirement. Another member 
o f the Klan majority assumed an independent stance and voted con­
sistently against his former associates.24
The final act in the downfall o f John Galen Locke began the day 
after the municipal elections. On May 20 Denver newspapers re­
ported that federal officials were investigating the Grand Dragon’s 
alleged failure to file income tax returns from 1913 to 1924. The 
government charged that Locke had reported no taxable income 
despite his earnings as a physician and his purported commission as 
Klan leader from initiation and robe fees. Locke denounced the in­
vestigation as an attempt by his enemies to discredit him. He denied 
receiving any income for his services to the Klan and declared that 
his medical practice was small, confined primarily to “the poor, 
working and industrial class who were and are not able to pay. . . .” 25 
When Locke refused to cooperate voluntarily, Judge J. Foster Symes 
ordered him to appear before the tax examiners on June 1 with all 
pertinent books and records. Locke failed to comply with the court’s 
order and was taken into custody by U.S. marshals. Judge Symes, 
however, vacated the contempt of court charge and released the 
Grand Dragon after he apologized and agreed to cooperate with the 
investigation. Yet, on the day o f examination, Locke announced that 
his financial records had mysteriously vanished from his automobile 
while en route to the hearing. Unknown to investigators, Locke’s 
aide Joseph Bushnell had taken the books and returned them to the 
Grand Dragon’s secretary. Symes lost all patience and again cited 
Locke for contempt of court. On June 15 Locke was sentenced to 
ten days in the county jail and fined $1,500. Governor Morley and 
other prominent Denver Klansmen pleaded in vain with Symes to 
reduce the fine and release their leader.26
Locke’s stay in jail was not unpleasant. Flowers and telegrams 
from all over Colorado flooded his cell. “Oodles and oodles of 
foodstuff were sent to him,” reported the Denver Post, “not to men­
tion thirty boxes o f cigars and ten cans of his favorite tobacco.” 27
104
Twilight on the Eastern Slope
Prison officials received 280 telephone inquiries about the Grand 
Dragon’s health. More than 600 friends called personally to express 
their support. Dr. Locke’s most solicitous attendant was Clarence 
Morley, whose eyes were sometimes “reddened and moist when he 
took his leave.” 28 To ease his leader’s burden, the governor ordered 
the state auditor’s office to pay $ 1,600 in salary owed John Locke for 
his National Guard service since January 20. Attorney General 
William Boatright, however, frustrated the governor’s will, ruling 
that Locke was not entitled to the salary because he had been ap­
pointed to nonexistent posts. Friends’ donations eventually paid the 
fine. Similarly, Governor Morley organized a fund to pay Locke’s 
income taxes arbitrarily assessed for the years 1918 to 1924 at 
$14,700. A six-year statute of limitations prevented the Internal 
Revenue Service from collecting taxes owed before 1918.20
Jail buffered Locke from the dissension that was tearing his 
organization apart. Upon his release he moved quickly to rally 
his shaken followers. Locke held private conferences with leading 
Klansmen to convince them of his innocence. Klan newspapers were 
filled with articles justifying the Grand Dragon’s resistance. A spe­
cial meeting was called to expose the government’s campaign of per­
secution, which supposedly included breaking into the Locke family 
mausoleum and “desecrating the dead” in search of tax records. 
Throughout the meeting Locke sat sullenly, his head in his hands, 
perhaps aware of the futility of his efforts. Many Klansmen, numbed 
by the spectacle of their leader behind bars, remained unconvinced. 
According to one member, Locke betrayed their trust and “took out 
a good part o f the money.” 30
John Galen Locke had been the Klan’s architect. His charismatic 
and dynamic personality gave the Klan much of its unity; he was the 
cement which bound together the organization’s heterogeneous fac­
tions. In command from the beginning, he was the visible symbol 
not only of Denver but of Colorado Klandom. Thus his disgrace 
proved to be far more than a personal injury. Public opinion gener­
alized the scandal to the movement and forced it upon the shoulders 
of every knight. Members reeled even more from the shock of their 
leader’s alleged perfidy. The leadership variable, which had been so 
crucial to Klan growth, now stimulated community disapproval and 
turned members from the cause.
The income tax investigation, perhaps instigated at the sugges­
tion of Senator Rice Means, was the decisive incident the insurgents 
had long awaited. Means met with Imperial Wizard Hiram Wesley 
Evans in Washington, D.C., and argued the case for the removal of
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John Galen Locke. The kidnapping, the police department scandals, 
the debacle in the state legislature, the election defeats, and now the 
imprisonment of their Grand Dragon had demoralized the knights 
and caused mass defections. The Colorado realm could be restored 
to health only if Locke resigned and leadership was entrusted to 
men untainted by corruption. Evans was receptive to these plead­
ings because he had for some time been suspicious of Locke’s ambi­
tions. The Colorado Grand Dragon had become too independent of 
national Klan headquarters. Emissaries sent by the Imperial Wizard 
to investigate conditions in the realm had frequently been turned 
back at the state border. Atlanta also questioned whether it was re­
ceiving its share o f Colorado Klan funds. Locke had further an­
gered Evans when he organized his own Women’s Klan in Colorado 
and Wyoming in defiance of the prerogatives of the Klan’s official 
women’s auxiliary. The insurgents had approached the Imperial 
Wizard at a most opportune time. Having just repulsed the strong 
challenge of Indiana Klan king D. C. Stephenson, Evans was sensi­
tive to any threats to his authority.31
On June 30, 1925, Imperial Wizard Evans asked Locke to step 
down as Colorado’s Grand Dragon. That same night Locke read his 
resignation statement to several thousand Klansmen assembled at 
the Cotton Mills Stadium. The knights refused to accept it. Their 
protests lasted more than an hour and, said a Denver Post reporter, 
“assumed the proportions of thunder.” When the demonstration 
ended, the Klansmen voted to banish Senator Rice Means, Mayor 
Ben Stapleton, Secretary of State Carl Milliken, and six members of 
the mayor’s city hall faction from the Invisible Empire. This unex­
pected emotional uproar caught the Imperial Wizard’s delegation, 
sent to supervise the transition, by surprise. Uncertain of the situ­
ation, they gave ground and asked Locke to continue as Grand 
Dragon. Evans agreed with his delegation’s decision and revoked 
the resignation order, temporarily, to allow Klan tempers to cool. In 
interviews with reporters Locke denied any bitterness and professed 
his steadfast loyalty to Atlanta. “Like a soldier,” he said, “I obey the 
orders of my commander and do the work assigned me. . . .” :V2
Despite such public declarations of fealty, Grand Dragon Locke 
knew that his Klan career had come to an end. Power was now only 
briefly his, tenuously held at the whim of the Imperial Wizard. But 
Locke had grown accustomed to command and was not eager to re­
turn to a quiet medical practice. He therefore used the lull to set in 
motion the Minute Men of America, a new secret society that would 
challenge the Invisible Empire for the allegiance of its members. On
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July 3 Klansmen supporting Locke filed the new organization’s arti­
cles of incorporation with the Colorado secretary of state. Twelve 
days later Locke’s secretary and two prominent Klanswomen sub­
mitted incorporation papers for the Minute Women of America.3*
Mayor Ben Stapleton ended the lull on July 15 when he de­
clared his independence by firing Chief of Police William J. Cand­
lish. On July 17, as a prelude to dismissal, the Imperial Wizard tel­
egraphed Locke to freeze the assets of the Colorado Klan. The 
Minute Men were well prepared. They took control of the regular 
klavern meeting at the Cotton Mills Stadium and read Evans’s wire 
to an estimated 6,000 Klansmen. After a brief demonstration a se­
cession motion was put to a vote and passed unanimously. Former 
Klan leader and now Minute Man M. Allen Barth ordered the 
knights to remove their hoods and robes. Minute Men tore down a 
huge electric fiery cross and carried it from the auditorium. Bricks 
were thrown through windows painted with the letters K.K.K. Next, 
Denver Klan leaders pledged their allegiance to the new society and 
donned the uniform of the Minute Men. The doors of the stadium 
were then locked and the men instructed to exchange their Klan 
memberships for Minute Men cards. Fifty booths at the rear of the 
hall handled the paperwork. Locke resigned as Grand Dragon three 
days later and was promptly banished from the Ku Klux Klan.34
The Imperial Palace in Atlanta moved quickly to contain and 
suppress the revolt. The charter of Denver Klan No. 1 was sus­
pended indefinitely. Imperial Representative Harry C. Hoffman of 
Wichita, Kansas, was ordered to Denver to take charge of the Colo­
rado Klan until Locke’s replacement could be chosen. A special del­
egation was dispatched from Klan headquarters to assist Hoffman 
in restoring order. In addition, Evans reinstated Means, Stapleton, 
and the other insurgents to help rally Klan loyalists. To secure the 
orderly exchange of Klan records and property, the chairman of the 
delegation met privately with Dr. Locke in Governor Morley’s office 
at the state capitol. Locke amicably returned the Klan’s books and 
over $23,000 but balked at the transfer of the klavern meeting hall. 
Probably aware of the impending crisis, Locke had asked Klansmen 
in the spring of 1925 to subscribe $60,000 as individuals, not mem­
bers, to purchase the Cotton Mills Stadium. The issue was decided 
in the court a year later; the building would be sold, the bond­
holders reimbursed, and the Klan given the right of redemption. 
Final settlement of the Cotton Mills claims, however, did not occur 
until December, 1932. In a last desperate attempt to save their or­
ganization, loyal Klansmen informed Locke that his banishment
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would be revoked if he agreed to return to the invisible fold. Locke 
summarily rejected their offer.35
Nearly 5,000 o f Denver’s 17,000 Klansmen followed Locke into 
the Minute Men of America. Less than 1,000 men reaffirmed their 
loyalty to the Invisible Empire. For the majority, the revolt provided 
an opportunity to sever all ties to 100 Percent Americanism. Many 
who joined the cause to save Denver from lawlessness and to restore 
governmental responsiveness felt betrayed. The police scandals and 
the illegal actions of the Grand Dragon had corrupted the organiza­
tion’s law and order reputation and discredited every member. Fur­
ther, as the crime issue gradually waned, men questioned their obli­
gations to a now superfluous body. Similarly, the Catholic and Jewish 
conspiracies to seize Protestant rights never materialized. Blacks, 
after their initial challenges to the racial status quo, settled back into 
their prescribed positions. Thus the question of Klan governmental 
responsiveness could act in both a positive and negative manner 
upon the movement’s fortunes. Those who perceived Klan author­
ities as responsible for the decline in minority challenges could leave 
the order assured that the crisis had passed. On the other hand, 
Klan governmental failures convinced many to withdraw their alle­
giance. Political needs had created other difficulties. In 1924 the 
Klan had expanded its voting base with a recruiting campaign that 
netted every willing, white, Protestant, native-born male possessing 
ten dollars. The drive had helped win an election, but it had also 
transformed the social and economic character of the Denver Klan. 
Meri entering the Invisible Empire in search of fellowship and fra­
ternity instead found meetings to be random affairs attended by 
hundreds and sometimes thousands of anonymous men. Some early 
joiners, such as the 1923 Exalted Cyclops, who had opposed lower­
ing the barriers left the order rather than share it with men of lesser 
rank. Even the economic lure was dulled as Minute Men and Klans­
men launched counterboycotts and Catholics shunned the mer­
chants of both groups. Finally, men had personal reasons for aban­
doning the movement. One man quit because he was tired of being 
herded like a steer by mounted Klansmen at the gatherings on 
South Table Mountain. A wife’s threat of divorce prompted another 
to resign. The Minute Men revolt merely hastened the decline of the 
Ku Klux Klan. The Klan’s fragile coalition could not survive the de­
feat o f its program in city and state government, the humiliation of 
its leader, or the absence of a multitude of enemies. Lacking success 
and a reason for existence, the order could offer its members only 
worn platitudes about Americanism, Protestantism, and white su­
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premacy. Interest and commitment vanished, and with them money, 
votes, skills, and the various other resource tokens necessary to in­
fluence community decision-making. The arsenal depleted quickly 
and the declension spiral spun out o f control.36
IV
The Minute Men of Denver Regiment No. 1 formalized their or­
ganization in August and September, 1925. Former Exalted Cyclops 
Rex Yeager and former Great Titan Gano Senter rejected Klan en­
treaties to return and were installed as Minute Men colonel and lieu­
tenant colonel respectively. Instead of white sheets, the uniform of 
the revolutionary soldier was adopted complete with tricorner hat 
and knee breeches. Minute Men wore no masks, boasted a group 
leader, because, unlike Klansmen, “We are not afraid to show our 
faces.” 37 Recruiters began the now familiar process of contacting 
prospective members, primarily concentrating their efforts upon 
old hooded comrades. Dr. Locke also hoped to attract Catholics and 
Jews to the new organization. He sent Father Matthew Smith, editor 
of the Denver Catholic Register, the Minute Men constitution before it 
was promulgated, in an effort to allay suspicion that his order was 
anti-Catholic. Ben Laska, the Grand Dragon’s attorney, and a few 
other Denver Jews were inducted into the regiment on Locke’s or­
ders. Locke’s attempt to expand his base, however, proved too radi­
cal and he was later overruled. Nor were the children forgotten. A 
Minute Boys organization was incorporated to care for their needs.38
On September 18, 1925, at the Cotton Mills Stadium, Locke was 
installed as commander in chief of the Minute Men. He appeared at 
the ceremony dressed in a blue flowing coat with bright red facings 
and lining, doeskin breeches, tan boots, and a blue colonial cap with 
cockade. After a thirty-minute ovation heightened by the band’s re­
peated rendition of “Hail to the Chief,” he outlined the principles of 
the new society. “We are,” proclaimed Locke, “members of a great 
organization that soon is to sweep the country. Our organization is 
founded upon patriotism and our course is dedicated to the teach­
ing of Americanism. . . .” Like the Klan, the Minute Men promised 
to uphold law and order, protect white womanhood, promote char­
ity, maintain the separation of church and state, and curtail foreign 
immigration. But, Locke also declared, “The right of every man to 
worship according to the dictates of his own conscience is guaran­
teed by the Constitution of the United States. The Minute Men of 
America o f today, like their great-great-grandfathers, who laid
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down their lives in 1776 . . . , will stand in the front ranks of Ameri­
cans fighting for these principles. Tolerance shall be our watchword 
and with this as our slogan we shall march forth to a grand and 
splendid victory in the United States.” 39
The dissension that shattered the men’s organization also in­
fected the Denver women’s Klan. Mrs. Laurena Senter, the Imperial 
Commander of the Colorado women’s order, attempted to steer a 
neutral course between the warring male factions. In August 10,000 
Klanswomen from thirty Colorado klaverns paraded in the Denver 
suburb o f Arvada to demonstrate female Protestant solidarity and to 
rally the divided forces of Americanism. Thousands lined the streets 
as the women marched, unmasked, with the “precision of a military 
machine.” Interspaced between the marching delegations in the 
two-mile-long procession were colorful banners and floats remind­
ing spectators of the dangers confronting the little red school house, 
the Bible, and the Constitution. Within two months of this display of 
unity Excellent Commander Minnie Love, who was also a lieutenant 
in the Minute Women, convinced a majority of Denver’s 1,000 
Klanswomen to shed their hoods for Betsy Ross outfits. Imperial 
Commander Senter suspended Love, revoked the Denver Klan’s 
charter, and seized its assets to prevent their disappearance into 
Minute Women coffers. Senter reorganized the loyal remnant and 
later survived a Minute Women lawsuit to recover the disputed as­
sets. But the rebellion had been costly; the strongest fortress in the 
women’s organization had been reduced to rubble.40
The Minute Men revolt spread westward to Salt Lake City and 
as far east as Madison, Wisconsin. Membership inquiries from Ala­
bama, California, Indiana, and Kentucky were received at the Min­
ute Men headquarters in Denver. Although such nationwide ad­
vances received extensive press coverage, recruiting success was 
primarily confined to northeastern Colorado. Fourteen of the state’s 
sixty-six klaverns voted to join the Denver-led secession and sur­
render their charters to the Imperial Wizard. Defections were con­
centrated in those areas where Dr. Locke’s influence had been strong­
est: Denver and its suburbs, the Greeley—Fort Collins region, and 
Colorado Springs. Southern and western klaverns, with the excep­
tion of Durango Klan No. 66, renewed their covenants. Yet victory 
was not always clear-cut. Littleton Klansmen, for example, voted 
195 to 147 against secession. But instead of yielding to the majority 
decision, the minority organized Arapahoe Lodge No. 1 of the Min­
ute Men of America. In Colorado Springs 350 Klansmen met to con­
sider the secession question. After shouting down Klan loyalists they
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unanimously approved their leader’s recommendation to enlist in 
the new movement. Despite their apparent enthusiasm, however, 
only half took out membership in the Minute Men and after a brief 
interval quietly disbanded. Meanwhile, a faithful band of Colorado 
Springs Klansmen successfully petitioned for their charter’s return.41
Colorado Minute Men held their first and last statewide encamp­
ment in Denver on November 30, 1925. Commander-in-Chief Locke 
called the 250 delegates from fifty-eight Colorado regiments to order 
in a hall emblazoned in red, white, and blue. After the required num­
ber of speeches predicting a glorious future, the Minute Men elected 
their state officers, only one of whom resided in a city outside of the 
state's northeastern quadrant. The delegates adjourned their con­
vention on an optimistic note. J. F. Mayes, the newly elected Minute 
Men major general, announced the commencement of an extensive 
membership drive which would raise Colorado regiment strength 
from fifty-eight to 150 by January 1. The opportunity to change from 
their colonial uniforms to civilian clothes after the day-long meeting 
probably also cheered the delegates.42
Even while the convention was in session, desertions were bleed­
ing Colorado regiments of their members. The new movement 
could not inspire, excite, or hold its recruits with a tired, Klan-like 
program. Membership was, in effect, a highly emotional commit­
ment to John Locke, a transitory state that quickly faded. Without 
issues or benefits, it could attract few new men. After the initial wave 
of enthusiasm the Denver Minute Men found themselves in sole 
possession of the fort.
The Denver regiment similarly failed to capture the issues or 
generate the excitement necessary for sustained growth. Rather 
than seeking a fresh approach, the Minute Men became in Locke’s 
hands a negative force, a personal instrument of revenge. From Oc­
tober, 1925, to June, 1926, the Denver Minute Men concentrated all 
of their time and energy upon a campaign to oust Mayor Ben Sta­
pleton from city hall. They sponsored an amendment to the Denver 
city charter which, if approved, would abolish the mayor’s office and 
substitute a city manager form of government. The amendment also 
authorized the creation of a public utilities commission to protect 
residents from unfair rates and excessive taxation. Minute Men 
organizers circulated petitions calling for a special election and ob­
tained twice the required number of signatures. City Attorney and 
loyal Klansman Henry May, however, blocked the effort dismissing 
the amendment as merely “recall in a different dress.” 43 May’s ruling 
cited five other violations of the Denver charter and convinced the
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city council to reject the Minute Men’s plea for an election. The Col­
orado Supreme Court later upheld the council’s decision.44
The amendment’s defeat was not the only setback the Minute 
Men suffered in 1926. In January Chairman John B. Stephen of the 
Republican County Central Committee moved to release the party 
machinery from Minute Men control. He appointed a loyal Klans- 
man and three other Minute Men opponents to the managing board 
of the central committee, thus giving the anti-Locke forces a major­
ity o f the votes. A month later the committee selected twenty-one 
new district captains, none o f whom wore a tricornered hat. Ste­
phen’s men continued the rout in April, ousting one of the commit­
tee’s Minute Men members and replacing him with Charles M. An­
derson, the son-in-law of long-time Locke foe Frank Howbert. The 
final purge occurred in August, when the Colorado Supreme Court, 
ruling in Stephen’s favor, decided that the names of only twenty- 
three o f 120 Minute Men-supported candidates for precinct com­
mittee posts could appear on the primary ballot. Denver District 
Attorney Foster Cline also quickened the Minute Men’s fall. An in­
vestigation of improper jury selection procedures led Cline to Com­
mander Locke’s office, where he found evidence that old Klan mem­
bership lists had been stuffed into the jury wheel.45
The Denver regiment lost its viability by the end of 1926. Politi­
cal failures and the jury-tampering investigation discredited the 
movement and further drained it of resources. Unable to spark 
Denver’s imagination with either a dramatic flair or a positive plan 
of action, the Minute Men had failed to attract new recruits suffi­
cient to offset staggering desertions. Even the uniform proved de­
bilitating; three-cornered hats and knee breeches could not replace 
the magic of the hood and robe. Dr. Locke lacked the patience and 
will to revive what had become moribund. Soon after the honorary 
election o f his friend Clarence Morley as Minute Men colonel, 
Locke quietly abandoned his six-year crusade.46
John Galen Locke’s return to private life was interrupted in
1928 when the Internal Revenue Service reopened its income tax 
investigation. Agents, assisted in their probe by the Ku Klux Klan, 
slapped Locke with an additional tax of $30,500 on his alleged in­
come as Grand Dragon. Locke appealed the assessment and in 1935 
was absolved of any wrongdoing. The U.S. Board of Tax Appeals 
ruled that Locke earned no income from Klan sources and was even 
entitled to a $3,000 refund on his 1925 assessment of $14,000. De­
spite his consuming tax struggle, Locke found time in 1934 to pro­
mote another secret society. Evidently hoping to repeat his Klan suc­
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cess, he convinced between 2,000 and 3,000 men to wear the black 
silk hood of the Order of Equals. Membership in the Equals was 
open to white Denverites of all religions who were concerned about 
the city’s subversive elements. Locke’s dream ended abruptly on 
April 1, 1935. While talking to a friend at the Brown Palace Hotel, 
he collapsed and died of a heart attack at the age of sixty-one. He 
was buried at Fairmont Cemetery on April 5, with a Catholic and a 
Jew among his pallbearers. The night after his interment, a band of 
ex-Klansmen secretly entered the cemetery and lit a cross before his 
crypt.47
V
Although the Minute Men rebellion seriously scarred the Den­
ver, Greeley, and Colorado Springs Klans, it hardly touched the re­
mainder of the Colorado realm. Every Klan in southern Colorado 
and the Western Slope except one rejected Minute Men allegiance. 
Fifty-one klaverns including Pueblo No. 5, Canon City No. 21, and 
Grand Junction No. 35 reaffirmed their ties to Atlanta. In No­
vember, 1925, four months after the split, Imperial Wizard Evans 
judged the realm sufficiently revived to elect a Grand Dragon to re­
place Locke. Eight hundred Klansmen attended the klorero held in 
Colorado Springs and chose Baptist minister Fred G. Arnold of 
Canon City as their new leader. With Arnold’s election, the head­
quarters of the Colorado Klan moved from Denver’s Glenarm Place 
to a garage located in an alley behind the Canon Hotel in Canon 
City. The rise o f the Exalted Cyclops o f Canon City reflected the re­
cent shift in the Klan balance o f power. The Eastern Slope Klans, 
which had for so long dominated the state organization, were now in 
decline. The Klan flame flickered for a while longer in Denver, Col­
orado Springs, and Pueblo, but the heat was gone.48
Slipping from one failure to another, Denver Klan No. 1 never 
regained its balance after the July, 1925, secession. Meetings re­
sumed on August 15 in the Woodmen of the World Hall, following a 
month-long reorganization. Slightly more than a hundred Klansmen 
attended the gathering, their beliefs made consistent by charges 
that the pope had bribed Locke to revolt. In October Klansmen res­
urrected an earlier petition drive calling for a state referendum 
upon the Colorado civil service law. The campaign, however, fell 
short o f signatures and collapsed. A simultaneous drive to recall 
Judges Henry Calvert, Charles Sackmann, and George Luxford for 
their alleged Minute Men memberships also gained little support.
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The new year brought no relief. The second annual Ku Klux Klan 
boxing and wrestling tournament received scant notice and drew 
few paying spectators. In May Denver Klansmen hosted a Memorial 
Day klorero, with 30,000 to 40,000 people expected to attend. Un­
fortunately for the Denver Klan, far fewer appeared at the celebra­
tion, and a much touted parade of strength through the streets of 
the city attracted only 468 masked Klansmen and Klanswomen.49
The Denver municipal elections in the spring of 1927 furnished 
further evidence of the Klan’s decline. Mayor Ben Stapleton an­
nounced his bid for re-election and joined six other candidates seek­
ing the office. Three of the candidates were, like Stapleton, former 
Klansmen, while two received the backing of the anti-Klan Constitu­
tionalists. Klansmen divided over the men, and as a result the orga­
nization made no endorsement. But disunity was not the only rea­
son for the Klan’s failure to take an active role in the campaign. In a 
letter to a Denver member Grand Dragon Arnold wrote: “The Klan 
has not sufficient strength to put a man across— such a man as might 
be after their own hearts.” Arnold also used the letter to berate the 
members for their contentiousness: “I do wish that Denver No. 1 
would settle down. . . . Ever since the reorganization took shape, 
there have been these complaints. No doubt many of them have a 
real foundation and others are imaginary. . . .  It is a poor comment 
upon the membership of Denver No. 1 for it to be unable to govern 
itself. They have vastly more difficulty than any other Klan in the 
State.” 50 Despite a Stapleton victory, the election was a repudiation 
of men with Klan ties in their past or present lives. Voters cleared 
the city council of its secret society members and defeated all but 
one of the ex-Klansmen seeking a seat on the body.51
Infrequent press releases marked the final years of the Denver 
Klan. On the night of July 24, 1928, 200 Klansmen demonstrated 
and ignited a cross on the lawn of a woman convicted of child abuse. 
In March, 1932, the Klan blamed the Depression for hindering its 
growth but predicted future expansion. A year later Klansmen an­
nounced that they had infiltrated the Denver Communist party and 
were aware of the red menaces every move. In December, 1933, 
protests from Jewish and Catholic organizations barred the entry of 
two Klan floats in an NRA—Blue Eagle parade. Having influenced 
neither opinion nor events for years, the Denver Klans demise 
shortly thereafter went unnoticed.52
The Minute Men splintering came just two months after the 
1925 municipal election defeats and meant the end of the Colorado 
Springs Klan to all but a faithful few hundred. After July, 1925,
114
Tw ilight on the E a ste rn  S lope
Klansmen rarely appeared publicly in the Pikes Peak region, outside 
o f the courtroom. In 1925 and 1926 three local Klansmen were 
charged with child molesting or statutory rape. A Klan leader’s libel 
suit against the Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph was dismissed 
after six months of litigation. Klan No. 1 i ’s voice, the Colorado 
Springs Independent, was forced to retract libelous statements against 
the secret organization’s foe Sheriff Samuel Berkley. Despite dire 
forecasts, a Klan election offensive before the 1926 fall primaries 
failed to materialize. In municipal elections the following spring the 
Klan endorsed a slate o f candidates for the city council. Yet even the 
bitterly anti-Klan Colorado Springs Gazette and Telegraph was uncon­
cerned, judging the move “more as an attempt to regain a shred of 
prestige than as an aggressive effort to elect a ticket. . . '.” 53 The only 
Klan-endorsed candidate elected also had the backing of the anti- 
Klan side. On September 2 1, 1928, the Pikes Peak Klan burned its 
last cross, at a home recently purchased by a black family in a white 
neighborhood. The fiery warning was ignored.5^
Pueblo Klan No. 5, unlike its counterparts in Denver and Colo­
rado Springs, lost only a fraction o f its members to the Minute Men. 
In the municipal election of November, 1925, the Klan won control 
of the government, electing two o f its men to the city commission. 
The Minute Men’s candidate placed last in a field of four contend­
ers. Two weeks after the election Klansmen, women, and juniors 
packed the city auditorium to celebrate their victory. On Christmas 
day Klansmen and Klanswomen distributed food baskets to hun­
dreds o f needy Pueblo families.55
Despite its seemingly robust appearance, the Pueblo Klan en­
tered a period o f decline in late 1925. The Klan’s decay resulted not 
from internal dissension but from an even more devastating cause, 
the loss o f its reason for being. The law and order issue that had 
drawn men and power to Klan No. 5 in 1923 and 1924 no longer 
had an explosive impact. The city’s crime situation had been brought 
under control, much of the credit due to Klansmen elected to office 
on law and order platforms. In 1925 and 1926 frequent police raids 
and arrests had made liquor more difficult to secure and sparked a 
renewed faith in the ability of visible government to handle the city’s 
problems. Just five murders were committed in the county during
1925 and only one remained unsolved. District Attorney J .  Arthur 
Phelps proudly announced that his office had obtained convictions 
in 92 percent o f the cases tried in 1925. The 1926 grand jury com­
mended the city’s campaign against lawlessness and returned no 
criminal indictments. Even the roadhouse question was solved. All
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Pueblo county roadhouses were ordered to close in 1926 when they 
failed to submit to government regulation. Although a few of the 
resorts resumed business just across the line in Custer County, most 
people believed that the struggle with sin had been won. In October,
1926, Chief o f Police J .  Arthur Grady proclaimed the end of the 
city's reign o f lawlessness. “Crime waves and criminal activities in 
Pueblo,” the chief explained, “ seem to come in very definite cy­
cles. A band o f criminals will set up business and will make things 
hot for a time until it is effectually broken up and dispersed by the 
police.” 56 The grand ju ry report o f 1927 confirmed Grady’s state­
ment, making few law and order recommendations and no criminal 
indictments.57
The Pueblo Klan could not adapt to the changing environment. 
Klansmen left their organization either fulfilled by its success or 
bored by its inactivity. Newspaper references to Klan activities be­
came scarce in 1926 and almost nonexistent in 1927. The last impor­
tant Klan event occurred on September 6, 1927, when Imperial 
Wizard Hiram Wesley Evans visited Pueblo and spoke to an open 
meeting held in the city auditorium. Klansmen had planned to 
honor Evans with a parade through the streets o f the city but were 
refused a permit. Charles B. Clark, the discourteous city commis­
sioner who turned down the Klan’s request, was immediately ejected 
from the Invisible Empire. Also marring Evans’s appearance was the 
filing o f two $50,000 damage suits which named him and twenty- 
three Pueblo Klan leaders as defendants. The Klan, unable to make 
the transition from crime fighter to an ordinary fraternal lodge, dis­
appeared from the city.58
In just seven months the Ku Klux Klan had lost its standing in 
the community and ability to influence decision-making. Once initi­
ated, the demobilization cycle had gathered momentum as it pro­
ceeded. The initial wound was opened in the state legislature where 
anti-Klansmen routed their inexperienced foes. Then, in rapid suc­
cession, political blunders, leadership errors, and revelations of cor­
ruption appeared to weaken a movement suffering from a loss in 
relevance. The bonds that unified the unstable and heterogeneous 
Denver Klan coalition had begun to unravel. Members withdrew 
their time, money, and allegiance, thus lowering the Klan’s resis­
tance to internal infection and external attack. Klan leaders who 
had seemed so perceptive during the order’s organizing stage now 
were unable to prevent the exit from influence. Simultaneously, hos­
tile community perceptions militated against an attempt to reverse
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the spiral through recruitment o f former or new members. Con­
versely, in Pueblo the Klan registered positive values upon all var­
iables and succumbed to its own success. Having accomplished its 
mission and unable to assume a new one, the klavern withered in 
victory. Decline in Colorado Springs was rooted in the local opinion- 
making public’s effort to rouse the city and smother Klansmen 
under successive defeats. Shut out from influence and plagued by 
leadership and issue impotence, Klansmen left the movement in 
frustration.
Klansmen on the Western Slope, their isolation fortified by 
mountain barriers, remained immune from the dissension which 
decimated their eastern comrades. With the fall from grace o f Locke 
and Denver No. 1, the Klan capital shifted to Canon City, the most 
powerful eastern outpost o f the now truncated empire. In Canon 
City the Ku Klux Klan controlled events to a degree unmatched by 
any other Colorado klavern.
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HOODED PROGRESSIVISM: 
Canon City’s Imprint upon Colorado Klanism
The Ku Klux Klan is behind the new blood of the county. Klansmen are 
supporting men with new and progressive ideas of government. They are 
on a crusade for better government, one in which the old political ring 
shall be done away with and the people shall rule as a real democracy.
Klan political advertisement
Canon City Daily Record, October 31, 1924 '
The search for the descendents o f the pre—World War I pro­
gressives has rarely, if ever, led historians into the Invisible Empire. 
The Klan’s watchwords, anti-Catholicism, law and order, and nativ- 
ism, were the arch symbols o f a decade o f reaction, the very antith­
esis o f the progressive temper. I f  the Klan’s mark is found, it is only 
on those reforms, such as prohibition, that turned sour during the 
1920s. Despite these judgments, the dividing line between the con­
ventional reformers and the members o f the Canon City Ku Klux 
Klan is blurred. Like the progressives, these Klansmen armed them­
selves with the rhetoric o f moral righteousness and stood at Arma­
geddon to battle for the return o f power to the people. They cam­
paigned against a conservative political and economic elite under 
whose control government had become unresponsive and encrusted 
with privilege. Once in power, they moved to correct abuses, leaving 
intact the basic political and social structure o f the town. The use of 
the Klan as a vehicle for change enabled the reformers to gain the 
support o f men and women unmoved by their civic responsibilities. 
This heterogeneous coalition, while necessary, saturated the reform 
impulse with the more odious features o f Klanism.
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Canon City, located on the Arkansas River forty-five miles south­
west o f Colorado Springs, was one of many small towns that fell un­
der the domination of the Ku Klux Klan. The retail and distribution 
center o f Fremont County, Canon City funneled supplies to the re­
gion’s coal miners, farmers, and ranchers. Also important to the eco­
nomic welfare o f the community was income gained from tourism, 
the state prison, and small-scale manufacturing. With 4,551 inhabi­
tants in 1920, Canon City was the largest town in Fremont County. 
Adding the residents o f the bordering villages of East Canon and 
South Canon raises the total population of the area to 6,277. Canon 
City lost population between 19 10  and 1920, but that trend reversed 
in the postwar decade; by 1930, 8,004 people lived in and around 
the town. Canon City contained few foreign-born immigrants and 
even fewer blacks. In 1920 immigrants comprised 8 percent (373) 
and blacks 2.6 percent (117 )  of the town’s inhabitants, and both 
groups had declined since 1910. The statistics for 1930 reflected 
continued slippage for the two minorities. There was only one Jew ­
ish family in Canon City. Florence, the site of the county’s other 
klavern, contained 2,629 people in 1920. Just nine miles to the east 
o f Canon City, Florence sat in the middle of Colorado’s oldest and 
largest oil field. The majority of Fremont County’s 2,771 foreign 
born, over a third of whom were Italians, lived in coal camps outside 
o f Canon City and Florence. The county’s Catholic population tri­
pled between 19 16  and 1926, rising from 826 to 2,580 or 14 percent 
of all residents.1
In 1923 a kleagle secretly arrived in Canon City after first 
organizing a provisional klavern in nearby Florence. Following a 
brief reconnaissance, he contacted the minister of the First Baptist 
Church, the county sheriff, and several guards at the Colorado State 
Penitentiary and convinced them to enter the Invisible Empire. The 
kleagle delegated recruiting chores to the new Klansmen and soon 
left town for Walsenburg and other prospective sales territories. Iso­
lated from outside influence and interference, they mobilized their 
fellow Protestant townsmen with a program tailored to the needs 
and conditions o f the community. By the end o f 1923, 500 Canon 
City men had responded to their call.2
The Catholic influx alone probably prepared many Canon City 
Protestants for the Klan’s message. Its conjunction with other sup­
posed evidence of papal intrigue made the Klan’s anti-Catholic ap­
peal irresistible. To Klansmen the rising Catholic tide was merely a
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prelude to the creation o f a papal state in Fremont County. In 1923 
the Benedictine Society o f Colorado acquired ninety acres o f or­
chard land in East Canon to build an abbey and boy’s school. Asked 
about the society’s plans, Father Cyprian Bradley replied, “ It is the 
aim o f the order to make Canon City the center o f the activities of 
the Benedictines in the West. We have had our eye on Canon City 
since 1896 and the purchase . . .  is the first step in the consumma­
tion o f our ambitions.” 3 The abbey school opened in 1925, joining 
Canon City’s other two Catholic educational institutions, St. Michael’s 
parochial school and Mount Saint Scholastica Academy for girls. 
The following year, reported the Canon City Daily Record, amidst “all 
o f the rich pageantry, fine pomp and inspiring ceremony o f the Ro­
man Catholic Church,” the Holy Cross Abbey held its first public 
service.4 The construction o f the monastery, warned the Klan, was 
an ominous sign. The pope had ordered the construction o f the 
Holy Cross Abbey o f Canon City as his summer residence, a base 
from which to infiltrate Protestant America. Fiery Klan speakers 
who denounced this nefarious plot generated bomb threats, causing 
guards to be posted around the abbey. In the same year that the ab­
bey’s cornerstone was placed, the Knights o f Columbus organized in 
Canon City. The pope’s “shock troops” numbered fifty townsmen, 
half the membership o f the Florence K. C. council. Throughout 
the Klan years recruiters never tired o f exposing the Catholic men­
ace, continually repeating stories o f arms being stockpiled in the 
churches and gossip concerning a local priest’s indiscretions. And 
many Canon City Protestants never tired o f listening. Protestant 
fears were groundless and now appear ridiculous. Yet, to under­
stand the Klan and its members, the events must be placed in their 
proper context. Catholic actions and population growth were real 
elements o f the local environment. Because the “provocations” oc­
curred in a rapid sequence, they appeared directed and thus more 
threatening. Klan organizers, whether sincere or not, bolstered this 
impression by tying the “conspiratorial” threads into a knot. When 
these factors interacted with a Protestant frame of reference, which 
had been conditioned from childhood with stories o f Catholic in­
trigue, the events’ meaning became unmistakable.’
Juxtaposed and at times entwined with anti-Catholicism was the 
other major theme o f the Canon City Klan, civic reform. According 
to Klansman Claude Singer:
The Klan came here for a definite, positive purpose. There 
was an old political group that had been here for years and
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years. Coming here from back East in the early days. They had 
a . . . death grip on politics. They owned all the real estate and 
the business houses and controlled the two banks. And a young 
man couldn’t run for dog catcher unless he had permission 
from this group. From the county sheriff and commissioners all 
the way down, that gang controlled everything.
Well, our schools were no good, they didn’t amount to any­
thing. Our streets were dirt, our sidewalks wooden. When I 
went to school . . . they didn’t even have electric lights. There 
were no lights in any o f the public schools.
We members o f the Klan decided that we wanted to make a 
change in that, which we did. We definitely did.6
The overthrow o f the local establishment was not a simple task. 
The elite controlled political offices, jobs, loans, and information. 
The effort would require independent and capable leaders, secrecy 
to protect members from retaliation, and resources, especially in the 
form o f votes. Reformers realized that the Klan could provide them 
with the necessary keys to influence. The movement enlisted those 
excluded from the town’s political and economic decision-making 
process with promises to “Clean Out the Court House Gang.” 7 Elite 
group members singled out for sharpest attack were businessman 
George Rockafellow; Dr. William T. Little; Congressman Guy U. 
Hardy, editor and publisher o f the Canon City Daily Record) attorneys 
John R Thomas, Jr., and Edwin Stinemeyer; and bankers A. J .
/T urn er and D. N. Cooper. The elite’s crime was not corruption but 
conservatism. Rather than supporting new bond issues and taxes to 
lay sewers or pave the streets, the influential favored economic re­
trenchment. Instead o f improving the public schools, the elite al­
legedly sent their children to private institutions. The ruling group, 
charged Klansmen, had become arrogant and unresponsive; access 
to power had been all but shut off. It was now time to move Canon 
City into the twentieth century and return it to the control o f the 
common people. This popular issue struck a responsive chord 
among small businessmen, middle-class professionals, workers, and 
disappointed office seekers. Even a few junior members o f the elite 
group, chafing under their elders’ dictates, rallied to the Klan. Klan 
speakers warmed anti-Catholics to the reform cause with accusations 
that the elite was merely a pawn of the pope, kept in power by a solid 
Catholic vote. Again and again Klan leaders reminded members that 
“millionaires and those who don’t eat meat on Friday” had joined 
forces to frustrate the Protestant will.8 ,
The law and order appeal, so effective in Denver and Pueblo,
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received little attention in Fremont County. Klansmen and non- 
Klansmen alike praised Sheriff Clifford Glasson, a member o f the 
hooded order, for his vigorous law enforcement efforts especially in 
regard to bootlegging. “ The number o f major crimes,” reported the 
Canon City Daily Record, “are few and far between. One seldom hears 
o f any scandal or o f big gambling parties.” 9 Occasionally during the 
1920s a wave o f burglaries engulfed the community. At those infre­
quent times the Klan beat the law and order drum in search o f men. 
White supremacy also needed few defenders. “We went to school 
with them,” said the Nighthawk of the Canon City Klan, “and color 
didn’t mean a thing to us, any o f us.” 10 The small black colony evi­
dently accepted the traditional patterns o f race relations and did 
nothing to arouse white suspicions. Similarly, the Klan had no argu­
ment with the town’s four Jews. Klansmen even returned, as a gesture 
o f peace, $ 10 0  in protection money donated by the wary Jews. De­
spite coal strikes in 19 2 1, 1922, and 1927, which primarily involved 
foreign-born miners, the Klan never resorted to the language o f the 
Red Scare. Nor was the local organization a product o f rural antipa­
thy and jealousy o f the urban lifestyle. The Klan’s attention was rare­
ly occupied with happenings in New York and Chicago. Protestants 
had no reason to look beyond the town limits for a reason to enlist. 
The Catholics appeared to be mobilizing for power. The elite frus­
trated reform. The Klan was grounded in governmental unrespon­
siveness and not status anxiety or a sense o f personal rootlessness.11
Three men guided the Canon City Klan through its formative 
stage and most o f its history. The Reverend Fred G. Arnold, one of 
the original converts, served as provisional Klan leader until his 
election as Exalted Cyclops in January, 1924. Born in Stella, Ne­
braska, on March 25, 1886, Arnold had entered the ministry in 19 12  
after a brief and unsatisfying career as a pharmacist. He had come 
to Canon City in 1920 to assume the pastorate o f the First Baptist 
Church. Young and handsome, Arnold impressed townsmen with 
his “ radical Baptist” beliefs and “ardent prohibitionism.” He appar­
ently impressed his fellow clergymen as well, for in 1924 he was se­
lected president o f the Colorado Baptist Ministerial Conference. In 
addition to his regular church work, Arnold attended to the spir­
itual needs o f the inmates o f the penitentiary. While prison chap­
lain, he secretly worked in conjunction with Governor W'illiam 
Sweet to effect penal reform. Arnold’s position, eloquence, organiz­
ing ability, and awareness o f community needs overshadowed his 
brief residence in Canon City and made him the popular and logical 
choice as klavern leader.
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Less is known about Clifford Glasson, the second member of 
the Klan triumvirate. Glasson had been born in Central City, Colo­
rado, in 1876 and had moved to Fremont County as a child. A for­
mer Florence saloon keeper, he had been elected county sheriff in 
1922 as “a rabid Prohibitionist.” Glasson was fraternally well con­
nected and found the Klan many recruits through his Masonic and 
Knight Templar connections. The Klan also benefited from his spot­
less law and order reputation.
Attorney T. Lee Witcher, the scion o f a prominent Fremont 
County family, completed the Klan troika. The son of a Confederate 
soldier, Witcher had been born near Cotopaxi, Colorado, in 1883. 
He had been elected county attorney in 19 17  and exercised consid­
erable power in the local Democratic organization. As a junior mem­
ber o f the elite, Witcher’s embrace o f the Ku Klux Klan lent it a mea­
sure o f prestige and respectability. It cannot be overemphasized that 
much of the Klan’s mobilization success was based upon ties to exist­
ing and established groups. Arnold worked the religious organiza­
tions, Glasson the lodges, and Witcher the political circles for mem­
bers. Despite their considerable influence, the three men did not 
attempt to dictate Klan policy. The Klan’s course, although guided, 
was subject to internal debate, with all members participating in de­
cision-making.12
The Canon City Klan, like the Denver organization, captured 
the issues and with them the members necessary for success. During 
the vulnerable period o f secret recruiting, local leaders effectively 
manipulated the Klan’s appeal to make its solutions to community 
problems and tensions convincing. Neither the opinion-making 
public nor an opposition group arose to challenge its answers or 
pressure the Klan into enervating defensive counterpunching. The 
elite made no effort to co-opt Klan officers or issues, and many re­
spected citizens joined. Moreover, Klan recruiting proceeded with­
out hindrance from government authorities. The failure to organize 
an anti-Klan movement is surprising in that Congressman Guy 
Hardy, the owner o f the Canon City Daily Record, was aware o f the 
Klan’s presence. On his orders a newspaper spy had joined the Klan 
and relayed information about its activities. But, rather than ex­
poses, the Daily Record was content to print a few scattered anti-Klan 
editorials and merely to report Klan happenings in Colorado and 
around the nation. Perhaps the elite was too contemptuous, too sure 
o f its control.13
I23
H O O D E D  E M P I R E
The Ku Klux Klan emerged from the shadows on January 26, 
1924. Klansmen erected seven wooden crosses, each twenty feet tall, 
and simultaneously set them ablaze. As the crosses burned, 500 
Klansmen gathered at the natatorium to receive the charter of 
Canon City Klan No. 21 from Grand Dragon John Locke. Following 
the ceremony, a large class o f new recruits was initiated into the local 
branch o f the Invisible Empire. Five days after the Klan rite mem­
bers distributed the klavern’s official organ, the Rocky Mountain 
Klansman, on the streets of the town. The newspaper explained the 
meaning o f the Klan’s initial appearance and also outlined the 
order’s intentions. Canon City Klansmen would not tolerate defa­
mation o f the Bible, the public schools, pure womanhood, or the 
Constitution. Lawbreakers were warned o f a Klan offensive to make 
Canon City and Fremont County crime-free. The Klansman did not 
overlook the most formidable enemy: “Rooted on American soil are 
religious zealots who by virtue o f their might in realms of industry 
and finance are reputed power of yea and nay between nations. . . . 
Together with and as a tool o f this dangerous power goes the public 
press— owned outright or under dictation— to justify their pro­
cesses before a bewildered people. . . . The shadow of the same 
deathhand is seen on the pages o f books in public schools [and] cur- 
riculums o f colleges. . . .” The newspaper concluded, “These are 
the briefest possible hints o f the size o f the job ahead. The move­
ment is birthed none too soon.” 14 The editor set no regular publica­
tion date, tying the appearance o f the newspaper to significant 
events.15
In January and February the Klan began to redeem its pledges 
o f civic improvement. To relieve overcrowding in the schools, Klans­
men joined fellow townspeople in circulating petitions calling for a 
school bond election. Their efforts were rewarded in March when 
the town, by a five to one margin, approved a bond issue allocating 
funds to build a modern high school and grade school. Immediately 
after the election the Klan appeared publicly to claim sole credit for 
the victory. On March 14 over 250 hooded and robed Klansmen “ re­
sembling a company o f ghosts” silently marched through the streets 
o f Canon City to the high school. There they formed a large circle 
around the athletic field and stood at attention, the night illumi­
nated by a large burning cross. Regardless o f the Klan’s contribution 
to the bond’s passage, the demonstration successfully imprinted a 
favorable image o f the order upon the minds of mothers and fa-
I I
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thers concerned about their children’s future. “ Perhaps,” remarked 
a newspaper reporter, “a more weird, fascinating and uncanny 
scene has never been staged in Canon City.” 16
Florence Klan No. 7 experienced comparable recruiting suc­
cess for similar reasons. On Ju ly 8 Fremont County’s other klavern 
demonstrated its strength. After dark, several hundred Klansmen, 
marching four abreast, emerged from their meeting hall and si­
lently paraded through the town. The column extended for more 
than seven blocks and included a drum corps, American flags, and 
electric crosses. When the parade concluded, two crosses were fired 
in the town square while friendly spectators cheered. Town officials 
did not interfere and the crosses burned themselves out. Such visi­
ble manifestations o f invisible power produced no anti-Klan broad­
sides or public meetings. Similarly, county newspapers seemed un­
concerned, reporting Klan activities without comment. In private, 
however, some non-Klansmen considered the possibility o f hooded 
meddling in the upcoming primary and general elections. State Sen­
ator George Colgate, for example, cautioned gubernatorial candi­
date Robert Rockwell, “We have a very uncertain element in the 
K.K.K.s. They are estimated to be 1200 strong— They are militant- 
organized[,] ready and anxious for a fight. . . . Many of our best 
people belong to them[;] both Democrats and Republicans are 
found in their ranks.” 17 Colgate’s fears were well founded; Klans­
men were busy formulating plans to seize control of both county 
parties.18
Fremont County Republicans attended caucus meetings on Ju ly
29, 1924, to select precinct committeemen and women and dele­
gates to the county assembly. Klansmen packed the poorly attended 
gatherings and elected their candidates to every precinct post in the 
Canon City—Florence area. The town precincts also gave the Klan 
sixty-nine assembly delegates, two-thirds of the county total. The or­
ganization’s success was so complete that the Daily Record remarked, 
“ I f  a single delegate from the Canon City district to the Republican 
county assembly was not a Klansman, he or she got in by mistake.” 19 
The turnover o f personnel in the party hierarchy similarly awed ob­
servers. Unknown men, never before active in county politics, con­
trolled the Republican party; the formerly prominent were defeated 
for every precinct and delegation slot. Klan delegates regrouped the 
following evening at Smith Hall, headquarters o f the Canon City 
klavern, to prepare the agenda o f the county assembly. With com­
mittee assignments and nominations for county office decided be­
forehand, the August 1 convention proceeded according to the
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Klan schedule. Klansmen designated all of their candidates for 
county office while allowing a few nonmembers to appear on the 
primary ballot. Again, reporters noted the changed complexion of 
the party: “Gentlemen of Canon City, who have been Republican 
supporters and leaders for many years were noticeable by their ab­
sence.” 20 As the Republicans succumbed to hooded envelopment, 
Klansmen maneuvered to capture the Democratic party. Large 
numbers of Democratic Klansmen overwhelmed party regulars in 
the Florence and Canon City precinct elections and named three- 
quarters o f the delegates to the county convention. Led by T. Lee 
Witcher, the chairman o f the convention, Klan delegates placed 
every one o f their candidates on the primary ballot. Klan Demo­
crats, like their Republican allies, attempted to appease non-Klan 
party members and prevent them from bolting by selecting several 
of their candidates for the ticket.21
The Klans o f Fremont County had scored an impressive victory 
in their first political foray. The name of at least one Klansman ap­
peared on the primary ballot for every county office. For some posi­
tions all nominees were members o f the Invisible Empire. To ease 
the Klan further into power, one party or the other refused in a few 
cases even to designate a candidate to oppose a hooded favorite. In 
those instances where Republican or Democratic Klansmen con­
tested the same office, the primary election served as the order’s se­
lection process. Klansmen would back the candidate who emerged 
with the greatest number of votes and discard the weaker contender.
An anti-Klan opposition finally surfaced thirteen days before 
the primary election. On August 30 displaced Fremont County Re­
publicans and Democrats organized the Independent party to com­
bat “the bipartisan dictatorship of a few Klan leaders.” 22 A con­
vention five days later endorsed a full slate o f candidates for county 
office and declared in its party platform for law and order, govern­
ment economy, and against the Ku Klux Klan. Too late to contest the 
primary election effectively, the anti-Klan group announced that its 
major effort would come in November. Yet the party hoped that its 
candidates already on the ballot would build a strong voter base 
from which to launch their fall campaigns. A write-in vote drive for 
those not on the ballot was also planned for the same reason. The 
fortunes o f the new party were greatly enhanced when the Daily 
Record declared its support. “Seldom in the history of Fremont 
County,” commented the newspaper, “has a political gathering 
taken place that comprehended more completely the rank and file 
o f its citizenship, in fact, . . .  it was the most representative con­
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vention that ever met here. . . .” 23 On the same day that the Inde­
pendent party was formed, Congressman Guy Hardy, opposed by 
the Klan for re-election, condemned the Invisible Empire in a front­
page editorial as an organization o f men “who are comparatively 
new in the community— who haven’t much interest in the commu­
nity except a desire to direct its affairs.” 24
Both camps claimed victory in the September 12 primary. 
Klansmen placed all o f their candidates on the November ballot and 
also carried the county for their gubernatorial and senatorial candi­
dates, Clarence Morley and Rice Means. Although the Independent 
party’s write-in vote failed to materialize, its designees listed on the 
ballot had compiled sizable vote totals. The only losers were those 
candidates who had attempted to take a middle ground between the 
two sides.25
The election campaign resumed in earnest in mid-October. 
Klansmen staged parades, canvassed door to door, and opened their 
meetings to the public in a vigorous effort to solicit votes. To bolster 
the drive, the Canon City klavern imported national Klan lecturer 
“Colonel” McKeever, who combined politics with his standard re­
cruiting pitch. At a meeting in the city armory McKeever told an 
overflow crowd, “The Klan stands for law enforcement; money and 
politics must cease to play a part in our courts. The Klan stands for 
the American home; there is no sanctuary like a mother’s heart, no 
altar like a mother’s knee. The Klan stands for good men in of­
fice. . . God, he later said, “ has set aside this giant oak for a pur­
pose. He will use it as a maul some November morning and crush 
rotten politics to earth.” 26 The Independent party relied primarily 
upon the newspapers to convey its message to the people. Its politi­
cal advertisements rapped the Klan as an alien presence and warned 
voters that hooded control meant “despotism equal to the darkest 
days o f Soviet Russia.” 27 The Klan counter charged that the Inde­
pendents were part o f the papal conspiracy to destroy Protestant­
ism. More important was the Klan’s attack on Fremont County’s 
courthouse gang, “a more perfect ring [than] in old Chicago’s State 
street [sic] or in Tammany.” 28 Typical was the Klan advertisement 
which asked: “Do you know that you have been at the mercy of a 
political ring for nearly a quarter o f a century? Do you know that the 
leaders o f the Independent party and the candidates of that party 
have been that ring? They have had their hands on the public 
money all that period, have had court procedures in their hands and 
have managed the affairs of county and city alike. Politically, they 
have owned Fremont County, body and soul.” 29 In the last week of
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the campaign the Klan invited the still undecided to a Morley- 
Means rally at the armory and to the Baptist Church for Sunday ser­
mons entitled, “Why the Klan Came to America and Fremont Coun­
ty” and “The Principles, Practices and Programs of the Ku Klux 
Klan.” 30
Superior organization and energetic campaigning combined 
with Independent party complacency to produce a stunning elec­
tion victory for the Klan. Klan candidates won every race but two, 
losing the county treasurer’s office by four votes and the county 
judgeship by twenty-one votes. Klansmen also delivered their coun­
ty by wide margins to the order’s state candidates, Clarence Morley 
and Rice Means. Alva Adams, the Democratic contender for the 
long-term U.S. Senate seat, won Fremont County only because Law­
rence Phipps had alienated Klansmen on the prohibition issue. The 
Klan’s opposition to Guy Hardy’s alleged pro-Catholic tendencies 
stripped the congressman o f his home base, but strong support in 
the surrounding counties ensured his re-election.31
Less than two years after its arrival the Ku Klux Klan had found 
the issues and leadership necessary to arouse the community against 
an unresponsive clique. Opponents, although in a commanding re­
source position, misjudged the Klan’s appeal and waited until too 
late to mobilize. With the elite unwilling to even confront citizens’ 
complaints, the Klan was able to pose as the champion o f civic 
reform. The secret society promised to work for the welfare of 
the common people and campaigned for improved schools, paved 
streets, and new parks. Industry would be encouraged to locate in 
the county. Such causes were undramatic, but they reflected the 
needs o f the local environment. The Klan spoke simultaneously to 
its other major constituency, vowing to protect residents from an in­
sidious effort “to make our political life subservient to the Catholic 
hierarchy.” 32 Now, as the dominant force in Fremont County politics 
and government, the men o f the Invisible Empire made ready to 
carry out their popular mandate.33
I l l  "
The triumph in November did not diminish the intensity of the 
Klan offensive. Fremont Klans announced the formation o f a Min­
ute Men unit (no relation to Locke’s Minute Men of America) that 
would safeguard citizens during floods, fires, crime waves, and 
other emergencies. According to the Canon City Directory, three
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short blasts o f the fire whistle repeated three times summoned the 
unit to duty. Members motored to nearby Penrose and donated sev­
enty-five dollars to Klan minister C. H. Leonard of the Presbyterian 
Church. On Christmas eve Klansmen lit up Canon City’s Main 
Street with fiery crosses erected at every intersection. A hooded del­
egation also visited the black congregation of the Mount Olive Bap­
tist Church and gave its pastor twenty-five dollars. In January, 1925, 
Klansmen took another swipe at the town elite. They elected the 
board o f directors o f the Young Men’s Christian Association, depos­
ing long-time members Dr. William T. Little, Congressman Hardy, 
and prominent businessman J .  R. Quinn. The Klan later raised 
$ 1 ,10 0  for the organization, more than a tenfold increase over its 
1924 contribution. January was an important month for Klansmen’s 
mothers, wives, and sisters. Over 400 women attended chartering 
ceremonies making Royal Gorge Klan No. 6 an official part of the 
Invisible Empire. Crosses were ignited, of course, to mark the 
occasion.34
With county offices in proper hands, the Klan’s next political 
targets were the municipal governments o f Canon City and Flor­
ence. In March Canon City Klansmen designated a “Progressive” 
slate headed by T. Lee Witcher to contest the city’s mayoral and 
eight aldermanic races. The Progressives adopted a platform ad­
vocating law and order, government efficiency, improved parks and 
streets, arid boosterism to draw tourists and new residents. The 
Klan’s opponents ran banker T. B. Coulter, Dr. Little, J .  R. Quinn, 
and several leading businessmen on a Reform ticket that empha­
sized economy and prohibition enforcement. The Reform party also 
denounced the Klan, warning that the election of men “under the 
control o f any secret organization makes for an irresponsible and 
dangerous form o f government.” 35 Despite the explosive potential 
of the confrontation, the Klan issue remained in the background. 
Except for one Progressive rally, both sides waged their campaigns 
in the newspapers. This strategy backfired for the anti-Klan re­
formers; on April 7 the Progressives captured every municipal office. 
The Canon City council later completed the Klan takeover when it 
appointed only members in good standing to government jobs. In 
Florence and South Canon Klansmen were elected without opposi­
tion. The victory celebration two weeks later attracted Klansmen 
from Denver, Pueblo, and Colorado Springs; among the honored 
guests were Grand Dragon Locke, Governor Morley, and Senator 
Means. Sixteen hundred Klanspersons paraded through the streets
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of Canon City to the high school in a procession which included 
bands, floats, and a mounted troop of kavalry. At the high school 
crosses were fired and the crowd entertained with songs, speeches, 
and military drills. When the program concluded, Klansmen ad­
journed to the armory and Klanswomen to Smith Hall to hear politi­
cal speeches and a talk about convent horrors by “Sister” Mary An­
gel. In May Klansmen won two uncontested seats on the Canon City 
school board.36 • .
The Ku Klux Klan’s powrer was felt in areas other than politics. 
To break the elite’s economic grip on the town, Klansmen incorpo­
rated the Colorado State Bank with a capital stock of $25,000. 
Klansmen also made plans to open a canning factory to produce ad­
ditional income for their order. T. Lee Witcher and the Reverend 
Fred Arnold were among the organizers o f the American Publishing 
Company, which printed the Daily American to compete with the 
Daily Record. The American not only gave its readers regular news 
copy but kept them current on Klan topics. Thus, merely by flipping 
the pages o f his newspaper, a Klansman could find Babe Ruth s cur­
rent batting average and afterward discover that John Wilkes Booth, 
Charles Guiteau, and Leon Czolgosz were Catholics. The Daily Amer­
ican, with 700 to 800 subscribers, cut deeply into the Daily Record's 
circulating and advertising revenues. Monetary gain, however, wras a 
secondary consideration. The American enabled the Klan to lay 
claim to an opinion-making public role. Through the newspaper 
Klansmen could present their version o f events and shape local per­
ceptions. Successful competition, moreover, would eliminate a pow­
erful Klan rival and leave the secret society nearly the sole arbiter of 
its im age/7
As the Klan grew in numbers and influence, its regressive side 
became even more prominent. Klansmen launched highly disci­
plined boycotts against Catholic businessmen in an attempt to drive 
them from town. Protestant nonmembers were ordered to dismiss 
Catholic employees and join the Klan or suffer similar treatment. 
Paper fiery crosses were repeatedly pasted on the windows of pro­
scribed stores to remind Klansmen of their duty. Frightened Cath­
olic parents warned their children not to enter the stores plastered 
with the letters KIGY, meaning “ Klansmen I Greet You.” Klan 
school teachers, protected by a sympathetic board o f education, 
praised their order’s coming while denouncing Catholics for their 
alleged dual loyalties. James Sterling, a small boy during the Klan 
days, recalls, “Being a Catholic, you were in a group all by your­
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self.” 38 Klan anti-Catholicism “was a disgrace,” added the klavern’s 
Nighthawk, “and it took us years and years to get over it.” *9 Fallout 
from Catholic baiting descended upon the town’s Episcopalians. 
They evoked Klan suspicion because, like the Catholics, their minis­
ters wore clerical collars and their services required sacramental 
wine. The Episcopal complexion o f the elite also generated bitter­
ness. It was probably fortunate that Klan leaders ordered members 
to leave their hoods and robes in the klavern meeting hall. They 
thus eliminated the possibility of free-lance violence.40
The opposition to the Klan finally awakened to the seriousness 
of the situation after the spring municipal elections. Anti-Klansmen 
and women had belittled their opponent’s appeal, confidently rely­
ing upon the people’s “common sense” and “better judgment” to 
gain victory. Now, with the Klan ensconced in power, they shed their 
naivete and began to build a grass-roots organization to oust the In­
visible Empire from the county. The effort began on May 20, 1925, 
when all but three o f the 150 members o f the Canon City Elks 
Lodge approved a resolution condemning Klan bigotry. This con­
demnation firmed anti-Klan sentiment and provided a membership 
base for the creation o f the Constitutional Liberty League of Fre­
mont County. The league censured the hooded f raternity in its dec­
laration o f principles as “un-Christian, un-social and un-Ameri­
can, and destructive of our constitutional form of government .” It 
pledged to use “all fair, honorable, legitimate and legal means . . .  to 
counteract, resist and destroy the evil activities and consequences of 
the Ku Klux Klan in this community and elsewhere. . . In June 
the league’s president, attorney J .  W. Foster, reported that 1,250 
men held memberships in the new organization. The women’s aux­
iliary counted another 350 recruits for the cause. Membership 
claims were validated on Ju ly 1 when 1,000 Constitutionalists gath­
ered at the armory to hear Denver’s Congressman William Vaile de­
liver an anti-Klan speech.42
The league met weekly and invited leading Coloradans, such as 
Charles Moynihan and Philip Hornbein, to discuss the Klan ques­
tion. In the winter the Constitutionalists published a weekly column 
in the Daily Record that exposed Klan secrets and contradictions. 
The Daily Record enthusiastically endorsed the new movement: “ It 
stands for the rights and privileges guaranteed to all citizens of the 
Republic . . . whether white or black, Protestant or Catholic, Jew 
or Gentile. Its patriotism is the patriotism of Washington and Je f­
ferson, o f Lincoln and Grant, of Roosevelt and Wilson. . . .” 4:* In ad­
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dition to fighting the Klan, the league was a social organization. 
Anti-Klansmen, like their hooded adversaries, enjoyed the weekly 
get-togethers which featured vaudeville acts, dances, dramatic read­
ings, and songs. Elite group members also joined and, in the early 
stages, played supporting roles.41
With their attention distracted by the Minute Men revolt in 
Denver, Canon City Klansmen at first ignored the opposition. The 
virus o f dissension, however, never infected Fremont County, and 
its i ,800 Klansmen voted unanimously to remain loyal to the Invisi­
ble Empire. During the summer months o f 1925 the secret organiza­
tion inaugurated a fresh recruiting drive, the highlight o f which was 
a public initiation o f twenty-six enlistees. The warm weather also 
proved conducive to a series o f outings, picnics, and barbecues at­
tended by the entire Klan family. In December Klanspeople packed 
the Canon City armory to honor Colorado’s new Grand Dragon, 
Fred Arnold. Following musical numbers by a male quartet, a “hu­
morous” one-act play, and a speech by Exalted Cyclops Witcher, 
loyal subjects presented Arnold with a gold watch and chain as befit­
ting his high office. The Grand Dragon named Canon City the capi­
tal o f the Colorado realm and established his headquarters in a 
garage behind the Canon Hotel.45
■ ■ I V "  ' ;
The Fremont County Invisible Empire drew its members from 
Canon City, Florence, and the immediate surrounding towns. The 
Klan was unwelcome in the outlying coal camps where the majority 
o f immigrants from southern and eastern Europe had settled- The 
official membership records o f the Fremont County Klans have dis­
appeared since the 1920s, and the identities o f most of the 1,800 
joiners have been lost. Although the bulk o f the rank and file re­
mains anonymous, newspaper reports and Klan election petitions 
circulated in 1924, 1926, and 1928 contain the names o f 329 (18 
percent o f the klaverns’ total) o f the more “visible” members. These 
Klansmen were either candid about their secret affiliations or just 
happened to be present at a klavern meeting when election petitions 
were distributed. “Visible” participation in the hooded order does 
not imply that the group was skewed socially or economically. Be­
cause o f the nature o f the sources, the recovered Klansmen are 
probably fairly representative o f Fremont County's wider invisible 
population. From the list o f 329 names, 200 were drawn at random
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and biographical information collected for each man. The men 
were not analyzed according to the different time intervals because 
their memberships were stable, with most appearing on more than 
one list.46
Age, birth, and military service data, compiled for just over 50 
percent o f the sample, yield a profile that both resembles and differs 
from the comparable Denver rank and file. Fremont County Klans­
men were older than their Denver counterparts, having entered 
their order at a mean age o f 47.5 years as opposed to 39.8 years for 
the early joiners and 37.8 years for the late joiners. Forty-two per­
cent o f the sample members were fifty years o f age or older, while 
24.5 percent were between the ages o f thirty and thirty-nine years 
and 24.5 percent between forty and forty-nine years. The young 
were again absent, with only 9 percent of the men between twenty 
and twenty-nine. Like the Denverites, the majority (57 percent) of 
the Canon City and Florence organizations’ members were born in 
the east north-central and west north-central states. Colorado-born 
members constituted 16 percent of the known group, slightly below 
the Denver percentages. Klansmen in the Fremont County sample, 
as might be expected, were predominantly rural in background, 
with 83 percent born in communities o f 2,500 or fewer people and 
just 1 percent in cities o f 100,000 or more. Military service attracted 
few Colorado Klansmen, and Fremont knights were no exception. 
There were no known Spanish-American War veterans in the Klan, 
and just sixteen men had served during World War I. The “visible” 
Klansmen had lived in their communities an average o f twelve years 
before joining. Congruent with the Denver Klan pattern, large 
blocks o f men appeared at both extremes o f the years of residence 
continuum (Table 6). Eighty-six percent of the men were married.47
“Leaders o f the Klan,” charged Congressman Guy Hardy, 
“undertook to set up a standard . . .  to be eligible for membership in 
and offices o f all local lodges, organizations and even the University 
Club.” 48 Hardy’s allegation is difficult to confirm or deny because 
fraternal information is fragmentary. Fraternal data could be ob­
tained for only 37 percent o f the sample, o f which 55 percent were 
members o f at least one lodge other than the Klan; 3 1 percent, two; 
and g percent, three. The most popular order was, as elsewhere, the 
Masons, attracting 25 percent of the fraternally inclined. Klansmen 
or Klanswomen held at least one leadership position in each o f the 
following: the Odd Fellows, Knights o f Pythias, Order o f the East­
ern Star, Modern Woodmen of America, and Lions’ Club. The Elks,
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Table 6. Length o f Residence o f Fremont County Klansmen, 
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. 18 and over 39 19-5
Unknown 32 16.0
Total 200
source: Canon City Directory.
as was noted earlier, were decidedly anti-Klan. The Barbers’ Union, 
the Brotherhood o f Locomotive Engineers and Firemen, the Canon 
City Typographical Union, and the Carpenters’ Union also listed 
Klansmen among their leaders. In the religious sphere Klan minis­
ters guided the Baptist Church and Church of Christ in Canon City 
and the Penrose Methodist Church. In addition, a sizable delegation 
o f Presbyterians appeared in Klan ranks. The Fremont County data 
complement the Denver results. Klansmen had stakes, often ones 
o f leadership, in the network of community groups. Outside alle­
giances enabled Klansmen to quickly penetrate lodge, union, and 
church pools for potential applicants. The Klan appeared in a more 
favorable light when recommended by a lodge brother or a fellow 
member o f a Bible study class. Such mobilizing possibilities were 
greatly enhanced when an officer of an organization engaged in re­
cruiting, for he commanded influence and easy access to members. 
Depending upon his authority, the suggestion may have been quite 
difficult to ignore.49
Small businessmen and farmers, comprising 75 percent of the 
middle nonmanual group, dominated the occupational structure of 
the Fremont County Klans (Table 7). When combined with mem­
bers holding other nonmanual occupations, they dwarf the 18 per­
cent laboring in blue-collar jobs. The results for this sample of “visi­
ble” Klansmen closely approximates, in all but the low nonmanual 
category, the occupational breakdown of Denver’s early joiners. Oc­
cupational census data were unavailable for Fremont County, thus
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making a comparison to the general population impossible. Pre- 
Klan occupational mobility histories are known for 39 percent of the 
men and indicate that 56 percent were nonmobile, 26 percent up­
wardly mobile, and 16 percent downwardly mobile. Occupational 
patterns after joining were determined for 68 percent of the Klans­
men, with the nonmobile group increasing to 67 percent, the down­
wardly mobile declining to 7 percent, and the upwardly mobile re­
maining constant.50
The “visible” Klansmen of Fremont County, like their counter­
parts in Denver, were conventional men whose interests and ac­
tivities focused upon proximate concerns. The sample members 
were middle aged or older, married, and to some degree well con­
nected fraternally. A large number were self-employed members of 
the middle class. Many had resided in their communities a decade 
or longer, enough time to cultivate a bitter resentment o f the ruling 
elite. Long-time residents objected as well to the abrupt appearance 
of the papal menace in their formerly peaceful and secure towns. 
Another sizable group entered Fremont County just prior to the 
Klan’s arrival. Perhaps, while attempting to start a business, some 
had been frustrated in a confrontation with the economically en­
trenched. Or, to survive in their new environment, they took out a 
secret membership. Other recent migrants may have used the Klan 
to penetrate the outer wall of small-town society.
Table 7. Occupational Distribution of Fremont 
County Klansmen, 1924-28.
Occupational Status Group N Percent
High nonmanual 22 11.0
Middle nonmanual 79 39-5
Low nonmanual L4 7.0
Skilled *7 8.5





source: Canon City Directory.
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Fraternal affairs consumed much Klan and Liberty League en­
ergy in the first few months o f 1926. In addition to the standard ^  
inspirational speeches, the two organizations entertained their mem­
bers with song fests, dances, and fellowship smokers. Such activities 
not only enhanced movement unity and identification but also were 
a means o f resource gathering. Nonmembers were often invited to 
these social events in hopes o f eliciting a commitment to join. Klan 
naturalization ceremonies, always popular with the hooded throng, 
were staged frequently throughout the year, although the classes of 
initiates grew smaller. While the league’s initiation rites were less 
spectacular, membership climbed to 2,100 Canon City men and ^ 
women. In Ju n e a league branch was organized in Florence. As its 
strength increased, the Constitutionalists became bolder. An unoffi­
cial boycott was begun to counteract Klan economic discrimination.
The league’s newspaper column escalated the confrontation weekly, 
aggressively assailing the hooded order with satire and logic. Flam­
ing circles, the symbol o f the anti-Klan movement, competed with 
fiery crosses in the night air around Canon City. The lull gradually 
came to an end as the summer county conventions and fall pri­
maries approached. League members devoted less time to fraternity 
and became increasingly absorbed in political planning and organi­
zation. President J .  W. Foster instructed his troops: “Only by con­
centration o f voting power can the Constitutionalists cast off the 
prejudicial oppressions foisted upon the state generally and on Fre­
mont County particularly by the secret religious and political orga­
nization. Anti-Klansmen must count noses and vote together if they 
are to prevent another strategic victory of a minority.” 51 Sensing a 
close contest, Klansmen intensified their efforts to get out the vote.52
The political year began in April when Oliver H. Shoup en­
tered the race for the Republican gubernatorial nomination. Shoup, 
a popular ex-governor and one o f the founders o f the statewide 
anti-Klan Constitutionalists, based his campaign solely upon the se­
cret society issue. In a press statement he declared, “ . . . I will op­
pose to my fullest ability any effort o f the Ku Klux Klan or the Min­
ute Men o f America in the election o f any member . . .  to any office, 
state or national.” 53 With Morley discredited and not seeking a sec­
ond term, Grand Dragon Arnold endorsed federal prohibition ad­
ministrator John F. Vivian for governor. Vivian realized that the 
Klan's nod was not as much an asset as a liability and publicly down­
played its significance. Secretary o f State Carl Milliken, a former
V
136
H ooded  P rogressiv ism
Denver Klansman, also contested the nomination, seeking as the 
compromise candidate to draw votes from secret society members 
and nonmembers. Senator Rice Means announced his bid for re­
election and received enthusiastic Klan backing. His opponent, as in 
1924, was attorney Charles Waterman. Waterman, like Shoup, gar­
nered the support o f the Constitutionalists for his stand against the 
Klan. The Colorado Democratic party was securely in the hands o f 
secret society opponents. Both William Sweet and attorney Paul 
Prosser vied for their party’s senatorial nomination on strong anti- 
Klan platforms. The Klan’s legislative nemesis, State Senator Billy 
Adams, declared his candidacy for the governorship and faced only 
minimal opposition.54
The fight for delegates to the Republican state convention was 
waged in late Ju ly  and early August in Colorado’s sixty-three county 
assemblies. The selection process registered the effects o f Klan de­
mobilization and the subsequent changes in the dispositions of hood­
ed power since 1924. The Klan’s candidates, Vivian and Means, won 
24 percent o f the Western Slope delegates, up sharply from less than 
6 percent in the previous election year. The eastern agricultural 
counties were less receptive to the Klan in 1926, giving 24 percent of 
their delegates to Means and Vivian, down from 33 percent. Means’s 
Pueblo and southern Colorado showing was much stronger than in 
1924 and he collected 39 percent o f the region’s delegate votes. The 
Klan was weakest in the Denver and Greeley areas, where two years 
before Morley had found four o f his every ten delegates and Means 
one o f every two. In 1926 the Minute Men and the Constitutionalists 
cut into the Klan vote, allowing Vivian 1 1  percent and Means 16 
percent shares o f the delegate total. With Milliken picking up only
10 percent o f the votes, Shoup’s and Waterman’s front-running 
positions were impregnable.55
The county conventions also dealt the Klan several setbacks in 
their nominations for local legislative, executive, and judicial offices. 
In Denver Klan and Minute Men delegates were outnumbered ten 
to one as a result o f John Stephen’s and Frank Howbert’s tinkering 
with the party machinery. Klansmen not only failed to prevent 
Shoup from winning the entire delegation but were unable to place 
their favorite candidates on the primary ballot. Men who had ridden 
the Klan wave in 1924 and received enough votes to be designated 
in 1926 had renounced their secret affiliations and returned to the 
party as penitents. The Denver Democrats convened a few days 
after the Republicans adjourned and renewed their anti-Klan stand 
with a sharp condemnation o f secret societies. The El Paso County
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Republican convention was anti-Klan in tone, membership, and ac­
tion. Guided by State Senator L. A. Puffer, the assembly pledged all 
o f its delegates to Shoup and Waterman and adopted a resolution 
denouncing Klan political intrigue. Just one Pikes Peak Klansman 
obtained a sufficient number o f votes to be nominated for office. 
The secret society issue was not openly discussed in either the Pue­
blo Republican or Democratic conventions. Klansmen as w'ell as 
non-Klansmen won places on both party tickets. In Grand Junction 
Republicans and Democrats unanimously passed anti-Klan resolu­
tions. Despite this unanimity, the two county parties selected several 
active Klansmen to appear in the primary election.56
After being surprised in 1924, Fremont County Republicans 
and Democrats were now eager for political confrontation with the 
Ku Klux Klan. Liberty League members in both parties met weekly 
to coordinate their strategy. Democratic and Republican Constitu­
tionalists spoke in Canon City and throughout the county rallying 
their respective party members in preparation for the precinct cau­
cus meetings on Ju ly  27 and 30. Republican efforts proved un­
necessary because the Klan surrendered party caucuses without a 
fight. On Ju ly  24 anti-Klan members of the Republican County Cen­
tral Committee pushed through a resolution giving country pre­
cincts greater representation on the party’s governing board. Out­
numbered in their Canon City enclave, Klansmen walked out of the 
meeting, organized their own Republican party, and elected fellow 
member Claude Singer as their chairman. The rebels then called 
upon all Republicans to boycott the Ju ly  27 precinct meetings and to 
attend, instead, Klan caucuses on Ju ly 30. Regular Republicans 
gathered as planned, although Canon City meetings were poorly at­
tended, and elected Constitutionalist delegates to the county assem­
bly. They nominated a complete anti-Klan slate for local office and a 
Shoup-Waterman delegation to the state convention. Klansmen 
elected at their precinct meetings held a convention on August 2 
and named a rival county ticket and a delegation pledged to Means 
and Vivian.57
Democratic precinct meetings convened as scheduled on July
30. Instead o f a quick and easy victory, Klansmen struggled for 
every delegate vote against a large and well-disciplined Constitu­
tionalist force. Klansmen were upset in two Canon City precincts 
and lost decisively in most of the outlying towns. The Klan’s other 
“safe” Canon City precincts were won only after strong Constitu­
tionalist challenges were turned aside. Florence Constitutionalists 
attended separate caucuses rather than meet in the klavern hall. In
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many precincts one or the other side withdrew, alleging dishonest 
tactics, and organized its own caucus and delegate vote. The dele­
gate totals at the end o f the selection process reflected the bitter 
fight; the Klan controlled fifty-three convention seats and the Con­
stitutionalists fifty-two seats, with the remaining 112  seats still in 
question. With the county central committee in Klan hands, how­
ever, the delegates’ allegiances were not long in doubt. On August 5 
the committee, under T. Lee Witcher’s control, gave every contested 
seat to a Klansman. The Constitutionalists bolted, formed their own 
convention, and sent an anti-Klan delegation to the Democratic 
state meeting. The anti-Klan Democrats reconvened on August 13 
and nominated a county slate identical to the regular Republican 
ticket. The Klan Democrats, meanwhile, designated their candi­
dates for local office and chose a delegation to represent the party at 
the state convention.58
Fremont County’s rival Republican delegations arrived in Den­
ver on August 6 and presented their credentials to the state con­
vention. The Klansmen could not have chosen a less receptive body 
to hear their case. Shoup and Waterman supporters ran the assem­
bly and were determined to commit their party to the anti-Klan 
cause. They succeeded in passing a stinging resolution that de­
clared, in part, “ Politics is the affair o f the whole people and must be 
conducted in the open. We are opposed to the Ku Klux Klan, the 
Minute Men or any other organization seeking to control the politi­
cal affairs o f the state. The Republican party must and will be master 
o f its own house.” 59 The resolution foreshadowed the fate of the 
Fremont Klansmen. After a brief hearing the county banner was 
awarded to the Constitutionalists. The balloting for the guberna­
torial and senatorial nominations was anticlimactic. Oliver Shoup 
overwhelmed John Vivian and Carl Milliken with 71 percent of the 
votes, while Charles Waterman’s margin over Rice Means was three 
to one. Despite these lopsided victories, all of the candidates re­
ceived sufficient votes to be designated on the primary ballot. Klan 
and anti-Klan candidates also faced one another in all but two of the 
primary races for state office. In a surprise move two days after the 
convention, Denver Judge George Luxford entered the race for 
the senatorial nomination as the unofficial Minute Men candidate. 
On August 13 the Democratic convention, in short order, refused to 
seat the Fremont County Klan delegation, adopted a resolution flay­
ing the hooded order, and sent all o f its anti-Klan candidates into 
the primary wars.60
“The issue,” wrote the editor o f the Colorado Springs Gazette,
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“was long ago made for this primary, and it is squarely drawn. It is 
an out and out Klan and anti-Klan fight with no complicating cir­
cumstances o f any nature.” 61 Despite the editor’s words, the primary 
campaign lacked the drama, clarity, and intensity which might be 
considered inherent in a Klan versus anti-Klan confrontation. Nei­
ther Shoup nor Waterman had reputations as exciting stump speak­
ers. Both men ran cautious campaigns stolidly plodding the state in 
search o f votes. Notwithstanding their colorless performances, they 
were confident o f victory. The Klan had benefited in 1924 from 
a split in opposition ranks; now the situation was reversed. John 
Vivian’s and Rice Means’s campaign strategies also blurred the Klan 
versus anti-Klan focus. Vivian, a two-time Colorado national com­
mitteeman, was not a citizen o f the Invisible Empire although he did 
welcome hooded support. During the primary he publicly avoided 
mentioning the Klan and emphasized his prohibition enforcement 
record when cultivating Republicans. Senator Rice Means spoke at 
Klan rallies in Colorado Springs and Denver and made no attempt 
to discard his hood and robe. At the same time Means found non- 
Klan Republicans receptive to speeches that stressed his experience 
and proven loyalty to Calvin Coolidge. John Galen Locke and his 
Minute Men further clouded the situation. Both before and after 
the convention reports circulated that Locke would throw the Min­
ute Men vote to Vivian, but the organization never committed itself. 
Political commentators did note, however, that “Vivian for Gover­
nor” bumper stickers decorated Locke’s automobile and signified at 
least an unofficial endorsement. One thing was certain— Locke 
would never let his men vote for Means, whom he considered “a 
personal and political traitor.” 62 The commander of the Minute Men 
favored Luxford yet was convinced he could not win. He therefore 
ordered his regiments to support Waterman and thus deny Means 
his Senate seat.6*
The state races overshadowed local contests everywhere but 
Fremont County. “The local Constitutional Liberty League,” Guy 
Hardy told Shoup, “ is so deeply interested in cleaning out the Court 
House o f the Klan that State issues are entirely forgotten.” 64 Klav­
ern strategists planned a two-pronged primary attack that entailed 
preventing the Constitutionalist tickets from appearing on the bal­
lot and mobilizing sympathetic voters in support o f the Klan’s candi­
dates. On August 19 county clerk and Klansman R. M. Booth re­
fused to certify the Constitutionalist’s Democratic slate because its 
duplication o f the Republican ticket was an attempt to defraud the 
people. Booth, without stating his reasons, also denied certification
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to the regular Republicans. Fortunately for the Liberty League, 
Judge James L. Cooper overruled Booth and added both sets of can­
didates to the Klansmen already on the ballot. With sure victory de­
nied, Klansmen stepped up their campaigns, promising further 
civic reform and tough law enforcement. The Liberty League coun­
tered with a succession o f meetings, rallies, and speakers. Especially 
effective were Constitutionalist taunts reviving the Walter Brasher 
incident. A well-known Canon City Klansman, Brasher had been ar­
rested in Ju ly for sexually molesting more than a dozen children. 
Breaking just before the primary campaign, the affair was a serious 
blow to Klan election chances.65
Grand Dragon Fred Arnold’s order to vote in the Republican 
primary did not save the Klan’s candidates on September 14. Oliver 
Shoup and Charles Waterman just edged the divided opposition 
with 49.7 percent and 50.6 percent, respectively, o f the vote. Shoup 
built a 9,000-vote lead in Denver and, with a good showing in every 
section o f the state, could not be overtaken. Supporters o f John Viv­
ian gave him his greatest victories in Pueblo and home base Je f­
ferson County while adding six Western Slope and four eastern 
farming counties to his column. Rice Means registered significant 
increases over his 1924 vote in Pueblo, southern Colorado, and the 
Western Slope. His gains were particularly noticeable on the West­
ern Slope, where he carried twelve counties, seven more than in the 
previous election. Senator Means was defeated because o f his disas­
trous third-place finish in Denver. In 1924 he had led a three-man 
field, winning 20,971 votes or 43 percent o f his total; in 1926 he 
gained only 7,843 votes or a 19 percent share. Former Klan districts, 
such as R, S, and T  in South Denver, that had voted overwhelmingly 
for Means now turned to Waterman by margins as high as two to 
one. Klan votes that Means had once owned now belonged to demo­
bilized members and Minute Men supporters who despised him. 
Judge Luxford ’s Minute Men effort, which gathered 14,330 votes 
(70 percent from Denver), proved more o f a drain on Waterman 
than Means. Klan-backed candidates were also beaten in the races 
for secretary o f state, superintendent o f public instruction, and Su­
preme Court justices. The Klan endorsed no candidate for either 
lieutenant governor or attorney general. Two weeks after the elec­
tion the Klan suffered another state-level defeat. The Colorado Su­
preme Court ruled a Klan-sponsored initiative amendment to abol­
ish the civil service off the November ballot.66
Local returns were equally devastating. Denver voters weeded 
such prominent ex-Klanspersons as Minnie Love and Charles Bige­
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low from the pack seeking nomination to the Colorado House of 
Representatives. The only candidate nominated for a House seat 
who had had Klan ties was Martha Long, and she had split with the 
Invisible Empire early in the 1925 legislative session. In El Paso 
County the only Klansman seeking office finished fifth in a field of 
six candidates. Fremont County, headquarters of the realm, wit­
nessed a Constitutionalist rout in the Democratic primary. A heavy 
vote from the country precincts coupled with reduced Klan major­
ities in Canon City and Florence enabled the Liberty League’s candi­
dates to sweep every nomination. Among those defeated was Sheriff 
Clifford Glasson, “ the backbone,” said the Daily Record, “of the 
Klan’s machine in the Court House.” 67 In the Republican primary 
anti-Klan candidates won nomination for county sheriff, treasurer, 
and superintendent of schools. Scattered victories in Grand Junc­
tion and Pueblo were o f some comfort to Klan leaders.68
With their candidates and amendment defeated, the Ku Klux 
Klan lost interest in the outcome of the statewide races. Yet neither 
Republicans nor Democrats would allow the secret order to depart 
quietly. The two parties adopted platform planks denouncing invisi­
ble government and fiercely contested for the anti-Klan mantle. 
This was especially evident in the race for governor, where basic 
agreement upon substantive issues led the candidates into character 
assassination. Although the Constitutionalists endorsed both Oliver 
Shoup and Billy Adams, each candidate tried to hang the hood and 
robe on his opponent. Shoup, through the Denver Post, accused 
Adams’s nephew and campaign manager o f sponsoring the Fellow­
ship Forum, a Klan newspaper published in Washington, D.C. In ad­
dition to having alleged Klan ties, the Post repeatedly charged that 
Adams was antilabor, antiwomen, and delinquent on income tax 
payments. Adams ignored the allegations, while such newspapers as 
the Denver Express came to his defense. The Express refuted the Post's 
erroneous assertions and then wondered in print why Shoup’s voice 
was not heard when the Klan captured the Republican party in 
1924. The newspaper also noted the discrepancy between Shoup’s 
campaign promise to oppose all Klan candidates and the existence 
o f men writh questionable affiliations on the current Republican 
ticket. Shoup’s viciousness evidently ricocheted on November 2, 
when he was the only Republican frustrated in a bid for statewide 
office.69
The Klan resumed the fight in Fremont County. In September 
the organization successfully petitioned to place the Progressive 
ticket, a bipartisan combination o f Klan primary winners and Dem­
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ocratic losers, on the November ballot. On October 5 Fred Arnold 
fired his followers for the coming campaign:
Our business is to put over the doctrine of our order. I f  it costs 
dollars, and it will, we are going to spend them. If it costs lives, 
and it probably will, we are willing to sacrifice them. If we have 
to wade in hot blood to attain the aims o f our organization, we 
are willing to do that.
Henceforth the war cry which must supersede all others is 
“dowm with the Catholic church.” All other issues are secondary 
to this and it is time we came out in the open to proclaim our­
selves on this issue.70
The elimination o f Klan candidates in the primary election, he con­
tinued, meant the ruin of white Protestant America. “ . . . The peo­
ple of Colorado voted to have their daughters marry negroes, their 
sons wenches. They voted to make of Americans a race of mulattoes. 
They voted to align this state with the Catholic-cursed, the liquor- 
cursed, priest-cursed, Rome-cursed, Al Smith-cursed state of New 
York.” 71 Fremont County was the last Colorado outpost dedicated to 
100 Percent Americanism, and the Ku Klux Klan had to hold it. The 
battle would be hard fought but, Arnold later assured his Baptist 
congregation, right would triumph. God would surely help them 
preserve their community from the Constitutionalists, the “beer- 
guzzling, wine imbibing, flask sucking, cellar loving seekers after the 
old-time brass rail and saloon.” 72
The Liberty League responded, as it had in the primary, with 
“get out the vote” rallies and intensive grass-roots organizing. The 
Constitutionalist ticket received the endorsement of Fremont Coun­
ty’s United Mine Workers and the support o f the Canon City Daily 
Record and Florence Paradox. In the last two weeks of the campaign 
the weekly Paradox was issued daily with almost every page devoted 
to the anti-Klan cause. Well-known Colorado Constitutionalists, 
such as Philip Van Cise, spoke at league meetings and ordered the 
members to remove the Klan from government “as you cut out a 
cancer from the physical body o f the individual. . . .” ™ On Novem­
ber 2 the heaviest vote in county history eliminated every Klan can­
didate for courthouse office. The only survivors were Klansmen 
running for a seat in the state House of Representatives and the ju s­
tice of the peace and constable positions in precinct one. The Klan, 
hoping to carry Canon City by a 300- to 500-vote majority, found 
its totals cut in half. Its candidates lost two Florence precincts and
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were overwhelmed in Portland, Penrose, Chandler, and the other 
country towns. “ . . . They caught us napping two years ago,” said 
Constitutionalist D. N. Cooper. “We were not organized to oppose 
them nor to get out the vote o f those opposed to the Klan. It is a 
different story today. . . 74 For Grand Dragon Arnold the election 
results meant a return “ to those pre-Klan days o f drinking from stys 
and eating from slop barrels.” 73
The spring 1927 municipal elections provided an opportunity 
for the Constitutionalists to extend their November gains. But, 
rather than a repetition o f the bitterly contested fall campaign, the 
election was a lackluster affair which failed to generate much enthu­
siasm or even interest. The Liberty League filed a complete mayoral 
and aldermanic ticket in support o f which they optimistically held 
only two rallies. Aside from the rallies, which resembled fraternal 
gatherings more than political meetings, the league’s major thrust 
was a series o f newspaper advertisements depicting ebbing Klan 
electoral strength in Canon City since 1924. The November defeat 
had tempered Klan spirits. Its Progressive slate played down the 
hooded connection, a spokesman even conceding that “ religion 
should not in any instance forfeit a citizen’s privilege to hold of­
fice.” 76 Instead, the Progressives reminded voters o f the high school, 
the city hall and municipal building under construction, the ex­
panded park system, the reorganized fire department, and the 
number o f newly paved streets. I f  returned to office, they promised 
to continue their street paving program and to erect a city stadium 
for athletic events. On April 6 the Klan vote again declined from the
1924 level, yet it was still sufficient to elect the entire Progressive 
ticket. In East Canon the Klan-organized People’s party downed the 
league-endorsed slate. South Canon voters chose a Constitutional­
ist-supported ticket o f rebel Klansmen over the official secret candi­
dates. The Florence city hall emerged partially from the Invisible 
Empire when the anti-Klan Citizen’s party elected the mayor and 
the second ward’s alderman. The Canon City area proved to be the 
only bright spot for the Klan on election day. Klan candidates were 
defeated in Brighton, Longmont, Grand Junction, and twelve other 
Colorado cities and towns.77
The Ku Klux Klan remained entrenched in Canon City, but the 
organization had entered a period of transition and decline. Con­
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fronted with decreasing attendance and revenues, the members of 
the Florence Klan had terminated their klavern lease in 1926 and 
moved to the smaller lodge rooms o f the Knights o f Pythias Hall. 
When Canon City meetings drew fewer and fewer men in late 1927 
and early 1928, Klan leaders ordered the members to sign atten­
dance pledges. The move had little effect on the trend. The state 
organization was in even worse shape. Realm leaders suspended 
publication o f the official Kolorado Klan Kourier, ostensibly to con­
form with the Imperial Wizard’s plan to standardize the order’s 
newspapers. On November 29, 1927, the financial state o f the realm 
became obvious when Grand Dragon Arnold filed a chattel mort­
gage on the furniture in Klan headquarters as security for a loan of 
$1 ,200 .78
Restricted to their Canon City bastion, Klansmen began to ad­
just to the changed environment. Some remained loyal to their or­
ganization, discarded its noxious features, and, except for an occa­
sional political campaign, placed heavy emphasis upon fraternalism. 
Thus in 1927 economic warfare between Klan and anti-Klan forces 
ended when members painted over the KIG Y signs o f their recalci­
trant comrades. Communal boosterism replaced boycotts as the 
means to prosperity. The majority of the Klan’s 1,800 members, 
however, had already departed or would soon do so. Klan demobili­
zation was, in part, a reaction to the rise o f a potent opposition. The 
Liberty League had rallied Fremont County citizens economically, 
politically, and socially cowered by the Klan and provided them the 
means to resist. It also had convinced Klan members and sympa­
thizers to desert their movement. Constitutionalist speakers and col­
umns had robbed the Klan o f its mystery and, by harping upon such 
incidents as the Brasher affair, o f its respectability. As the anti-Klan 
organization gathered more recruits and votes, the resource balance 
between it and the hooded order gradually shifted. The league’s vic­
tory in 1926 destroyed the Invisible Empire’s appearance of invul­
nerability and its claims o f indispensability. Fremont County did not, 
as Arnold predicted, return to pre-Klan conditions o f “hell-hole sa­
loons” and “flesh pots.” Constitutionalist county officials quickly 
convinced residents o f their determination to ferret out bootleggers 
and lawbreakers. Further, four summers had passed since 1923, and 
the pope had not moved into his residence at the Holy Cross Abbey. 
^  As time passed, the Catholics appeared less frightening and their 
presence was tolerated, if not yet accepted. Just as defeat generated 
y  defections, so did success. The Klan had fulfilled many of its prom­
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ises o f reform and civic improvement while also slashing at the con­
centration o f economic power. “We all done w^ hat we had started out 
to do with it,” recalled Klanswoman Leona Singer. “We had no other 
interest to go on ahead with it. . . . We didn’t need it anymore, we 
just forgot it. We were on our way.” 79 Perhaps the hardest blowr fell 
on Ju ne 1, 1928. After a brief illness forty-two-year-old Grand 
Dragon Arnold died o f blood poisoning and erysipelas. Six hundred 
Klansmen, women, and children followed the muffled drums of the 
Pueblo contingent to Lakeside Cemetery and buried their leader in 
accordance with the order’s secret ritual. A fiery cross was engraved 
on his headstone, a permanent reminder o f the Klan era. Arnold 
had been the driving force behind the Canon City Klan since its in­
ception in 1923; without him, members lost their direction and pur­
pose. Arnold’s death also meant the end of Colorado as an indepen­
dent realm o f the Invisible Empire. In 1929 Hiram Wesley Evans 
assigned an imperial representative to manage the states Klan 
affairs.80
Fraternal activities and social events dominated the Klan calen­
dar for a year after the 1927 municipal elections. Perhaps stirred by 
the rising momentum of Al Smith’s candidacy, Klansmen in the 
summer of 1928 set aside their klorans for a last major county cam­
paign. Anti-Klan Republicans and Democrats again named a coali­
tion ticket which allocated county offices equally between the two 
parties. The Klan, rather than dividing its forces in twx> primaries, 
concentrated its strength upon an independent Republican slate. 
Fremont County Klan Democrats and Republicans sent delegates to 
their respective state conventions, but in both instances the anti- 
Klan contingents were seated. To win election, Klan county candi­
dates had to attract votes from outside Canon City. The Catholic and 
foreign-born majorities in the surrounding coal camps, however, 
had never been amenable to hooded ambitions. The Klan’s solution 
to this dilemma was an attempted alliance with the organization that 
dominated the mining towns, the Industrial Workers o f the World. 
The Wobblies entered Fremont County in October, 1927, and shut 
down every local mine to force a hike in wages. The strike failed, yet 
the IWW’s influence continued to permeate the camps. Some Klans­
men had joined the IWW and had been active in promoting the 
strike. A few Klan businessmen had provided strikers with needed 
food, clothing, and shelter. The Klan’s Daily American bolstered 
these offerings with editorial support. Klan leaders hoped that these 
gestures against their common enemy, the ruling elite, could be par­
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layed into votes on election day. Their answer came on September 
1 1 ,  when just four Klan candidates emerged from a fusion ticket 
wave that engulfed the coal camps and three of Canon City’s six pre­
cincts. These four men were victorious only because their popularity 
transcended their Klan ties. A month later the Klan filed the Inde­
pendent ticket to compete in the general election. Again the results 
were the same— the Klan’s four primary winners were elected to of­
fice. The November returns did offer some solace to the Ku Klux 
Klan; Herbert Hoover carried their county by more than a two-to- 
one margin. In 1930 county Republicans and Democrats renewed 
their alliance and posted another anti-Klan coalition slate. Their op­
ponents, tarred by past secret affiliations, vainly declared, “ W e  a r e  
n o t  sponsored by nor pledged to any s e c r e t  o r  o p e n  organiza­
tion.” 81 Only two nonfusion candidates won office. The 1932 elec­
tions marked the end o f Klan versus anti-Klan politics. Former 
Klansmen attended the Republican and Democratic county con­
ventions, and several were designated for places on the ballot.82
Klan and anti-Klan labels lost their significance in Canon City as 
well. In 1928 dissident Klansmen, with the support of former Con­
stitutionalists, were elected to South Canon’s town hall without op­
position. The East Canon municipal elections were similarly free of 
the Klan issue. The following year Mayor Witcher and his Progres­
sive ticket won an uncontested victory in an election which only spo­
radically aroused interest. In Florence the formerly antagonistic 
City Welfare and Progressive parties merged and offered a united 
slate. During 1924, observed the Paradox, “ . . . Florence was a hot­
bed for the propagation of the seeds of hatred, but since the last city 
election rays o f light began shining through and increasing in 
brightness until today a peace prevails . . . not unlike that existing in 
a happy family.” 83 Conditions had changed so dramatically by 1929 
that the Knights o f Columbus chose Canon City for their annual 
state convention. The 600 knights received a warm welcome from 
most o f the townspeople, and no incidents marred the two-day 
gathering. At the same time, the return of realm headquarters to 
Denver sparked scant notice. Depression-generated adversity fur­
ther unified the town as the last vestiges o f the Klan days disap­
peared. Hard times forced the Klan’s Colorado State Bank and the 
Young Men’s Christian Association to close their doors. The Daily 
American, already weakened by a Constitutionalist libel suit, failed in 
1932 after a seven-year run. Klan dues became a luxury, and mem­
bership lapsed. Politicians who had began their careers in the Klan
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organization, however, survived. These men shed their hoods and 
robes and emerged as an important faction in a rejuvenated politi­
cal elite. The reform impulse thus survived but without its Klan 
markings.84 ;
The positive and negative impact o f the Ku Klux Klan was most 
clearly visible in Canon City. Klan leaders, aided by their religious, 
political, and fraternal connections, mobilized a diverse coalition in 
support o f a conventional program of needed civic reform and im­
provements. Local opinion makers facilitated their task by either 
joining the movement or arrogantly ignoring it. The Klan’s reform 
drive rallied citizens against the establishment’s backward-looking 
mentality and paved the streets, built modern schools, and extended 
park acreage. Not only was the physical environment made more 
amenable, but the political structure and government became more 
responsive as the conservative elite was ousted. The Klan bank and 
newspaper were attempts to decentralize economic and opinion- 
making power. The triumph o f reform, however, was as dependent 
upon anti-Catholicism as good citizenship. Canon City paid a high 
price for Klan-inspired reform, almost a decade of fear and intol­
erance. The rise o f a strong opposition movement interacted with a 
decline in local tensions, the re-emergence o f a responsive “visible” 
government, a Klan leadership vacuum, and success to destroy the 
Fremont klaverns’ resources. The bigotry upon which the Klan fed 
did not vanish with the last fiery cross. Its shadow lingered in the 
1930s and 1940s when Catholic voters suffered occasional harass­
ment from ex-Klan poll watchers. As late as the 1950s, the stores of 
some merchants remained o ff limits to Catholics. The tensions of 
the Klan period left scars in the minds o f older residents that have 
not healed to this day.85
148
\
GRAND JUNCTION AND THE 
WESTERN SLOPE
C H A P T E R  E I G H T
To live in a modern world and be an ancient; to live in a hum-drum 
world and be a knight; to live in a gabby world and have a secret—all 
this is possible. It is the essence of fraternalism that it does its best to make 
it possible.
Charles Merz
Harper’s Magazine, February, 1927
The kluxing o f Grand Junction and other Western Slope towns 
was begun after most eastern Klans had already received their char­
ters. Not until the summer o f 1924 did Grand Dragon John Locke 
journey across the mountains and officially welcome western Klans­
men to the Invisible Empire. Rarely did he or other state leaders re­
peat the trip. As they had delayed the Klan s appearance, the Rocky 
Mountains also shielded these klaverns from the dictates and fric­
tion emanating from Denver and, later, Canon City. On the Western 
Slope inadequate transportation facilities combined with geograph­
ical obstacles to further heighten this seclusion. Thoroughly insu­
lated, internal community currents molded the Klan life cycle to the 
exclusion o f all other factors. Western Klansmen, to a greater de­
gree than their Eastern Slope brothers, were thus able to cast their 
organizations into almost any shape they desired.
Klavern individuality and isolation were most clearly visible in 
Grand Junction, the center o f the Klan’s Western Slope empire. In 
this community the traditional stereotypes o f the Ku Klux Klan are 
inapplicable. The Grand Junction organization announced no plat­
form o f change or plan o f action. The standard Klan appeals of
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anti-Catholicism, law and order, and nativism were ignored. Al­
though a moral reform movement was mobilizing to redress local 
problems, it had no connection with the Klan and the knights re­
fused to participate in its work. Unlike the Pueblo and Denver orga­
nizations, this Klan could hardly be characterized as a contender for 
influence and power. Local leaders spoke to another need, stressing 
a feature inherent but overshadowed in the programs o f most klav­
erns. The Ku Klux Klan offered Grand Junction Protestants an op­
portunity to enter an exciting fraternal lodge, to share in the secret, 
the fun, and the fellowship. “Don’t ask me why I joined,” remarked 
a former Klansman. “The whole thing looks like a lot o f nonsense 
now. But at the time if you weren’t a member you weren’t anybody, 
you were on the outside o f everything. It’s a hard thing to under­
stand now.” 1 Managed by community leaders and opinion makers, 
the order’s purpose was rendered benign and posed no threat to the 
local balance o f power. When the prominent retired from their 
order with the bulk o f the rank and file, the Klan diverged from its 
original intention. Only then did Grand Junction reject the secret 
society.
i' i . .
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With a population o f 8,665 m 1 92°> Grand Junction was the 
largest city on the Western Slope. Secluded in the Grand Valley at 
the confluence o f the Colorado and Gunnison rivers, the city served 
as the retail outlet for the vast territory between the Rocky Moun­
tains and the Wasatch range in eastern Utah. Trade far outweighed 
industrial development, with local manufacturing keyed to the sur­
rounding cattle-raising, general farming, and fruit-growing econ­
omy. Grand Junction’s growth rate rose 12 percent in the decade 
after 19 10 , and during the 1920s climbed to 18 percent for a 1930 
population o f 10,247. Townspeople were white, native born, and 
Protestant. Few blacks or Jews made their homes in Grand Junction 
and none were active in town affairs. One-third o f Mesa County’s 
1,598 foreign-born residents had immigrated from Canada or the 
British Isles and encountered only minor obstacles in the assimila­
tion process. Two minority groups, however, disrupted the homoge­
neous pattern. The number o f Catholics had jumped from 982 to 
1,770 (an 80 percent increase) between 19 16  and 1926, thus com­
prising 8 percent o f the county’s inhabitants. Much of the Catholic 
influx originated in Mexico. The Mexican population of Mesa Coun­
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ty had expanded over 600 percent, from 136 persons in 1920 to 973 
in 1930.2
The Catholic and Mexican presence was not the only problem 
an enterprising Klan organizer could offer to solve. Although Grand 
Junction did not suffer recurring crime waves, all of Mesa County 
soaked in moonshine and bootleg whiskey. From DeBeque, Gover­
nor Sweet received a plea for state aid in enforcing the prohibition 
laws. “Conditions,” wrote Methodist minister Paul Shields, “are get­
ting deplorable in this town and vicinity. Men, boys and girls are 
drinking in semi public and often public places.” * In February, 1924, 
tragedy struck a young Grand Junction man when he drowned 
while intoxicated. The anti-liquor furor that arose after his death 
flared again in September when federal prohibition officers raided 
three Grand Junction bootlegger dens openly operating in violation 
of the law. The agents characterized their action as merely “a drop 
in the bucket.” The Daily Sentinel paraphrased their assessment of 
the situation: “ Bootleggers are plying their illegal trade in this city 
day in and day out with little attempt at concealing their work. I f  this 
city gets a black eye anywhere it gets it from the bootleggers. It is a 
part o f the work o f people appointed by the city and county to stop 
bootlegging, but things go along as usual with little break in the mo­
notonous routine. Vagrants are picked up by the score— but not 
bootleggers.” 4 The town’s moral reform element, led by the Rever­
end W. C. Wasser of the Methodist church and the Women’s Chris­
tian Temperance Union, found other black marks on the city’s repu­
tation. Grand Junction officials permitted houses of prostitution to 
operate in a regulated red-light district. Despite protests, this af­
front to decent citizens was not shut down. Sporadic waves o f arrests 
and fines neither appeased the reformers nor affected life in the 
“Little Barbary Coast.” Also provocative were the titillating motion 
pictures show^n in the town’s two theaters. Earlier in the decade 
when films were more traditional, eight congregations, including 
the Catholic church, had attempted to bolster religious devotion by 
proposing that the theaters at least close their doors on Sunday. 
Sponsors of the move had pursued their campaign in the press, the 
pulpit, and eventually the courts but had failed to attain their goal. 
By 1924 and 1925, the Sunday closing issue had become irrelevant, 
for the “ film evil” had so corrupted young people’s morals that vig­
ilance was necessary seven days a week. Residents were concerned 
about the effect upon their fellow citizens o f such motion pictures as 
“The Truth about Husbands,” “Sinners in Silk,” and “ Pleasure
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Mad.” “Sporting Youth,” which played in 1924, invited the public to 
see “Young blood, young love, young ideas— bound recklessly plea- 
sure-ward, jazz stepping and thrill chasing its way towards newer 
more vital sensations.” 5 The opening of a municipal dance hall in 
May, 1924, sparked another outcry and lament for the moral well­
being o f Grand Junction.6
Yet few moral reformers made the transition to the Invisible 
Empire because it did not address their needs. The men who orga­
nized and initially led the Ku Klux Klan in Grand Junction were 
content with the status quo. As members o f the elite and opinion- 
making public they did not envision an activist role for their associa­
tion. Although the evidence is only suggestive, it appears that the 
local elite may have coopted the order to distract citizens and pre­
vent any change in the distribution o f power. The town’s first Klan 
leader was Walter Walker, the editor and publisher of the Daily Sen­
tinel, the owner o f the Avalon Theater, and a ranking member o f the 
establishment. He obtained the Klan franchise from Grand Dragon 
Locke in 1924 and marked a course from which the order deviated 
only in the later stages o f its life cycle. To Walker, Grand Junction 
was “one o f the cleanest towns in the west and the conduct and de­
portment and ideals o f its citizenship . . . compare[d] most favorably 
with any city o f its size in the entire nation.” He and many o f his 
friends had lost patience with those “trying to make it appear that 
‘conditions are awful in Grand Junction,’ that everyone needs re­
forming, that everything needs to be controlled and regulated by 
this particular crowd and clique, that every organization and every 
individual needs its censorship.” 7 Liquor law violations stirred Walk­
er and his followers as much as the alleged deterioration of morality. 
Daily Sentinel editorials disputed those who charged that bootleg­
ging was rampant in Mesa County and continually praised local law 
enforcement efforts to end the traffic. Beer was served at klavern 
meetings, a reflection o f the members’ attitude toward prohibition, 
at least as it pertained to their own drinking habits. The hooded af­
filiation o f the Mesa County sheriff also made Klan demands for law 
and order inappropriate. Prejudice attracted few recruits because it 
was not an overt appeal, and Catholics, immigrants, Jews, and blacks 
presented few challenges to existing economic and political power 
relationships. In addition, the foreign-born link to crime was not 
clearly drawn in the county, for many lawbreakers had Anglo-Saxon 
names. A Klansman, married to a Catholic, recalled that while mem­
bers knew o f their organization’s reputation for intolerance, it “was 
not a loud issue in Grand Junction. What I mean by loud, it wasn’t
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talked about and there was no fights about it. . . .  I wasn’t mad at 
anybody. I never heard o f any Klansman being mad at anybody.” 8
Walker recruited his friends, employees, lodge brothers, and 
fellow citizens not for a holy crusade but for an exotic fraternal or­
ganization. “ It was just like another lodge starting, although it had 
this secret business. O f course, lodges are secret too; the Elks are se­
cret, the Masons are secret [and], the Odd Fellows are secret.” 9 The 
Klan, however, was newer and more exciting than these fraternal 
groups. No other lodge burned crosses in darkened fields or pro­
vided its members with so foreboding a costume. Each week men 
could dress in their hoods and robes and briefly leave drab small­
town life for a sojourn into a world of fantasy. With a password and 
a secret handshake an ordinary man was transformed into a knight 
of the mystical Invisible Empire. Together with the mystique, the 
Klan offered its members the more common pleasures associated 
with fraternalism: fellowship, social activities, and business contacts. 
Walker’s presence drew men well known in the town’s business, po­
litical, and fraternal circles. Their membership, said a Klansman, in 
turn became a factor in the organization’s growth; many white- and 
blue-collar employees joined “ because of the hell o f a lot o f promi­
nent men that belonged to i t . . . . We didn’t get too serious about this 
thing. We belonged to a bunch that was the popular thing to be in.” 10 
Here was an opportunity to meet important people. No one in the 
middle echelons o f the community or on his way up the ladder 
would fail to grab the ring.
Still, leadership, camaraderie, and a desire for influence do not 
completely explain the Klan’s mild disposition. With Catholics and 
immigrants quiescent, it was difficult to divert members from frater­
nalism. A minority did believe that the Klan’s thrust had been mis­
placed. Some anti-Catholics and zealous prohibitionists had entered 
the Klan hoping to shake members from their fraternal lethargy. 
Small yet cohesive, this faction found itself powerless to influence 
Klan leaders or members. Ritual and personal ambition proved too 
consuming and Klansmen paid little attention to agitation either in­
side or outside the lodge room. Only in the later years o f the Klan 
period would the balance shift in the minority’s favor.11
Grand Junction Klan organizers launched their membership 
drive on February 6, 1924, with a three-day engagement o f Birth of 
a Nation at the Avalon Theater. Most residents did not understand 
the significance o f the film’s appearance or the double meaning of 
a newspaper advertisement which claimed, “ It will make a better 
American o f you.” 12 The motion picture’s portrayal o f the coura­
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geous knights o f the Ku Klux Klan made men receptive, and re­
cruiters successfully tapped the usual membership sources, the 
churches, the fraternal lodges, and the police force. Members met 
secretly each week in the Margery Building on Main Street without 
fear o f newspaper exposure or government harassment. By sum­
mer, the provisional Klan organization was sufficiently strong to ap­
ply for a charter and to make its presence known. On Ju ly 25 three 
crosses were burned simultaneously around the city; “an impressive 
sight/’ remarked the Sentinel.™ A few days later a typewritten note 
was nailed to the door of a local black family: “Warning to the col­
ored race you are requested to leave this neighborhood under or­
ders o f the Klu [sic] Klux Klan.’Ml Police officers, however, dis­
counted Klan involvement because the organizations official seal 
was not stamped upon the letter and its name was misspelled. Be­
sides, the family was “law abiding” and had lived in the house for 
more than a decade. The blacks refused to be intimidated and were 
not bothered again. Grand Junction residents got their first glimpse 
o f the Ku Klux Klan on August 17. Shortly after nine o’clock at 
night a cross was fired and carried at the head of a column of 500 
hooded and robed Klansmen in a parade through the streets of the 
town. Several thousand people watched the forty-five-minute dem­
onstration, remaining as silent as the marchers. The parade was 
staged to celebrate the end of the local organization's dependent 
and provisional status. That afternoon Grand Dragon Locke had 
handed over the charter of Mesa County Klan No. 35 to its 800 
knights. An effusive newspaper report the next day recaptured “the 
spectacular silent, orderly and impressive” activities of the “famous 
and mysterious organization” for those who were absent.15
The Mesa County Klan was too disinterested and preoccupied 
with recruiting to become deeply involved in the 1924 political cam­
paign. The order did little more than ask its members to vote for 
Clarence Morley and Rice Means; neither candidate carried the 
county in the primary or general elections. Locally, Klansmen were 
named to the primary ballots o f both parties, not because of secret 
influence but because o f their own popularity and prestige. The 
Klan made no public endorsements for county office and did not 
emerge as an election issue. Instead o f political rallies, the Klan in­
vited Grand Junction Protestants to recruiting lectures. On October 
6 an Ohio knight told a standing-room-only crowd at the city audi­
torium that the Klan stood for law enforcement, Christianity, Amer­
icanism, and equal justice for all. “They say we are breeding re­
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ligious hatred but we are breeding religious love. They say we are 
breeding racial hatred but we are breeding racial sympathy . . . and 
friendliness. We have no hatred for anybody.” “ His talk,” observed a 
reporter, “went over the top, and he was nearly mobbed by prospec­
tive Klansmen. . . .” 16 Twelve hundred men and women attended a 
similar meeting three weeks later. Also in October, the Klan donated 
$100  to sponsor the YM CA memberships of underprivileged chil­
dren. The hooded delegation was received enthusiastically: “ Not 
only did the cheers resound while the klansmen were in the build­
ing, but as they departed and until they were well aw'ay. . . .” To the 
chairman o f the membership committee, “They looked like they 
were eight feet tall.” 17 The absence o f resistance is hardly surprising. 
The Klan had neither proposed nor executed an objectionable act. 
It offered no challenge to the local establishment or to any minority. 
Leading townspeople had given the order respectability. Citizens ac­
cepted the Ku Klux Klan as just another harmless fraternal lodge 
attempting to relieve the boredom of small-town life. Unlike klav- 
erns in many other Colorado cities, this organization tempered and 
deflected grievances rather than aroused them.18
II
In other Western Slope towns Klansmen responded to many of 
the same fears as the knights across the mountains. The order, with 
its flexible program, gained considerable power in the towns of 
Routt County. Klansmen in Hayden were concerned about Catholic 
influence in the public schools. In Milner, Oak Creek, and Yampa 
members had their hands full with bootleggers, prostitutes, gam­
blers, and a large immigrant population. The situation was similar 
in Meeker, where Klansmen attempted to save Protestants from 
a conspiracy hatched by Catholics, bootleggers, and corrupt gov­
ernment officials. The men of Montrose Klan No. 37 fought the 
papal menace with committees working “ to deprive every Catholic 
o f employment, no matter how small or inconsiderate. . . .” 19 At the 
same time the organization’s donations to a high school band uni­
form drive and a historical monument fund won it the praise of un­
prejudiced Protestant townspeople. To the south, in Dolores Coun­
ty, Klansmen promised to root out bootleggers and again make their 
communities safe for women and children. They received a boost 
from the Dolores Star, which declared in 1925, “Today the best of 
Americans are Klansmen.” 20 As in Grand Junction, each Klan as­
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sumed an identity subject only to the needs o f its members and the 
immediate community. But though the local environment gave the 
Klan its meaning, it also generated the causes for change and 
decline.21
I l l
The Ku Klux Klan had been received in Grand Junction with 
only scattered dissent. As one o f a number of approved fraternal 
lodges men could enter the Klan without fear of being branded with 
the odious stigma o f hooded membership. Minority group leaders 
ignored the organization while Protestant clergymen enlisted or re­
mained silent. The Daily Sentinel, the principal agency o f local opin­
ion making, was sympathetic if not enamored. Acceptance, though, 
was only temporary. The Klan and its environment began to change 
slowly at the end o f 1924.
A highly successful ten-month recruiting drive had inundated 
the order with membership applications. Screening was not official 
policy, and “anybody who had a ten dollar bill could join.” 22 Al­
though the rush o f new members made the Klan less cohesive and 
exclusive, it did not distort the basic fraternal focus. The enlarged 
rank and file did, however, opt for fresh leadership. Just before the 
November elections Klansmen chose Grand Junction realtor D. B. 
Wright as their first Exalted Cyclops over a chagrined Walter Walk­
er. Walker’s defeat was not a rejection o f the local establishment, for 
Wright was a wealthy and respected businessman. Rather, it was a 
personal rebuke to the Klan’s creator. Walker, whom a friend de­
scribed as suffering from a “Napoleon Complex,” would not accept 
his rejection and turned against his former devotion.23 His first anti- 
Klan editorial appeared on November 2 and warned residents of 
the “bold, bald, daring effort to incite, excite and play upon the prej­
udices o f men. . . .” 24 The Daily Sentinel would continue to hound 
the organization for the remainder of its local existence. Walker’s 
resignation and the exodus o f his friends did not modify elite domi­
nation or the fraternal orientation o f the order. Still, 1925 would be 
a year o f transition for the Mesa County Klan. With Walker’s assis­
tance and Klan mistakes, the community’s perception o f its newest 
lodge shifted away from the fraternal definition.25
Concern for the future o f their community diverted individual 
Klansmen briefly from fraternalism into local politics. At stake in 
the municipal elections o f April, 1925, was the entire seven-man city 
council. The council acted as a legislative body and also appointed
156
G ra n d  Ju n c t io n  a n d  the Western Slope
the city manager who, in turn, selected the chief o f police, the city 
attorney, and every member o f the municipal government. The 
campaign opened in March when Methodist minister W. C. Wasser 
urged all Christians to join a political crusade dedicated to the elim­
ination o f bootlegging, prostitution, and gambling from Grand 
Junction. Wasser, a leader in the moral reform cause, blamed city 
officials for allowing the community to slip into depravity. High 
school boys, he charged, were frequently found in the brothels of 
the red-light district, their characters forever flawed. Police officers 
had allegedly allowed prostitutes to brazenly solicit on Main Street 
and in the municipal dance hall. The minister later added pool halls 
and movie theaters to the forces making Grand Junction a “cesspool 
of vice and iniquity.” 26 To avoid God’s wrath, Wasser endorsed six 
candidates for the city council and pleaded their case before Chris­
tian voters. The Women's Christian Temperance Union accepted 
Wasser’s accusations and called upon municipal officials to enforce 
the law. “Do you need,” it queried, “ the religious and moral element 
which does not patronize such business, to minutely investigate and 
bring you the proof?” 27 The union’s election slate included all but 
one o f Wasser’s candidates. The Mesa County Klan made no public 
endorsements though its members were well represented in the 
field o f candidates. O f the nineteen men running for office, at least 
ten belonged to the Ku Klux Klan, yet none o f them revealed his 
membership. The Klan addressed citizens only once about the cam­
paign. Even that public utterance, tacked to the bottom of a recruit­
ing invitation, was a bland appeal for “ the election of competent and 
conscientious officials, and the economical and business-like admin­
istration o f the affairs o f the city” 28 On election day Klansmen took 
every seat on the city council. Although the Sentinel labeled the re­
turns a defeat for Wasser, three o f the Klansmen had received the 
minister’s support. The men’s success, however, was more a product 
o f their own standing in the community than either Klan or Wasser 
sentiment. All o f the winning candidates were well-known civic lead­
ers who had profited from their long-time connections.29
The secret affiliations o f the councilmen were not long hidden. 
They named Klansman Edward Thompson city manager, and he 
filled every municipal office from his order’s membership roster. 
The Grand Junction police department, under Chief Frank Clifton, 
became the main source o f Klan patronage, with experience no 
longer the chief prerequisite for employment. Klannishness or fra­
ternal nepotism rather than malevolence probably accounted for 
the appointments. The Daily Sentinel censured the new administra­
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tion and warned citizens of the frightening implications: “Men are 
serving on the Grand Junction police force today for no other rea­
son than that they are members o f this organization and from the 
chief down they are taking their orders from the exalted cyclops of 
the Ku Klux Klan. It is a deplorable condition. It is more than that— 
it is an outrageous condition. Never were there so many men on the 
police force. Never were there so many special and private officials. 
Never were there so many stool pigeons and amateur gun men.” 30
In Ju ne Grand Junction Klansmen invited members from all 
over the Western Slope to a celebration konklave. The councilmen 
granted the Klan a parade permit and, in preparation for the event, 
draped the county courthouse and city hall with large American 
flags. Sixty-seven stores along the parade route were similarly 
adorned. Seven hundred Klansmen marched two abreast in the 
night procession. Also featured were the Grand Junction municipal 
band and drum corps and an automobile carrying City Manager Ed 
Thompson and Chief o f Police Frank Clifton. After the parade 
Klansmen and members o f the newly organized womens auxiliary 
gathered in Lincoln Park for a festive evening of speeches, fire­
works, initiations, and dancing. The Denver secession crisis in the 
summer o f 1925 did not diminish Klan spirit. Klansmen from 
Grand Junction, Montrose, and Delta assembled in Gunnison in 
Ju ly  for another parade and family outing. The following month 
Mesa County Klan No. 35 joined every Western Slope klavern but 
one in a declaration o f loyalty to Atlanta.31
Grand Junction’s Klan city officials were, for the most part, re­
sponsible and diligent public servants. They passed no obnoxious 
laws nor enforced ordinances unfairly. The existing power structure 
was left undisturbed. Business efficiency and government economy, 
instead, were their passion. Municipal authorities did not harass 
business in the Little Barbary Coast. The red-light district remained 
open during the Klan’s city hall tenure and obeyed the traditional 
restrictions o f no liquor, no youthful customers, and no expansion. 
In the city and county the Klan sheriff averaged one bootlegging 
raid every five days and began to curb the area’s liquor traffic. Police 
inexperience and aggressiveness, however, made more o f an im­
pression upon community perceptions than moderation and gov­
ernmental effectiveness. On the night of August 3 a Klan policeman 
shot and killed Manuel Cordova and wounded his companion after 
a cursory search o f their automobile for liquor. The next day a coro­
ner’s ju ry acquitted the Klansman, ruling that he had acted in self­
defense when Cordova reached for a pistol. The Daily Sentinel ac­
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cepted the verdict but argued that the officer’s unfamiliarity with 
correct police methods had prevented a thorough search which 
would have uncovered the weapon and averted the shooting. Cor­
dova’s death, contended Walter Walker, was the direct result o f Klan 
domination o f the police department. Klan membership, not prior 
police experience or knowledge, had become “the magic talisman, 
the open sesame” into the force: “The killing the other night was the 
first score on a toll o f incompetency and inefficiency, and the blame 
should be placed where it belongs. And it is time to say that the city 
hall, in every department, is under the complete control of the Ku 
Klux Klan, and the exalted cyclops and n o t  the city manager or the 
council is ruling Grand Junction today. . . . The time has come to 
have a showdown.” 82 Other incidents of police bullying, unreason­
able searches, and lengthy detention of both residents and tourists 
bolstered Walker’s argument that “ things have gone far enough.” 
Also damaging was the arrest o f a Klansman and city employee for 
child molesting.33
Walker paid a price for his unrelenting criticism of the Klan. 
On September 3, 1925, Deputy Sheriff Charles F. Thomas, labeled 
by the Daily Sentinel as “ the most radical and violent talking klans­
man in Mesa County,” hailed Walker on Main Street and cursed him 
for his newspaper attacks.3'1 When words failed to produce a retrac­
tion, Thomas struck Walker and knocked him to the sidewalk and 
kept knocking him down each time the editor managed to rise. 
Chief Clifton arrived on the scene a few minutes later, but refused 
to arrest the deputy sheriff because he had not witnessed the beat­
ing. Thomas was eventually arrested and confined to the county jail 
for thirty days. An eyewitness disagreed with the Daily Sentinel's ac­
count of the incident: “Thomas just shook him, that’s all. He didn’t 
rough him up, he didn’t cuff him, he didn’t hit him, he didn’t trip 
him, he didn’t throw him to the ground. . . .” 35 Only a handful, 
however, read or heard anything other than the newspaper’s report. 
Public reaction went strongly against Thomas and the Ku Klux Klan 
with few people able to draw a distinction. The Walker assault was 
seen as one more in a long series o f examples of Klan irrespon­
sibility. The next day respected attorney M. D. Vincent called for 
the creation o f an anti-Klan organization to end the “ reign of ter­
ror.” Republican leader Lee Burgess, in support o f Vincent’s appeal, 
asked in an open letter: “ Have we reached a point where a free-born 
American is not free to discuss his public officers without fear of vio­
lence? Are we no longer free to think and express our thoughts pub­
licly without fear o f a boycott? . . . Are we servile subjects who must
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conform to the wishes o f Imperial Rulers, set up in our midst?” 36 
Two weeks after Walker was beaten, his thirteen-year-old son ar­
rived home dazed, suffering from a concussion. Although the boy 
had merely been in a bicycle accident, the Sentinel's story placed 
a Klan leader at the site o f the mishap and left readers to draw a 
causal connection.37
Grand Junction began its reassessment o f the Ku Klux Klan in 
the summer o f 1925. The aggressive behavior of individual Klan po­
licemen evoked hostility which generalized to all members o f the or­
ganization. Every Klansman shared the responsibility and blame for 
the actions o f the intemperate and inexperienced- The Daily Sentinel 
facilitated this identification by repeatedly depicting the deeds o f 
the few as a direct result o f official Klan policy and decision. Thom­
as’s assault upon Walter Walker hastened this process, hardening an 
amorphous discontent into steadfast Klan opposition. The incident 
also awakened city officials to the seriousness o f the situation, and 
the police department was brought under tighter control. The fun 
was now over and Klan ties had become counterproductive. The 
popularity o f the secret society plummeted further as the influential 
departed. Klansmen, in reaction to the flight of the prominent and 
changing community attitudes, reviewed the benefits o f their mem­
berships. When members found that the fiery cross, the kloran, and 
the hood and robe were not worth their neighbors’ rejection, many 
withdrew. The decision to withhold dues or not to attend meetings, 
however, was not always consciously made. “We didn’t leave it,” re­
called a member, “we just forgot it. There were no resignations 
turned in. It just faded away.” 38 Regardless o f how men terminated 
their commitments, the Klan had entered a downward spiral from 
which it could not break free.
The Mesa County Klan retreated slowly in 1926, its rearguard 
actions incapable o f modifying public opinion or damming the 
membership drain. The organization broke seven months of silence 
in May, 1926, to announce the election o f the Reverend George 
Rossman o f Grand Junction’s First Christian Church as the new Ex­
alted Cyclops. Despite the importance o f the voting, less than 100 
Klansmen appeared to cast their ballots. As a leading moral re­
former and anti-Catholic, Rossman had benefited from the internal 
power realignment which followed the lodge men’s withdrawal. 
Rossman’s faction, so long muted, had remained intact and easily 
captured the organization. Once in control, they directed Klan en­
ergy away from benign fraternalism and against those who threat­
ened Protestant America. Rossman invited wayward members to re­
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turn to the Klan: “ For the sake of America and her institutions that 
are now in deadly peril— let us forget our differences and come to­
gether in a great meeting.” 39 In August he wrote: “ Do not be misled 
by the false reports circulated by the enemies o f America. Petty pol­
iticians are in hand with the Wets and Romanists. . . . The real is­
sue is Wet versus Dr y ,— and America versus her enemies. Unless 
the Klan is able to unite its forces and enlist the cooperation of the 
peoples who have this nation's institutions and welfare at heart, 
dark days loom before us.” 40 Rossman's anti-Catholic rhetoric and 
prohibitionist extremism, however, failed to have the desired effect. 
Few were impressed with the Klan's new message and even fewer 
responded. Nor did the fresh approach enhance Klan political influ­
ence. Mesa County Republicans and Democrats passed resolutions 
denouncing the hooded order. All Klan-endorsed candidates were 
defeated in either the primary or general elections, while commu­
nity service and standing erased the former memberships of several 
winners.41
In March, 1927, the Klan issued “fiery summonses” ordering ac­
tive and ex-members to attend a political rally honoring the Grand 
Dragon. “ I f  you fail to answer this summons by your presence 
(Providence alone preventing), you may never be permitted to cross 
the threshold o f a klavern again.” 42 Only 150 Klansmen, a third 
from rural Mesa County, took the threat seriously. Rossman also 
failed to rally Klansmen in time for the April municipal elections. 
Klan opponents, supported by the Sentinel, organized the citizens’ 
ticket and won all three city council races. Klan representation on 
the council had declined sharply since 1925. The body's new 
makeup was three anti-Klansmen, three former members, and only 
one active Klansman. Among the council’s first actions was the re­
moval o f Chief Frank Clifton and all but three policemen from the 
department. “Let it be a new day in Grand Junction,” proclaimed 
the Daily Sentinel.43 The dawn actually arrived two weeks later when 
Rossman was removed from his church and advised to leave town. 
The minister had become romantically entwined with a sixteen- 
year-old member o f his Sunday school class. Rather than administer 
the final blow, Grand Junction ignored the Ku Klux Klan and al­
lowed it to drown in its impotence.44
The Grand Junction experience offers another dimension to 
the Klan's image. Although crime waves and minority pressure were 
absent from the community, problems existed amenable to a Klan 
solution. The Klan might have campaigned against unresponsive
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government and with an established, church-based moral reform 
movement. But Grand Junction Klan leaders, unlike their counter­
parts elsewhere in Colorado, did not address or exploit Protestant 
concerns. These prominent community figures turned their atten­
tion and their followers from local tensions to fraternalism. The lo­
cal Klan ceased to be the arm of a social movement and became a 
conventional association. Whether the leaders’ purpose was phi­
lanthropy or social control is unclear; the effect was to render the 
Klan useless as a protest vehicle. Direction from above thus assured 
favorable community perceptions and respectable leadership while 
neutralizing the energizing variables o f governmental responsive­
ness and issues. The Mesa County Klan, purposely built upon this 
narrow foundation, did not actively pursue politics or engage in law 
enforcement. T he majority o f its members were not driven to effect 
or prevent change. The contrast between elite control in Grand 
Junction and elite resistance in Colorado Springs and Canon City is 
dramatic. In 1924 the order had taken its place beside the commu­
nity’s established fraternal lodges, unhindered by adverse publicity. 
There it might have remained except for the unauthorized behavior 
o f individual Klansmen which poisoned the atmosphere for fellow 
members. Prodded by an avenging editor, residents shunned those 
who bore the guilt o f association. The Klan was no longer benev­
olent, no longer acceptable. The threat to reputation and position 
would end only through renunciation. The desertion of the influen­
tial, followed by the lodge men, further isolated the Ku Klux Klan. 
The espousal of bigotry sealed its fate.
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THE KU KLUX KLAN AS A SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT
. . . with the exception of Indiana, there was no bigger or brighter star in 
the Klan flag than Colorado.
L. C. Speers
New York Times, September 26, 1926
The anatomy of a social movement like the Ku Klux Klan can 
be dissected from numerous entry points. The Klan’s roots in the 
American traditions of nativism, vigilantism, and religious bigotry 
may be traced to the colonial period. Comparative analysis with si­
multaneous and kindred European movements after World War I 
might indicate basic similarities or differences. Advertising and sales 
promotion models would furnish valuable insights into the Klan’s 
rapid growth during the 1920s. Except in the Democratic conven­
tion o f 1924, the Klan’s role as a national political pressure group 
remains largely unexplored. The socioeconomic character of the 
Klan leadership can be probed with the techniques of collective bi­
ography. Inquiries at the state level could measure the lower eche­
lon’s obedience to national directives as well as regional uniformity 
and diversity. Macroinvestigation, however, conceals as much as it 
reveals. To understand the meaning o f the Ku Klux Klan for the 
participants o f the drama, for those who joined or were affected by 
its actions, it is necessary to descend to the local community. Local 
leaders and needs shaped an already pliable program to fit a par­
ticular time and place. Each klavern program distinctively fused is­
sue and non-issue appeals, drawing a heterogeneous membership. 
Rather than a tight belief system or monolithic organization, a mo-
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saic emerges which denies commonly held generalizations and ster­
eotypes. This case study approach conceptualizes the Klan as a social 
movement. Seeking to influence community policies, Klans had to 
mobilize and expend resources. People, money, and votes were the 
keys to power. Klaverns were not inhabited by uprooted men and 
women suffering from psychic and societal disorders. Instead, Klan 
membership represented a normal individual’s decision to confront 
real and immediate problems. Tactics and goals may be questioned 
and censured but not rejected simply as the work o f the irrational. 
Just as the generators o f growth and success were confined almost 
completely to the local environment, so too were the forces making 
for decline and failure.
I
Traditional explanations for the growth o f the Ku Klux Klan do 
not fit the Colorado case. Economic depression has often been con­
sidered a causative factor in the development of social movements. 
Students o f the southwestern and Colorado Klans have linked the 
order’s emergence to the deep but brief depression that struck the 
United States in 1920. Economic hard times did not spawn the 
Rocky Mountain organization. The Klan came to Denver in 19 21, a 
year o f financial collapse. All economic indicators pointed down­
ward: farm prices and livestock receipts had declined, iron and coal 
production was curtailed, and the number of new business incor­
porations had fallen off. The Klan, however, was quiescent during 
the trough, its growth and political victories awaiting the return of 
prosperity in 1923, 1924, and 1925. Scapegoating to ease the fears 
o f the unemployed or downwardly mobile was not a prominent 
Klan feature. The Colorado organization’s literature, recruiting ap­
peals, and speakers rarely listed job competition or economic crimes 
among the charges leveled at Jews, Catholics, blacks, or immigrants. 
Moreover, the Klan’s first recruits tended to be the more econom­
ically and socially prominent members o f the community.1
World War I has repeatedly been called into service to account 
for the rise o f not only the Klan but all right-wing social movements 
o f the “ Bigoted Twenties.” 2 John Mecklin eloquently set forth the 
standard interpretation in 1924:
The war, with its hymns o f hate, its stories o f poison gas and 
human carnage, its secret spyings upon fellow Americans, its 
accounts o f Belgian atrocities, its imprisonments o f radicals . . .
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had opened up the fountains o f the great deep o f national feel­
ing. After the armistice these hates kindled by the war and to 
which the nation had become habituated during the years of 
bloodshed were suddenly set adrift. . . .  As a nation we had 
cultivated a taste for the cruel, the brutal, the intolerant, and 
the un-Christian that demanded gratification. Here was an un­
paralleled opportunity for the Klan “salesmen of hate” 3
Charles C. Alexander, writing in 1964, also stressed the war’s crucial 
impact: “ In the fall o f 19 18 , just as the indoctrination process was 
reaching a peak, as patriotic feeling was mounting to a frenzy, the 
war came abruptly to an end. Americans who had stored up an 
enormous volume o f superpatriotic zeal now no longer had an offi­
cial enemy on whom to concentrate this fervor.” 4 The Creel Com­
mittee’s causal relationship to Klan building, despite fifty years of 
scholarly assertion, remains nebulous. There is no evidence that 
such tensions needed an outlet or even existed. Nor is it explained 
why such feelings, if they did endure, were displaced from the Hun 
to American Catholics and Jews. Moreover, if unquenched wartime 
passion was at its height immediately after the armistice, why was 
the Klan’s rise delayed until 1923 and 1924? Finally, what data could 
even be mustered to substantiate a link between war frustrations 
and the Klan? How could it be measured?
Six years after the armistice the war had ceased to arouse excite­
ment or resentment. Newspapers and politicians shied away from 
mentioning what had become an unpleasant experience. Moreover, 
by the mid-1920s more salient problems pressed Coloradans. The 
emergence o f  the Ku Klux Klan did not signal a return to “nor­
malcy” or a tiring o f crusades. For many Klansmen and Klanswom­
en membership was an idealistic commitment to a goal beyond the 
self. The Klan offered Protestants an opportunity to enlist in a cause 
to save a nation, a faith, and a way o f life from their detractors. 
Commitment was not difficult; with ten dollars or a vote for a Klan 
candidate, any man or woman in any community could battle the 
forces o f evil. This time God’s side would not be tainted with a Euro­
pean stain. The Red Scare had also receded. The Bolshevik was no 
longer a frightening figure and kleagles did not conjure him up. 
The red threat had so diminished by 1927 that Fremont County 
Klansmen greeted an IWW strike not with a call to arms or a jere­
miad but with limited support.
The southern black exodus, while accelerated after World War 
I, had no meaning for white Coloradans. Between 19 10  and 1920
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the states black population increased by only 5 10  persons. The 
black “threat” in Colorado was confined to Denver and was gener­
ated from within, not from without. Similarly, the surge in foreign 
immigration after the war posed little danger to Anglo-Saxon su­
premacy in the Centennial state. Colorado’s foreign born comprised 
just 14 percent o f the population, and the Ellis Island battle front 
was far away. To Coloradans, alleged criminality, rather than eth­
nicity or numbers, was at the core o f the immigrant problem. Neigh­
borhood transition, while useful in explaining the motivation of 
some Klansmen, was also o f secondary importance in the growth of 
the state's urban klaverns. In Colorado cities the “zone of emer­
gence” concept was inapplicable.5
Abstract appeals for law and order, Americanism, or the salva­
tion o f white womanhood were not sufficient in themselves to mobi­
lize men. Nor was the Klan a regressive consequence of the triumph 
o f urban society and culture over small-town values. Colorado 
Klansmen did not cast Denver or New' York in the role of devil or 
decry the urban lifestyle. The Klan had to adapt to each local en­
vironment, finding the conditions which would make its vague solu­
tions relevant and concrete. Kleagles systematically exploited real 
community tensions and problems, not ethereal evils outside a 
man's immediate frame of reference. The pope was an obvious 
villain, but without evidence o f local Catholic “aggression” anti­
Catholic rhetoric would have drawn few members. An international 
Jewish conspiracy could not have generated as much anti-Semitic 
agitation as the exotic inhabitants o f Little Jerusalem. Blacks became 
dangerous only when they moved next door or attended the high 
school prom. The local moonshiner or drug dealer produced far 
more fear than Al Capone and his Chicago mob. Each Klan, attuned 
to its community’s concerns, became a differentiated cell in a larger 
organism.
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Recalling a kleagle’s instructions to key the Klan to the target’s 
needs, what problems did Colorado communities present to the In­
visible Empire for solution? In which areas did the authorities ap­
pear unresponsive to citizens’ needs and fears? The Denver Klan 
was able to offer its complete cure. The order did not manufacture 
but manipulated Protestant anxiety concerning crime waves, Cath­
olic organizing, Jewish distinctiveness, immigrant criminality, and 
black violation o f inferior status. Frightened, sincere men respond­
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ed with money and votes. They placed “ 100 Percent Americans” on 
guard in the city hall and the police department, sure that they had 
struck an effective blow against their enemies. Boycotts and cross 
burnings were employed to handle situations beyond the govern­
ment’s reach. Conversely, anti-Semitism, anti-Catholicism, and 
white supremacy were not important planks in the Pueblo Klan’s 
platform. Klansmen attacked crime conditions and promised to ex­
pel bootleggers, roadhouses, murderers, and foreign-born law­
breakers from the county. Blacks, Jews, and law violators were not 
threatening to Canon City Klansmen. Townspeople demanded civic 
reform and the Klan was determined to provide it. Klansmen 
pledged to save their town not only from an indifferent elite but 
from a Catholic offensive. The danger became quite real to sus­
picious Protestants when the Fremont County Catholic population 
increased sharply in preparation for the pope’s alleged arrival. 
Grand Junction welcomed a fraternal lodge rather than an organi­
zation dedicated to Protestant morality or religious bigotry. The 
Klansmen o f Colorado Springs were unable to develop a particular 
style or image. Harassed and intimidated, plagued by vapid issues 
and poor leadership, the Pikes Peak Klan never established a firm 
klavern identity. In its selection o f issues, primed to actual commu­
nity tensions and governmental unresponsiveness, the Klan became 
less a free agent and more a servant of the local environment.
Non-issue appeals, as well, attracted men to the secret society. 
The Klan was a political machine, and struggling office seekers 
joined to secure its vote. Membership could mean the difference be­
" tween economic success or failure to a businessman. Mystery and ex­
citement w'ere powerful draws. For others, fraternalism was the only 
goal. “Marginal men” also appeared in Klan ranks. To those low in 
socioeconomic status, socially uprooted, or cut off from the network 
of community relations, the Klan offered a new sense o f self-re­
spect, dignity, and meaning. For ten dollars the Invisible Empire al­
lowed a knight to rededicate his life in a holy crusade for the de­
fense of Americanism, Protestantism, and the white race. Many 
Klansmen held no other fraternal memberships. In Denver sizable 
proportions o f both early and late joiners had experienced the sta­
tus frustrations and uncertainties o f vertical mobility. A substantial 
number had only recently migrated to their communities. The Klan, 
with its emphasis upon familiar ideas, served those lacking roots as 
a comforting decompression chamber between rural and urban 
life. The organization probably facilitated their adaption to a new 
lifestyle.
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The importance o f the marginal Klansman, however, should 
not be overdrawn. The most heavily traveled paths into the Invisible 
Empire ran through the lodge, the church, and the family. Friends 
and relatives served as part-time kleagles and were most able to 
overcome doubts about entering an unknown secret society. Infor­
mal work and leisure groups, with their own forms o f communal 
bonds, were often the places where men first were introduced and 
later recruited into the Klan. Economic pressure and even social os­
tracism, rather than an unwanted self, prodded others to join. Fur­
ther, short-term residence and factory employment do not neces­
sarily indicate psychological insecurity or less anxiety about crime in 
the streets and Catholic “ aggression.” The Klan mobilized Protes­
tants o f differing socioeconomic status and background with an 
appeal to shared values and ideals. A common Protestant frame of 
reference toward minorities and lawbreakers cut across personal cir­
cumstances and allowed all to unite in defense o f their community. 
Like more conventional organizations, the Klan was goal-directed, a 
problem-solving response keyed to local conditions. Those who 
joined to ease psychic tensions had little influence on the movement 
and were unrepresentative o f their fellow members.
Despite Klan heterogeneity, a common theme emerges from 
the Colorado pattern. Viciousness and cruelty marked the person­
alities o f few Klansmen and women. Instead, they were concerned 
citizens reacting to local problems left festering and untended by 
government authorities. Local government officials had failed to re­
spond to grievances concerning an actual breakdown in law and 
order, minority challenges, and the necessity o f civic reform. Retain­
ing their basic faith in the system, they used the Klan to mobilize the 
discontented and reassert the influence o f the Protestant majority. 
Their solution was usually political, the election o f trusted men who 
would assail criminals, regulate minority groups, and initiate com­
munity improvements. Cooptation, as was the case in Grand Junc­
tion, could, however, effectively short-circuit and negate this Klan 
pattern. On the state level, too, the Klan’s primary goal was to take 
control o f the agencies and bureaus which had allegedly fallen into 
unreliable hands and thus make government more amenable to the 
Protestant will. At the same time, minorities often had to be re­
minded o f their place with boycotts and fiery crosses. Klan member­
ship was an optimistic commitment. Change could be effected, the 
problems remedied, once the law-abiding and God-fearing were 
aroused. Klansmen attempted not to resurrect a past golden age but
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to make the Protestant hold on the present more secure. Their vic­
tory could only have been temporary.
The problem of government authorities being unresponsive in 
the face o f local tensions was not confined to Colorado. Klansmen 
throughout the United States seemed to share the belief that public 
officials had left them defenseless or had actually betrayed them to a 
conspiracy o f criminals, Catholics, Jews, and immigrants. Men en­
tered the Klan in Madison, Wisconsin, because the police force ap­
peared to have capitulated in the war against crime. The depart­
ment, pockmarked by inefficiency and corruption, could offer the 
community no respite from bootleggers, murderers, and prosti­
tutes. In El Dorado, Arkansas, residents accused the city govern­
ment o f collaborating with lawbreakers and ignoring rampant vice: 
“Gambling has been run wide open in several places. . . . Booze has 
been sold right over the bar and every known kind o f vice has been 
going full sway. . . . All night long . . . women can be seen on the 
downtown streets with men in a drunken condition.” 6 Disgusted 
with the situation, Protestants accepted the Ku Klux Klan as the 
only means of cleansing their town. In the face o f government leth­
argy Klansmen in Chattanooga, Tennessee, compiled a list o f 100 
suspected bootleggers and demanded their apprehension. All Klans­
men knew the reason for the government’s failure to act: two Cath­
olics, a Jew, and a renegade Presbyterian, who hired “ papists” to 
teach in the public schools, sat on the Chattanooga city commission. 
In Anaheim, California, Klansmen were instrumental in forcing an 
incompetent city official from office and later helped replace an ad­
ministration branded as ineffective and fiscally irresponsible.7
The common Klan remedy for unresponsive government was 
the election o f reliable men who could be depended upon to enforce 
the law and to protect rights. The presence o f Klan public officers 
was usually sufficient to redress the balance in the Protestants’ favor 
and keep Jews, Catholics, and blacks in their places. Rarely were dis­
criminatory ordinances passed once the Klan attained power. Law 
and order required a more active defense, and communities fre­
quently witnessed sustained anticrime campaigns. Some Klansmen, 
particularly in the Southwest, believed conditions were deteriorat­
ing too rapidly to await election day. They responded to government 
failure with direct action— the lash, the tar bucket, and the gun. 
Terrorism, however, was not official Klan policy and violence was 
usually perpetrated by independent bands o f radicals. After 1923 
the Klansmen o f Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas discarded their
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night-riding tactics and joined the rest of the Invisible Empire in 
pursuing their goals through the ballot box.8
The Colorado klaverns’ differing positions on the appeal spec­
trum masked another factor making for homogeneity. No member­
ship was monolithic, despite emphasis upon a particular Klan fea­
ture. Each organization was composed of a coalition of informal, 
competing groups separated by their diverse concerns. The law and 
order men coexisted uneasily with the “ true believers,” who in turn 
probably doubted the sincerity o f the fraternalists and economically 
motivated. Grand Junction fraternalists overshadowed but did not 
silence the anti-Catholic and moral reforming members. Law and 
order advocates prevailed in the Pueblo Klan while nativists and 
anti-Catholics were also recruited. Jew  and black baiters joined the 
Canon City Klan yet exercised little influence. The coalitional hier­
archy was not static, and the Klan’s thrust could shift with the for­
tunes o f a rising or declining faction. Coalition heterogeneity fur­
thered interklavern understanding and produced a measure of 
unity. No Colorado Klansman could ever be an outsider when visit­
ing distant hooded brothers.
The Ku Klux Klan did not suddenly appear in a community, 
become inundated with klectokens, and automatically rise to power. 
Klan building, especially in the formative stage, was a slow process 
o f contacting eligible men, persuading them to join, and following 
up their initial commitments. The keys to Klan mobilization success 
were the men who made their order’s solutions to local problems ap­
pear reasonable and inexorable. These early leaders first introduced 
the organization to the community, shaped its early identity, con­
trolled its growth, and were thus largely responsible for its future. 
The leaders o f Denver, Pueblo, Canon City, and Grand Junction 
were imaginative, eloquent, enthusiastic, even charismatic. Walter 
Walker, John Galen Locke, George Lowe, and Frederick Arnold 
were well-known local figures who capitalized upon their connec­
tions and positions o f trust and respect to attract followers. Each 
guided a competitive and volatile coalition o f factions toward coop­
erative action. They restrained hotheads and radicals from inde­
pendent adventures which would discredit the Klan, weaken its 
unity, and frustrate its aims. While exercising a tight internal rein, 
every leader had to hold his organization together against external 
attack. In tasks, responsibilities, and status, these men were no dif­
ferent from their counterparts in more conventional groups. Only 
the hood and robe set them apart. At the same time state-level lead­
ership was entrusted to men who rarely pried or meddled in the af­
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fairs of the local Klans. Both Colorado Grand Dragons granted 
klavern leaders maximum autonomy, thus avoiding the internal dis­
sension which tore apart other state organizations. The importance 
of the leadership variable to Klan health is obvious when the men in 
command were defamed, died, or too frequently replaced.
Community perceptions and the reactions of authorities touched 
every stage o f Klan mobilization. The opinion-making public— 
newspaper editors, clergymen, respected local figures, and other 
shapers of attitudes— significantly influenced the meaning of the so­
cial movement. Their approval, neutrality, or hostility affected a 
man’s propensity to join or vote with the organization. Similarly, 
government action could stimulate or retard Klan growth. Official 
silence was often interpreted as unofficial support. Klansmen in city 
and town halls actively recruited fellow citizens while frustrating in­
vestigations. Conversely, government disapproval in the form of ha­
rassment o f leaders, disruption o f meetings, and intimidation of in­
dividual members might have caused men to hesitate before joining. 
Repressive overkill, however, could arouse sympathy and make 
memberships firmer. Klan opponents responded to their hooded 
adversaries indirectly by exerting leverage upon the unaffiliated 
majority. The potency o f the anti-Klan argument was a function of 
the intensity o f the resistance, its tactics, the type of men who engi­
neered the counteroffensive, and local Klan behavior. The Klan was 
most vulnerable when well-known Protestants built a permanent or­
ganization and repeatedly appealed to the populace with newspaper 
exposes, rallies, and intensive enlistment campaigns. Although it 
was easier to oust the secret society in its formative years before 
membership hardened, so intense a response, even if belated, could 
be effective. The Klan’s advantage was greatest against a vacillating, 
minority-dominated thrust which appeared only before elections.
No Colorado community produced an opposition movement 
which swayed the public mind sufficiently to completely shut off the 
Klan impulse. The Colorado Springs counterforce most closely ap­
proximated the ideal type. An informal resistance movement, pri­
marily composed o f public opinion makers, responded to visible 
Klan intrusions with newspaper condemnations, government sur­
veillance, and appeals to establish opposition groups. These efforts, 
combined with other factors, created a negative local perception but 
did not prevent the creation of Pikes Peak No. 1 1 .  Overt thrusts 
were met, yet anti-Klan sentiment could not be sustained against a 
hidden enemy. Not until the hard-fought municipal elections in
1925 did the Protestant social, economic, and political leadership
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commit itself to a methodical anti-Klan campaign and aggressively 
rally the population against the secret society. In Denver the Klan 
survived opposition from several government sources in its first year 
and was never again seriously confronted. The anti-Klan forces were 
disorganized, appeared sporadically, and were unable to attract wide­
spread Protestant popular or opinion maker support. The responses 
o f Canon City and Grand Junction were more nearly typical. At first 
the Klan was accepted or at least tolerated. In Canon City Klan op­
ponents misjudged the strength o f the hooded appeal, awakening 
only after city and county government had been lost. Their Liberty 
League aroused the county, recaptured the courthouse, but could not 
sustain its drive against the Canon City stronghold. The Grand Junc­
tion Klan was a project o f the elite and initially functioned solely as a 
fraternal lodge. There were few local objections to such an organi­
zation. Klan abuses, amplified by the town’s newspaper, eventually 
forced the establishment to withdraw its support and the community 
to reverse its verdict. In this hostile environment the Klan died with­
out the aid o f an organized opposition. In Pueblo no group ever ap­
peared to challenge Klan domination.
The major lines o f interplay in the mobilization process be­
tween local tensions, unresponsive government, Klan leadership 
and program, the opinion-making public, opposition, residents’ 
perceptions, and actions o f authorities are diagrammed in Figure 3. 
The failure o f local authorities to respond to real grievances and 
fears dissipated faith in the honesty and efficacy o f elected officials. 
The government’s inability to prevent crime or harass minorities 
made men and women susceptible to an extralegal agency’s prom­
ises to ease such dissatisfaction. Community beliefs, buttressed by 
official pronouncements, tied religious and ethnic minorities to local 
problems (i.e. ethnic link to crime), further heightening receptivity. 
The absence o f environmental supports plus the monotony o f daily 
existence readied others for the Klan’s appearance. Klan leaders re­
sponded with a diversified program modeled upon the needs of 
alienated Protestants. The package identified the sources o f strain 
and offered convincing remedies. Klan proponents magnified the 
organization’s allure by lending it their sincerity, respectability, and 
credibility. Public opinion makers and government officials were si­
multaneously shaping the Klan’s local definition. Their acceptance, 
tolerance, or rejection affected a man’s accessibility to Klan recruit­
ers. The opposition force exerted influence upon community atti­
tudes commensurate with the nature o f its membership and cam­
paign style. Klan actions as well as words fed back into the public
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mind. Church donations, acts of charity, and fiery cross threats gen­
erated negative and positive adjustments in the evolving judgment. 
Previous and newly arising tensions interacted with the Klan’s pro­
posals, the character o f its leadership, and the community’s percep­
tions upon each Protestant’s frame of reference. Could the Klan 
make the streets safe for women and children? Were the tales of 
Catholic atrocities, learned as a youth, true? Were Klan leaders as 
corrupt as the newspapers claimed? WThat effect would a black 
neighbor have on property values? Were blacks lusting for his 
daughter? W^ as his low salary the product of Jewish scheming? Did 
the hood and robe mask an organization o f cowards? Past experi­
ences and current needs were analyzed in the family, work, church, 
and lodge settings. From such discussions came commitments to join 
the Invisible Empire, pledges of political support, opposition, and 
neutrality. As the Klan mobilized more and more resources and thus 
exercised increasing influence, its presence became another element 
affecting membership decisions.
The Klan did not exist in isolation and without reference to 
time. Changes in any o f the variables, during any o f the stages, 
could hasten or short-circuit the mobilization process. Adjusting 
community definitions and authorities’ perceptions, the emergence 
o f a strong opposition, evolving Klan strategy, leadership transition, 
heightened governmental effectiveness, and the rise and decline of 
local tensions constantly interacted upon joining motivation. The 
roles o f the variables merged in this continuous interplay, making 
measurement o f their relative importance difficult. Relationships 
may therefore be suggested but, in the absence of sufficient qualita­
tive and quantitative evidence, not conclusively demonstrated.
Ill
Who joined the Ku Klux Klan in Colorado? Were Klansmen the 
stereotypic “marginal men” o f American society? Was the Klan a 
movement o f a particular social and economic class? Colorado ex­
amples indicate that the Klan’s membership was highly diversified. 
Except for the elite, Klansmen were drawn from all sections of the 
socioeconomic class spectrum. Modifications in recruiting methods 
and issue salience enabled any white Protestant, regardless of back­
ground, to find a home in the Invisible Empire. Denver’s early 
joiners were, as a group, prominent men holding high-status oc­
cupations and multiple fraternal memberships. The later appear-
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ance in the klavern of men more representative of the outer society 
did not cause mass defections of early members. The later joiners 
were considered neither intruders nor subordinates. The two join­
ing blocs were not uniform; diversity existed between and also 
within them. Both groups had sizable shares o f urban newcomers 
and life-long residents. Early joiners, as a whole, lived in their com­
munity for longer periods, yet more than one-fourth resided in 
Denver three years or less; over one-third, six years or less. At the 
same time, 41 percent of the late joiners were recent migrants and 
20 percent long-time residents. Similarly, two-thirds of the late 
joiners labored in lower middle and working-class occupations while 
one-fifth held high or middle nonmanual jobs. Early joiner occupa­
tional figures were: 5 1.5  percent employed in the high-status oc­
cupations and 37 percent in the lower occupational divisions. Late 
joiners were not shunned but welcomed as Klan voters and allies in 
internal factional battles. What disharmony did exist was more a 
product of conflicting issue interests than differing economic status. 
In addition, discord had little time to develop in the short period 
between the opening o f the membership rolls and the Minute Men 
split. Common generational and life experiences also seemed to 
lessen socioeconomic disparities. Denver Klansmen were married 
and middle-aged. A large majority were born on farms or in the 
small towns o f Colorado and the east and west north-central states. 
All but a fraction had escaped service in World War I and were per­
haps seeking a patriotic substitute in the 1920s.
Fremont County’s “visible” Klansmen also demonstrated a ten­
dency to cluster at both extremes o f the length o f residence con­
tinuum. Twenty-five percent of the knights had lived in the commu­
nity three years or less, as opposed to 19.5 percent, eighteen years or 
more. Like Denver’s early joiners, members with high and middle 
nonmanual occupations dominated their Klan’s occupational struc­
ture. Still, one-fourth of the men were occupationally lower middle 
or working class. Although older and more rural in background, the 
Klansmen of Fremont County did resemble their Denver comrades 
as to regions o f birth, military service, and marital status. ;
Table 8 is a compilation o f available occupational information 
for Klansmen in five American klaverns. Data for Aurora, Illinois 
(1920 population 36,397), Knox County (113,000), and Winchester, 
Illinois (1,540), were obtained from Kenneth Jackson’s The Ku Klux 
Klan in the City and resorted into the occupational categories used in 
this study. A list of Chicago Klansmen was excluded because of its
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Table 8. O ccupational D istribution o f Selected Klaverns by Percent
Occupational Denver
Status Fremont Knox County
Group County Early Late Total Aurora (Knoxville) Winchester
High nonmanual 11 .0 15-5 3 7.6 19 8.5 12
Middle nonmanual 39-5 36.0 18 25.0 30 12.0 46
Low nonmanual 7.0 20.3 24 22.6 25 15 .1 9
Skilled 8.5 8.5 19 I5.O 5 26.6 8
Semiskilled and service 8.0 7-5 17 i 3-6 14 30.0 7
Unskilled l -5 •5 7 4.4 7 7-8 18
Retired i -5 - - - - - -
Unknown 23.0 1 1 . 7 12 11 .8 - - -
Total 200 375 583 958 73 399 180
source: Tables 5 and 7; Jackson, Klan in the City, 62, 119, 120.
unreliability. Unfortunately, it is uncertain whether the occupations 
cited for these Aurora, Knox County, and Winchester Klansmen are 
representative o f their entire klavern’s membership.
Farmers and small businessmen combined with the professional 
class to numerically dominate the smaller Fremont County, Aurora, 
and Winchester Klans. Klansmen in the high and middle non­
manual status groups also ruled the occupational structure o f the 
Denver early joiner sample. Most of these knights were not of the 
“ struggling businessman” or “advertising chiropractor” variety. 
Conversely, lower middle and working-class membership in the 
Denver late joiner group and in the Knox County Klan stood at 67 
percent and 79.5 percent respectively. The Denver Klan’s recruit­
ment o f the occupationally less prestigious late joiners had lowered 
the organization’s level o f economic status. When the Denver sam­
ples are joined, one-third o f the Klansmen held occupations in the 
high and middle nonmanual range while 55.6 percent were em­
ployed in jobs below that line. In no Klan other than Winchester No. 
72 did the unskilled comprise more than 8 percent o f the member­
ship. On another level, every Klan but Knox County No. 14 con­
tained a white-collar population o f 45 percent or more.
While small-town Klansmen may have been socially and eco­
nomically respectable, simple counting substantiates the notion o f a 
lower middle—working class movement. O f the 1 ,810 men listed
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above, two-thirds labored in occupations below middle nonmanual. 
Despite appearances, the statistics do not support a clean urban- 
rural dichotomy. Closer examination of the Denver case suggests 
significant qualifications. When Denver late and early joiners are 
combined and the unknowns are excluded, the men in the higher- 
status occupations are outnumbered almost two to one. The lower- 
status groups’ advantage existed, however, because Denver’s econ­
omy generated more clerical and blue-collar jobs and not as a result 
of special appeals to the occupationally marginal types or a worker’s 
alleged greater propensity to join a social movement. Perhaps the 
situation was similar in Knox County.
Denver Klan membership reflected the outside environment. 
The economic makeup of the late joiners, except in the unskilled 
category, closely approximated the city’s wider occupational struc­
ture. The cross-sectional pattern is warped when early and late 
joiner blocs are considered as a unit, since the original members 
were a select body recruited through exclusive professional, busi­
ness, and fraternal links. I f  the occupational characteristics of the 
total membership are compared to the Denver distribution, the high 
and middle nonmanual categories are overrepresented, the low 
nonmanual division equivalent, and all blue-collar groups under­
represented in Klan ranks. In other words, the Denver Klan drew a 
greater share of the upper economic groups than appeared in the 
outer society. Most slighted were the unskilled workers.
Denver and Pueblo Klan leaders were remarkably alike in oc­
cupational and social status. Three-fourths of the men were em­
ployed in high or middle nonmanual occupations with only a hand­
ful wearing blue collars. Residing an average of more than fourteen 
years in their communities, many were fraternally well connected 
and almost all were married. Their mean age was over forty years 
with Pueblo men slightly older tljan the Denverites. Marital status 
was the only characteristic they shared with their Colorado Springs 
counterparts. Only one-third of the leaders of Pikes Peak Klan No.
11 were employed in high or middle nonmanual positions while 
one-third labored in manual jobs. These men had also lived in their 
city for shorter periods, a mean of 8.6 years. There were no signifi­
cant differences between the Denver leadership and the socially and 
economically comparable early joiners in terms of place or length of 
residence, age, occupational status, and fraternal memberships. 
Like the early joiners, the leaders tended to hold higher-status jobs 
and affiliate with more lodges than did the late joiners. Fremont
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County’s “visible” Klansmen were older and had resided in their 
community shorter periods, but scored similarly on the other 
variables.
Diversity is as much the key to understanding Klan member­
ship as it was to interpreting the Klan appeal. Prominent men led 
and held together a heterogeneous membership attracted from al­
most every stratum of the society. The Colorado Klan was not an 
economic movement or a spokesman for the socially deprived. The 
Denver case demonstrated that, excluding the elite and unskilled la­
borers, the Klan rank and file was an occupational cross-section of 
the local community. Distortions of this pattern were often the prod­
uct of defections, recruiting bias, a socioeconomically skewed Klan 
leadership or opposition, and unrepresentative samples.
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The Klan’s attempt to tighten the Protestant grip on state gov­
ernment was the beginning of the Colorado realm’s end. Klan lead­
ers quickly discovered that the skills required to conduct a successful 
election campaign were not the same as those needed to steer a pro­
gram through the legislature. Outmaneuvered at every turn by ex­
perienced politicians, the Klan amateurs were unable to prevent the 
emasculation of their plans. The Klan’s proposals to eliminate state 
boards and agencies antagonized government bureaucrats who then 
refused to execute the governor’s orders. As a result, Klansmen 
were left commanding the symbols but not the essence of powrer.
Legislative impotence was a Klan experience nationally. Klans­
men in California, Kansas, Maine, Ohio, and Tennessee scored im­
pressive electoral gains yet suffered governmental frustration. Elec­
tion day had cleared the barricades but had not opened the road to 
power. Often the Klan commitments of office seekers were rooted in 
votes rather than ideology. Once elected, these politicians ignored 
their hooded supporters and refused to follow the Klan line. Bu­
reaucrats viewed Klansmen not as Republicans or Democrats but 
as usurpers who only temporarily held the reins of government. 
Owing no loyalty to the political upstarts, they quietly smothered of­
fensive Klan demands under a blanket of red tape. The inexperi­
ence of Klan political newcomers further dulled the hooded impact. 
Internal dissension was another cause of Klan failure. In Indiana, 
the only realm to match the Colorado organization’s political influ­
ence, factional disputes between hooded legislative blocs enabled 
opponents to mutilate the Klan package. Unprepared for crushing
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legislative defeat so soon after sweeping electoral success, Klansmen 
began the questioning which would gradually erode their ties to the 
Invisible Empire.
The variables that affected Klan growth also operated in its de­
cline. In each community shifts in issue salience, governmental re­
sponsiveness, Klan leadership, and local perceptions interacted to 
diminish resources and force the secret society into retreat. The 
Klan grew in an emotionally charged atmosphere filled with unre­
strained, larger than life villains. Government officials seemed un­
able or unwilling to cope with the lawbreakers, Catholics, Jews, and 
blacks bent upon undermining white Anglo-Saxon Protestant he­
gemony. By the mid-1920s the dangers had passed or never ap­
peared. Crime waves had declined in severity and became less 
threatening. Jews and Catholics had not organized to take over the 
government. The black thrust was more symbolic than real and was 
easily blunted. The hooded vehicle had outlived its usefulness and 
was no longer necessary or relevant. Success proved as debilitating 
as the absence of enemies. Klan officials had curbed crime in Pueblo 
and initiated reforms in Canon City, thus completely or at least par­
tially stripping their organization of purpose.
Others lost interest because they considered their Klan experi­
ence a betrayal. Despite promises to clean up Denver, the Klan po­
lice force was riddled with corruption. Although in control of the 
governor’s office and the lower house of the state legislature, the 
Klan could not rid the capital of Catholics and Jews. Domination of 
Grand Junction’s city hall produced only abuses of power and public 
antagonism. The governmental responsiveness variable could thus 
reverse in several directions. It could work to the organization’s det­
riment whether Klansmen in the government succeeded or failed in 
restoring responsiveness. Nonmembers or anti-Klansmen could also 
cause the variable to function negatively by making government 
more amenable to local needs. Some “true believers” would not have 
been satisfied until the Klan had torn down convent walls and 
herded the Jews into ghettoes. A few felt that the Klan had lured 
them by cynically manipulating imaginary fears. Those tuned to 
non-issue appeals were similarly disillusioned. Instead of fraternity 
and spiritual regeneration, the Klan furnished its members a num­
ber and a place in a crowd of anonymous milling men. What had 
been mysterious and exciting in 1924 became banal and inane in
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1926. Their needs met or thwarted, men withdrew their loyalty, 
time, money, and votes, and the coalition crumbled.
Klan leaders could not stop their organization’s slide. While 
often the same men who had nursed the Klan through its formative 
years, they could not find the means to later survival. Officers were 
unable to refocus the Klan program, and it lagged behind events. 
Political defeat, judgment errors, and disaffected rivals discredited 
and drained them of their influence. Election blunders weakened 
the Colorado Springs leadership and immorality destroyed the Ex­
alted Cyclops of Grand Junction. Fred Arnold fell victim to disease 
and John Locke to hubris and an alliance of powerful foes. Leader­
ship failure further tarnished the organization’s reputation as it left 
the rank and file without direction.
Methodical campaigning helped turn Colorado Springs and 
Canon City against the hooded order. Anti-Klan sentiment could 
also, as in Grand Junction, crystalize without a formal effort. Re­
gardless of the means, public hostility initially mutilated the Klan’s 
image for potential recruits, thus cutting off growth. Friends’ and 
neighbors’ antagonism then robbed the Klan of its political and 
economic sympathizers, the men and women needed to secure 
power for a minority movement. Later, ostracized and impotent, 
Klansmen gradually found membership supports insufficient to sus­
tain enthusiasm.
Except for a brief interval in 1928, interest faded and the Klan 
disappeared into the back pages of Colorado’s newspapers. The 
Klan attempted to funnel anti—Al Smith sentiment into a renewed 
membership drive, but its disgrace was too fresh in the public mind. 
Besides, there were far more interesting topics in the “ballyhoo 
years” : Would Lindbergh arrive safely in Paris? What would the new 
Ford automobile look like? What was the price of a common share of 
American Can?
v . . .  . . ■
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Did the Klan attract more men in the nation’s small towns than 
in its metropolitan areas? Did urban klaverns dominate realm deci­
sion-making? Were Klan leaders and newspapers products of the 
small town or the city? Both sides in the debate concerning the 
Klan’s small-town or urban nature can find support in the Colorado 
realm. Denver, while containing only one-fourth of the state’s popu­
lation, recruited at least half of the organization's knights. Grand
180
The Klan as a Social Movement
Dragon John Galen Locke had spent his entire adult life in large cit­
ies. Many state leaders as well as the Klan’s 1924 candidates for gov­
ernor and U.S. senator resided in Denver. Conversely, the Minute 
Men split ended the Queen City’s primacy, and Fred Arnold and his 
staff operated from a small town. Of Colorado’s four Klan news­
papers, only one, the Protestant Herald of Denver, was published in a 
city of more than 11,000 people. Although only a handful of issues 
are extant, all of the newspapers seemed to share a fascination with 
homilies and local social gossip, hardly characteristic of an urban en­
vironment. Even the news stories were written in a folksy style.9
The Klan adapted to Colorado’s cities and towns regardless of 
population, minority presence, rate of growth, or economic base. 
The mobilization variables, rather than physical or demographic 
features, determined the degree of Klan success. While there were 
more Klansmen in the cities, small-town knights recruited a higher 
percentage of their communities and exercised greater influence in 
local affairs. Small-town and big-city Klan behavior was indistin­
guishable. Denver Klansmen were as likely as their Canon City 
counterparts to stage parades, conduct charity drives, or burn 
crosses to threaten enemies. Outdoor initiations and barbecues were 
as well attended in the city as in the small town. Politics infected al­
most all klaverns equally. At least in Colorado, the urban-rural 
dichotomy proved useless as a guide to understanding the secret 
society.10
VII
Kleagles attempted to revive the Colorado Ku Klux Klan dur­
ing the 1930s. Their recruiting efforts, however, failed to net many 
new men or excite former members. Coloradans watched the last 
cross burn in 1940. Thirty-six years later, at a time of racial unrest 
precipitated by court-ordered school busing, the Klan was resur­
rected in Denver. “Grand Wizard” Jerry Dutton of Louisiana was 
looking for men who would work for the expatriation of blacks and 
fight the international Jewish conspiracy. As in 1922, Denver’s dis­
trict attorney reacted to the intrusion by assigning an investigator to 
scrutinize the organization’s moves. “ I’m concerned,” said Dale 
Tooley, “about the lack of official response to the Klan in this com­
munity. . . .” M Also reminiscent of the 1920s was the Anti-Defama­
tion League’s decision to repulse the Klan by ignoring it. Dutton’s 
task would be vastly more difficult than was John Galen Locke’s, yet
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The religious aspects o f the Ku Klux Klan have Jed historians to inves­
tigate the relationship between organized Protestantism and the hooded 
order. Ministers and church members may havejoined the Klan as individu­
als, but what were the views of the Protestant establishment? Studies on the 
national level have produced no evidence of outright Klan-church collu­
sion. For example, Robert Moats Miller’s survey of the church press, min­
utes of national denominational conventions, and the opinions of promi­
nent clergymen failed to detect support for the Klan. Unfortunately, few 
state-level studies consider the question in detail. One exception, an exam­
ination o f the Mississippi Klan, uncovered a general pattern of “passive re­
sistance” and an absence o f formal ties between church and Klan.'
In Colorado most state Protestant organizations remained neutral and 
observed Klan-engendered prejudice and tensions in silence. The Northern 
Baptist church, with 24,000 members, did not shy from controversial issues 
during the 1920s. Its state conventions adopted resolutions demanding 
strict prohibition enforcement, favoring America’s entrance into the World 
Court, and censuring Charles Darwin’s theory o f evolution. The Baptists 
never raised the Klan question in convention, and they did not oust leading 
Klansmen from posts in the church hierarchy. The church’s executive com­
mittee did, however, refuse in 1924 to financially support a supply minister 
who neglected his religious duties because of Klan commitments. The Colo­
rado Baptist Bulletin also kept silent about the Klan, but a flurry of anti-Cath­
olic articles in late 1926 gave some indication of its sentiments. The leaders 
of Colorado’s 27,000 Presbyterians were too busy fighting polygamy and de­
fending the sabbath to heed the Klan danger. The Methodists, the state’s 
largest Protestant denomination with nearly 47,000 members, were the first 
to consider the Klan problem. In 1923 the state conference passed a vaguely 
worded resolution which condemned “private law enforcement” without 
specifically naming the Ku Klux Klan. During the same conference the Lay 
Association of the Colorado Methodist Church approved a similar resolu­
tion but rebuked the Klan directly. Apparently satisfied with their mild rep-
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rimand, the Methodists avoided the subject at later meetings. Both the Con- 
gregationalists and Episcopalians delayed their denunciations of the Klan 
until 1925. Only the fundamentalist Pillar o f Fire Church, with con­
gregations in Denver and Colorado Springs, gave its official support to the 
harbingers o f the “new reformation/’2
The Invisible Empire rose to power with the aid o f ministers from ail 
denominations who turned their churches into Klan sanctuaries and re­
cruiting camps. These ministers served the realm at all leadership levels and 
willingly bestowed their benedictions upon the fiery cross. They welcomed 
delegations o f Klansmen and eagerly accepted their donations. They gave 
the Klan its aura o f religious respectability. The activities o f clergymen in 
urban and rural parishes thus assumed far greater weight than the belated 
and ineffective resolutions o f the state conventions. On the local level in 
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o f Occupations: A Problem in Vocational Guidance,” School Review, 
x x x i i i  (Jan., 1925), 16 —27; Albert J . Reiss, Jr., Occupations and Social 
Status (New York, 1961); Stephan Thernstrom, The Other Bostonians: 
Poverty and Progress in the American Metropolis, i8 8 o - ig jo  (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1973). See Appendix A for a breakdown o f status groups by oc­
cupation. Occupational mobility is considered to be any movement 
from one status group to another
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reporter Lee Casey the Klan’s Roster o f Members and Membership Ap­
plications Book. Casey subsequently donated the material to the State 
Historical Society o f Colorado where it remained closed to researchers 
until 1975. The men listed in the membership roster bear numbers 
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passim, 82, 85, 87, 92, 93, 9 7 ­
100, 1 0 3 - 1 3 ,  1 1 5 ,  1 1 7 ,  12 1 ,
123,  129, 137 ,  14 1 ,  147, *49>
150, 164, 166, 1 8 0 - 8 1 ;  early 
Klan activities, 3, 5, 1 3 - 1 4 ,  
1 6 - 1 7 ;  Klan appeals, 9 - 1 0 ,  
1 3 - 1 4 ,  1 9 - 2 9 , 4 2 - 4 3 ,  1 6 6 - 6 7 ;  
Klan recruiting, 12, 13, 14, 
1 6 - 1 7 ,  21,  23, 2 7 - 2 8 ,  30, 38,
4 2 - 4 3 ,  46, 47, 9 7 - 9 8 ;  economy, 
13;  population, 13; Klan opposi­
tion, 14, 1 7 - 1 9 ,  29, 3 2 - 3 4 ,  
7 5 - 7 6 ,  78, Bo, 9 3 - 9 4 ,  98, 172;  
Klan membership figures, 14,
29, 38, 108; Klan leaders, 1 4 ­
16, 2 8 - 2 9 ,  3 5 “ 37> 46-4 7>  48, 
55, 64, 65, 97, 170, 1 7 7 - 7 8 ;
Klan meeting places, 19; crime 
conditions, 1 9 - 2 2 ;  cross burn­
ings, 25, 3 1 ,  35, 1 1 4 ,  167; may­
oral election, 1923, 2 9 - 3 0 ;  Klan 
and judicial system, 30, 1 1 2 ;  
Klan and city government, 
3 0 - 3 3 ;  boycotts, 3 1 ,  167; vio­
lence, 3 1 - 3 2 ,  9 8 —99; mayoral 
recall election, 1924, 3 2 - 3 5 ,
69; Klan membership, 3 7 - 4 8 ,  
1 3 3 - 35> 1 7 4 - 7 8 ;  primary elec­
tion, 1 9 24 , 72-73- 74. 75_ 76>
77, 78; general election, 1924, 
8 0 - 8 1 ,  82; Klan parade, 87,
1 14 ;  Klan decline, 96 —97, 9 8 ­
100, 1 0 4 -9 ,  1 1 3 _ 1 4» 1 1 6 —17, 
179; Klan dissension, 96, 98 ­
100, 1 0 4 -8 ,  1 14 ;  Klan corrup­
tion, 99, 100; school board elec­
tion, 103; municipal elections,
1925, 1 0 3 —4; Minute Men, 
1 0 7 - 1 2 ;  municipal election,
1927, 1 1 4 ;  primary election,
1926, 137 , 140, 1 4 1 —42; revival 
of Klan, 1 8 1 —82. See also Cotton 
Mills Stadium; Knights of the 
Ku Klux Klan; Police; Stapleton, 
Benjamin F.
Denver Athletic Club, 36, 41
Denver Catholic Register, 18, 22, 3 1,
109
Denver Club, 36, 41
Denver Country Club, 36, 41  
Denver Democrat, 34  
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sembly, 33  
Denver Doers Club, 13  
Denver Express, 37, 76, 142; op­
poses Klan, 14, 18, 33, 9 9 - 10 0 ;  
on crime, 19; supports Staple­
ton, 29; boycotted by Klan, 31  
Denver Jewish News, 18, 24 
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Denver Labor County Central 
Committee, 29, 33, 34  
Denver Ministerial Alliance, 34  
Denver Post, 14, 34, 73, 82, 104,
142; on crime, 7, 20, 21;  on 
Klan, 18, 33, 76, 78; supports 
Stapleton, 29 
Denver Star, 25
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Detroit, Mich., x, 4 
DeVore, A. P., 65, 93  
Dickinson, John, 87 
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Dolores Star, 155  
Drake, Martin, 100 
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Durango, Colo., 1 1 0  
Dutton, Jerry, 1 8 1 - 8 2
East Canon, Colo., 119 ,  120, 144, 
147
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El Paso Club, 58  
El Paso County, Colo., 1 3 7 —38; 
primary election, 1924, 72, 77; 
primary election, 1926, 142. See 
also Colorado Springs 
Elections: Denver mayoral, 1923,  
2 9 - 3 0 ;  Denver mayoral recall, 
3 2 —35, 69; Colorado Springs 
municipal, 1925, 100—1, 17 1  — 
72; Colorado Springs school 
board, 1925, 1 0 1 —3; Colorado 
primary, 1924, 6 9 - 7 8 ,  125,  
2047134; Colorado general,
1924, 78-83, 125, 205^ 2 ; 
school board, 1925, 103; Denver 
municipal, 1925, 103; Denver
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1 2 5 - 2 7 ;  Canon City general,
1924, 1 2 7 —28; Florence munici­
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nicipal, 1925, 129; South Canon 
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City school board, 1925, 130; 
Colorado primary, 1926, 1 3 6 — 
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County, 1 9 2 8 - 3 2 ,  1 4 6 - 4 7 ;  
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1928, 147; East Canon munici­
pal, 1928, 147; Florence munici­
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1924? 154; Grand Junction mu­
nicipal, 1925, 1 5 6 - 5 7 ;  Mesa 
County, 1926, 142, 16 1 ;  Grand 
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See also Knights of the Ku Klux 
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Elks Club, 31 ,  36, 4 1 ,  l a i ,  133  
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1 1 3 ,  145, 146. See also Locke, 
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Klux Klan, relations with na­
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Florence, Colo., 72, 119 ,  120, 121,
126, 129, 1 3 6 —47 passim; cross 
burning, 125 ;  Klan parade, 125;  
Klan membership, 1 3 2 —35,  
!75-78 
Florence Paradox, 72, 143, 147  
Fort Collins, Colo., 8, 81, 92, 110  
Fort Morgan, Colo., 74
Fountain, Colo., 56 
Foster, J .  W., 13 1 ,  136  
Fraternalism: as Klan appeal, 26—
27, 54, 108, 150, 152, 162, 167 
Fraternal orders: and Klan, 36, 41,  
5 3 > 64, 1 3 1 ,  134. See also individ­
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Fremont County, Colo., 119 ;  elec­
tions, 72, 75, 78, 80, 81, 82, 
1 2 5 - 2 8 ,  1 4 0 - 4 1 ,  1 4 2 - 4 4 ,  
1 4 6 - 4 7 ;  Klan opposition, 75,
80; Klan membership figures, 
132 ;  Klan membership, 1 3 2 —35, 
1 7 5 ~ 7 8 ;  Industrial Workers of  
the World, 165. See also Canon 
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Frost, Stanley, ix—x 
Fruedenthal, Simon, 87 
Fuller, Edgar I., 12 
Fulton, Charles A., 52
Garden of the Gods, Colo., 55  
Gash, Ward, 17  
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Giddings, Ralph O., 103  
Ginsberg, Charles, 18, 71  
Given, Warren R., 2 1 - 2 2  
Glasson, Clifford, 123, 142  
Globeville, 43, 1947153 
Grace, Walter, 22, 23  
Grady, J .  Arthur, 1 1 6  
Graham, Royal, 82 ,
Graham, W. J., 102 
Grand Junction, Colo., xi, 5, 144, 
1 4 9 - 6 2 ;  primary election, 1924, 
7 1 * 7 4 > 7 5 > 7 7 _ 7 8 ; Klan parade, 
74, 154, 158; Klan rejects Min­
ute Men, 1 1 3 ;  Klan opposition,
138, 156, 1 5 7 - 6 1 ,  172, 180; pri­
mary election, 1926, 14 1 ,  161;  
Klan appeal, 1 4 9 - 5 0 ,  1 5 2 - 5 3 ,  
1 5 4 — 55, l60 — 6 l,  l62, 167; 
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15 ° —5 1 ’) moral problems, 15 1  — 
52, 157 ;  crime, 15 1 ,  152, 157;  
Klan leaders, 152, 156, 160—61,
170, 180; elite domination of  
Klan, 1 5 2 - 5 3 ,  156, 162, 168, 
172; cross burning, 154; Klan 
recruiting, 1 5 3 - 55 , l 57> Klan
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and city government, 157-6 0 ; 
violence, 159, 160; Klan decline,
159—61; Klan corruption, 159, 
16 1; shift in Klan program,
160—61; municipal election,
1927, 16 1. See also Mesa County
Grand Junction Daily Sentinel, 1 5 1 ­
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157- 58. 159. 16 °. 161 
Greeley, Colo., 5, 74, 75, 81, 110 , 
1 1 3 . 137
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Grigsby, Joseph, 90 
Gross, George, 17 
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5 2 -5 3 . 78. 10 2 -3  
Hardy, Guy U., 12 1, 123, 127, 128,
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Harper, Hugh, 50, 5 1, 102 
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Hawkins, E. S., 8g 
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Hays, Will H., 71 
Hershey, Reuben, 30 
Higham, John, viii 
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Hollenbeck, A. T., 93 
Holmes, Clarence, 25 
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Hornbein, Philip, 18, 33, 13 1 
Howbert, F. C., 14, 98, 112 , 137
Immigrants, vii, 9—10, 155, 164, 
166, 169; in Denver, 13, 24—25; 
in Colorado Springs, 50; in 
Pueblo, 60—61; and crime, 
6 1-6 2 , 66; in Fremont County, 
119 , 132, 146; in Mesa County, 
150, 152, 153 .
Indiana, xi, 4, 178 
Industrial Workers of the World, 
146-47, 165
Italian-American Social Club, 29 
Italians: in Denver, 24 -25, 43; in 
Pueblo, 6 1—62; in Walsenburg, 
66; in Fremont County, 119
Jackson, Kenneth, ix, x, 43, 175 ­
76
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Jewell, James F., 5 1 —52 
Jews, vii, 10, 16, 50, 57, 60, 84, 90, 
92, 119 , 122, 150, 152, 164, 165, 
169, 179; in Denver, 9, 18, 24,
25, 30, 3 1, 34, 108, 109, 181 
Johnson, Irving Peale, 90 
Johnson, J . E., 94 
Junior Ku Klux Klan, 28
Kansas, 178 
Kelley, Thomas, 31 
Kelly, Frank, 87 -
Kennedy, Leo, 3, 5, 23 
Kit Carson County, Colo., 71 
Knight Templars, 36, 41, 123 
Knights of Abraham Lincoln, 22 
Knights of Columbus, 8, 22, 3 1, 
3 4 ,5 3 ,12 0 ,14 7  
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan: 
appeals, vii, 5, 7 — 10, 1 3 —14,
19 -2 9 , 42- 43. 5 i. 53- 54. 
5 9 -6 0 ,6 1-6 3 ,6 6 , 118 , 1 19 -2 2 ,
124, 127, 128, 135, 146, 148, 
149-50, 15 2 -5 3 , 154 -55 .
160—61, 162, 164-70 ; member­
ship figures, vii, xi, 4—5, 14, 19, 
29. 38> 49. 57. 59. 60, 69, 108, 
119 , 132, 154, 180; Reconstruc­
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WoTTcTWar II, vii, 18 1-8 2 ; and 
scholars, viii-xii, 16 3—66; as a 
rural movement, viii-ix, 180­
81; and Depression of 1921, 
viii—ix, 164; and World War I, 
viii-xi, 16 4-65 ; as an urban 
movement, ix, 180—81; and 
marginal men, x, 4 2-43, 64,
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7. 2 1, 29 -30 , 3 2 -3 5 , 38, 57, 
68-83, 100-4 , 114 , 1 15 , 12 5 ­
28, 129, 136 -44 , 168, 169—70;
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23, 27-28 , 3 0 -3 1 ,  3 8 ,4 1 -5 3  
passim, 63, 69, 97-98, 119 , 123, 
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145, 146, 19 9 m 2; opposition,
14, 17 - 19 ,  2 9 ,32 -34 ,4 9 ,
50-5 3 . 56- 59. 64, 67, 75-76, 
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1 1 5 —16, 128, 144, 147—48, 
157 -6 0 , 168, 169, 178 -79 ; and 
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208716; boycotts, 3 1, 130, 167, 
168; violence, 3 1 —32, 98—99, 
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Ku Klux Klan
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The Ku Klux Klan in the City, 43, _ 
175
Labor, organized, 29, 3 3 , 3 4 - 3 5 ; 
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Denver, 14 - 16 , 28 — 29, 3 5 - 3 7 , 
46-47, 48, 55 , 64, 65, 170,
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57, 58, 64, 17 7 -7 8 , 180; com­
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Klux Klan; Leadership, Klan
Logan County, Colo., 77 ~ 
Long, Martha, 89, 142 
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The Menace, 2 2 
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New York, 4
Nicholson, Samuel D., 69 
Night Riders, 22, 23 
Norlin, George, 90
Oak Creek, Colo., 7 , 155  
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Penrose, Colo., 129, 144 
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66, 72, 82, 98, 99, 100, 102, 119 ,
1 2 3 , 1 5 2 , 1 5 7 - 5 9
Portland, Colo., 144 
Progressive party, 78, 2047140 
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59-60, 6 1—63, 67, 12 1, 167; 
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A Note on the Author
R o b e r t  A la n  G o ld b e r g  w a s  b o r n  in  N e w  Y o r k  C i t y  in  1949 
a n d  r e c e iv e d  h is  P h .D .  f r o m  th e  U n iv e r s i t y  o f  W is c o n s in -  
M a d is o n  in  1977 . W h i l e  a  g r a d u a t e  s tu d e n t  h e  w as  th e  r e ­
c ip ie n t  o f  K n a p p  a n d  F o r d  fe l lo w s h ip s .  H e  is p r e s e n t ly  a n  
a s s is ta n t  p r o f e s s o r  a t  th e  U n iv e r s i t y  o f  U t a h .  H e  h as  p u b ­
l is h e d  in  th e  Western Historical Quarterly a n d  th e  Wisconsin 
Magazine of History; th is  is h is  f ir s t  b o o k .
